Signs of a changing US approach to Iran
Recent statements by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice indicate Washington is backing away from its alarmist rhetoric about Iran.
By Dr Hooman Peimani for ISN Security Watch (20/04/05)
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice played down any nuclear threats from the two remaining members of the “axis of evil”, Iran and North Korea, in an interview with The Wall Street Journal on 14 April. In an apparent change of tone, Rice said that she had confidence in the EU’s ability to deal with Iran and in China’s ability to rein in North Korea. A less confrontational US policy towards North Korea emerged about two years ago, when North Korea opted out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and declared that it possessed nuclear weapons. As such, Pyongyang’s unambiguous declaration in December of its nuclear capability had little effect on US policy. However, considering that Washington has long expressed its concerns about Iran’s alleged nuclear-weapons program, and is determined to end it even by force, the new US tone towards Iran’s alleged nuclear program - voiced by Rice - indicates its appreciation of certain realities in maintaining an alarmist, at least in the short-run.
This diplomatic course, the ‘right course’
Speaking to The Wall Street Journal, Rice expressed confidence that the ongoing Iran-EU negotiations would ensure the non-military nature of the Iranian nuclear program, saying that this “diplomatic course” was “the right course” - although she reserved the option of referring the Iranian nuclear dossier to the UN Security Council, should the negotiations fail. Nevertheless, she said, any change of US policy in that regard would not happen before the summer, when Washington would likely assess the progress of those negotiations. While it is too early to unequivocally say that Rice’s statements represent a new US policy towards Iran, at the very least, they reflect a new US approach to the issue. Since 2001 particularly, Washington has repeatedly said Iran was reaching a point of no return in mastering the required technology for producing nuclear weapons, despite the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) statements saying there was no evidence to prove the US allegations. The US has warned of an Iranian nuclear threat based on the assumption that Tehran was pursuing a clandestine nuclear-weapons program under the guise of its legitimate non-military nuclear programs as authorized under the NPT.
Dismissing the Israeli assessment
Israel has also subscribed to this alarmist view, in an even more exaggerated way, although it has never substantiated its assessments on Iran’s alleged nuclear program. In March, for example, it warned that Iran was only six months away from acquiring the capability to produce nuclear weapons in nearly two years. During his talks in Texas with US President George Bush on 11 April, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon presented some aerial photographs meant to substantiate the March assessment. However, in a clear break with past practice, US officials publicly rejected the assessment. In her interview, Rice dismissed the photographs for providing “no new revelation”. Similarly, US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher rejected the Israeli assessment on 13 April, saying that based on US intelligence reports, Iran would not have nuclear weapons before the beginning of the next decade.
The Iraq factor
Certain factors may have contributed to the changing US approach. One is the worsening security situation in Iraq. The US needs Iran’s cooperation to help stabilize its neighbor. Tehran can use its influence in Iraq to consolidate the new Iraqi regime and weaken the Sunni-led armed violence against the US-led occupation forces. Alternatively, if backed into a corner, Tehran could help expand that violence by backing Sunni militants and, more dangerously, opening a second front against the US-led forces through the Iraqi Shi’ites, who are also disillusioned with the continued occupation of their country, though pleased about their expanding role in the post-Saddam Hussein government. The re-emergence of radical Shi’ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi Army symbolically reflects the potential of Shi’ite radicalism that Iran could use to its benefit. About a year ago, the extremist Shi’ite clergy turned the Shi’ite strongholds of Najaf and Kerbala into a battleground against US forces for a few weeks before mediation by Iraqi Shi’ite religious leader Ayatollah Ali Sistani and Iran ended the fighting.
The Afghanistan factor
Another factor is the (less-publicized) deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. Iran has influence in this neighboring country, where the US-led coalition has failed to uproot the remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaida. Iranian assistance to al-Qaida seems unlikely, given the group’s hostile policy towards Iran when the Taliban was in power. However, it can certainly help many dissatisfied Afghan warlords with ties to Iran to challenge the Kabul government and its backer, the US-led coalition.
Military tied up
Yet another factor is the infeasibility of a military option for Washington. A surgical aerial attack by the US or Israeli to destroy Iran’s capability to embark on any type of nuclear program is not feasible, experts believe. Iran’s nuclear facilities are scattered all over the country to remove the possibility of their simultaneous destruction by such attack. Moreover, all the facilities are well-protected by air defense units, while many of them are buried underground to withstand air strikes. A US invasion to occupy Iran, to change its government, and to dismantle its alleged nuclear-weapons program is likewise not a realistic scenario. Apart from an apparent lack of enthusiasm among the US public for such a war, the over-stretched US military does not have enough forces for a full-scale invasion of Iran, while it is facing ever-expanding wars of attrition in Iraq and Afghanistan. A rapid Iraq-like victory in Iran is highly unlikely because of the significant differences between the two countries. Iran is geographically three times larger than Iraq (1.7 million square kilometers), as is its population (70 million), and it has significant military capabilities and a strong sense of nationalism among its people, which became evident during the Iran-Iraq war that lasted from 1980-1988. Additionally, should the US invade, Tehran could expand the field of combat to include the US-led coalition in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thus turn the war into a regional conflict, consuming the oil-exporting Persian Gulf and the Middle East.
Again, oil
Any war against Iran would surely push oil prices further up to damage the weak performance of many Western economies, including that of the US - another factor contributing to Washington’s apparent change in tone. Rice referred to the delicacy of negotiations with oil-rich states like Iran at a time when oil demand continues to rise.
A weak case
Yet another factor is that Washington, in the eyes of much of the world, has a weak case against Iran. It lacks evidence of any Iranian nuclear-weapons program to create grounds for referring Iran’s nuclear dossier to the UNSC, let alone to justify a military attack on the country. What is seen as a US nuclear double standard (tolerating Israel’s nuclear arsenal while seeking to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program) further weakens the case. All these factors and the fear of US domination over the oil-rich Persian Gulf have contributed to a lack of support among the US’ regional and non-regional friends who are also concerned about the possibility of a regional war.
Fear of failure
Washington also does not want to be held responsible, because of its aggressive stance towards Iran, for the failure of EU-Iran talks. So far, its negative evaluation of the EU’s diplomatic efforts, it criticism of what it calls the EU’s "soft approach" towards Tehran, and its efforts to impose harsh measures against Iran could shift some of the blame for any failure onto Washington. Washington must therefore support the ongoing talks and the efforts of its EU ally. At least officially, the US had disapproved of the EU’s policy towards Iran’s nuclear program (and in particular, disapproved of its reluctance to resort to tough measures), including referring Iran’s dossier to the UNSC, until last March, when it agreed to back EU talks with Iran. On many occasions prior to that, US officials had expressed disappointment in the EU policy - portrayed as one of appeasement - which it said could buy Iran enough time to achieve nuclear-weapons capability.
From Brussels to Washington
Although Brussels and Washington agree on the necessity of preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power, they disagree on how to achieve that goal and also on the makeup of Iran’s nuclear program. Tehran insists on its right, in accordance with the NPT, to have a full-scale nuclear fuel cycle and to mine and to enrich its own uranium for non-military purposes. The current voluntary suspension of its enrichment program is therefore only temporary and will end when the EU-Iran talks are over, regardless of the results. Consequently, a permanent end to this program - a US demand backed by some European countries - is not acceptable to Iran. Nor is it justifiable under the NPT, although Iran has raised the possibility of downsizing its nuclear enrichment, while offering measures to verify the non-military nature of the program. France, one of the three EU negotiators along with Germany and Britain, has shown interest in that formula. However, the US is still against any Iranian enrichment program, as stressed by Rice, who demanded “objective guarantees” to ensure Iran’s non-resumption of the program.
Dr Hooman Peimani is an ISN Security Watch contributor based in London. |
