So many constituencies, so many guns.
- Kurds want independence (really) AND the Kirkuk oil fields (REALLY)
- Shias (at least some of them) want an Islamic State governed by al sistani and crew in the background with Sharia laws and women relegated to second, or maybe third class citizens.
- Sunnis probably don't really want Saddam back but are frightened of the two other groups and are still wondering where their privileges and their jobs and their pensions went.
Add in the Turks, the Syrians, the Iranians, the jihadists, the secularists and modernists, the fundamentalists....
In the meantime, WE are simply going to run out of time, troops and money. I think we're going to run out of troops first AND now the fundamentalist fake Christians want women out of combat zones EXCEPT it's all a combat zone.
It's really interesting. The analysts and academics who had studied the region warned of ALL OF THESE things before the invasion. These were all well-known, well-understood problems but WITH ENOUGH TROOPS (around 500,000 or more than three times what we've had at the peak)we could have replaced Saddam's iron fist and actually done some good.
What a mess. What a predictable mess.
========== an oldie but goodie
First Afghanistan, now Iraq
By Zvi Bar'el
Haaretz- Jan 29, 2004
A religious man of about 75 with no direct contact with the American government, who publishes religious rulings on the Internet or via his emissaries, is evidently the one deciding the future of Iraq. Twice so far, the Ayatollah Ali Sistani has leveraged policy shifts by the United States, which is starting to realize that the project to export American democracy to Iraq may well end with the establishment of another traditional Islamic state in the Middle East alongside Iran and Sudan.
When the Iraq War began, Sistani gave the Americans six months to a year, during which time the nation's governance would have to be turned over to Iraqi leadership. In the interim, Sistani realigned his forces and prevented a Shi'ite war against coalition forces. He even managed to put the brakes on an attempt by the young leader Muqtedar al-Sadr to set up a private militia and take on the United States.
During the last two weeks, Sistani has demonstrated his capabilities. Tens of thousands of Shi'ites took to Iraq's streets to demonstrate against the coalition forces, provoking a threatening report by the CIA to the effect that civil war could break out in the country. After a few mass demonstrations, Sistani pulled his forces back again. The message got through all right, and the American government began hasty consultations on how best to reach an understanding with this religious leader.
The Kurds are angry
The way the American government intends to transfer rule to Iraqi hands is what's behind Sistani's protest and the demonstrations. The American approach, in Sistani's view, is not just undemocratic; it could harm Shi'ite prospects for landing the lion's share of governing control. The Americans intended to name committees in each of Iraq's 18 regions that, following consultations with notable regional figures, would choose Iraqi parliament representatives who would write the new constitution. Free elections would take place only a year later. Sistani ruled that free general elections must be held now, prior to transfer of governance at the end of June.
American explanations that free elections would be too difficult to hold during that time frame because there's no orderly list of citizens or voters did not impress Sistani. He views the American plan as a plot designed to put into office an administration of staunch U.S. supporters - at the precise historical moment so suited to establish a Shi'ite state in the Middle East.
Sistani is prepared for one compromise: If the United Nations says that holding free elections now is impossible, he'll go along with the American plan. This will be a bitter pill for U.S. President George W. Bush if he wants a reconciliation with the ayatollah for two reasons: One, it permits the UN, earlier shorn of any role in dealing with Iraq, to decide how the new regime will be chosen; second, figures faithful to the United States will not necessarily end up in the new Iraqi government. Of course, Bush can refuse Sistani's demands, but then he'll have to deal with the Sistani constituency on the street.
There's another serious wrestling match in the picture because the Kurds want a federal state; i.e. one that would give them autonomy and self-rule linked to the central government in Baghdad. This is a red flag primarily for Turkey, but also for Iran and Syria. Bush can ostensibly ignore Turkish threats that a bloodbath would ensue in Iraq if a federation is permitted. He certainly owes nothing to Iran or Syria. But now it turns out that the Shi'ites, headed by Sistani, are also not enthused any more by the federation idea.
As long as the Iraqi coalition was working in exile, the idea of a federation was the only record played for delegates at every conference. The Kurds supported the understanding arrived at before the war, and believed that the federation would give them two advantages: autonomy and a slice of the ruling pie over all of Iraq via participation in the central government. Now they fear that no one really intends to keep this agreement. The Americans don't want a Kurdish-Shi'ite confrontation or a Shi'ite-Sunni one, and the Shi'ites don't want to relinquish their prospects to rule all of Iraq, especially not when they see it as their chance to remove the Sunnis from power. Thus far, this not only has wrought bitterness among the Kurds over the American and Shi'ite betrayal, but also has created a Kurdish-Sunni coalition that either would threaten any central government, or could result in a strong Kurdish autonomy that almost would be an independent state.
Who will control the oil
About three weeks ago, the Americans still believed that neither the Kurdish nor Shi'ite threat was serious, and that an understanding could be reached that would permit elections for the American plan. The mass demonstrations proved this was illusory. The Americans, anxious to reduce their forces in Iraq, now understand they can't count on replacements from other nations and will have no option but to take another look at the principles that have guided them since their occupation of Iraq began. Therefore, for example, they've reached an "understanding" with the leaders of various Arab tribes over protecting the oil pipeline from Kirkuk to Turkey and the main road between Baghdad and Kirkuk. In both cases, the Americans intend to use local forces that are not part of the new Iraqi army or regular police forces, but something more like a militia.
Moreover, the coalition force command is now prepared to discuss involvement of Ba'ath Party leaders in the guard forces. Some of these leaders, excluded originally by U.S. civil administrator Paul Bremer from any role in the new regime, once served in Saddam Hussein's army; their exclusion has caused a public uproar. Later the Americans agreed to pay them a salary but not actually to employ them. Now it appears they'll be working in their old profession again.
This step still doesn't insure that the oil from Kirkuk will finally reach the Turkish port of Jihan. The Kurds were not enthusiastic about Arab tribesmen being assigned to guard the oil pipeline. At the outset of the war, the Kurds suggested to the Americans that they themselves should guard the pipeline as part of the ruling power they were seeking over all of Kirkuk. The Americans courteously declined this suggestion, fearing that such a step would be read as American acquiescence to Kurdish control over the sources of Iraqi oil.
Another Islamic state
Meanwhile, the Americans realized that the demand for the liberalization, not just democratization, of Iraq might also suffer from the warfare among various forces. The temporary governing council, for example, annulled the law on personal status that was passed in 1959 and was revised significantly in the 1970s. This law gave women important rights, including the ability to demand a divorce and to inherit. In annulling this law, the council, led in December by religious Shi'ite representative Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, meant the transfer of authority in matters of personal status from the civil courts to the religious courts. The upshot is a severe constriction in women's rights and a reduction in their status to a level equal to that in other Muslim countries. The United States avoided intervening in order not to come into conflict with the Shi'ite or Sunni religious leadership, and thereby put itself in the position of religious arbiter.
This legislative change is just one example of what may be expected in Iraqi jurisprudence if free elections are held as demanded by Sistani, a move the Americans appear poised to approve. Iraq could become the second traditional Islamic state engendered by the Americans after Afghanistan's adoption of a constitution based on the laws of Islam.
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