The world may be flat, but it's not one-dimensional
Power Line
Thomas Friedman exhorts the government to "shut down" Gitmo. Friedman's argument is that the world is so outraged by what is happening at Gitmo (or what reportedly is happening -- Friedman doesn't seem to worry about the distinction), that for purely public relations purposes, we must release the Gitmo detainees.
This is pretty naïve stuff. If Gitmo didn't exist (and there's not much evidence that, as portrayed by the MSM, it does) our enemies and elements of our MSM would have to invent it. Indeed, Friedman claims (without citing evidence) that 100 prisoners in the war on terror have died in U.S. custody. But none has died at Gitmo. If we were to close up shop there, our enemies and our MSM would simply shine their alleged light somewhere else. For all that Friedman shows, Gitmo is not the cause of anti-American sentiment; rather it's cartoonish depiction is the result of such sentiment.
Friedman also slides past the problems that would result from releasing al Qaeda and Taliban members. He acknowledges that some would probably take up arms against us, but responds, in effect, "so what?"
There's been a good deal of speculation about the extent to which it remains possible for the U.S. effectively to prosecute a serious and sustained war given the anti-military sentiment of many opinion-shapers and a considerable segment of the Democratic party. I've never been too worried about this. But having seen a highly respected columnist arguing that we should release enemy detainees knowing that, if we do, they will soon be back in the field trying to kill Americans, I'm less sanguine. It's also interesting to contemplate what the reaction of Friedman and others in the MSM would be if a Gitmo detainee released by the Bush administration were to participate in the next "9/11."
Beyond the benefits of simply keeping those who have taken up arms against us off the field (a justification that has always been deemed sufficient), one must also consider the benefits of obtaining information from the Gitmo detainees. Friedman seems oblivious to them. He thus aligns himself with the simple-minded left, which appears to think that we're interrogating the detainees for no reason other than sadism. The military, of course, is reluctant to discuss with specificity what it has learned from the Gitmo detainees. However, it does claim to have obtained valuable information. For example, it says we are saving lives in Iraq through knowledge gained from Gitmo detainees about al Qaeda's use of explosive devices. Such information has enabled us to engage in reverse engineering that makes the Iraqi insurgents less lethal. The military also claims to have gained valuable information from Gitmo detainees about how al Qaeda's leadership functions -- how it communicates and moves money, for example. It has also learned the details of how al Qaeda trains its fighters. One key element of the training is to complain, if captured, about "torture."
One might argue that after all of this time, there is nothing more to be learned from the Gitmo detainees. However, such an argument would misunderstand the nature of our intelligence effort in this context. In a traditional war, low-ranking soldiers know very little. But, since this enemy has an informal, catch-as-catch-can command structure, the military says it's finding that even the low-level operatives often have pieces of information that help complete the intelligence mosaic. Obtaining these pieces of the puzzle is an ongoing process because we are always finding new pieces from around the world. Moreover, unlike in the traditional "name-rank-and serial number" context, at Gitmo it is very difficult to distinguish the low-ranking and high-ranking people. Everyone starts out claiming to be a goat herder. However, as we obtain information about al Qaeda from other sources around the world, we sometimes learn much later that a Gitmo detainee previously considered of low value is actually a high-value source. At that point, we are in position to gain valuable intelligence from that source. In addition, as noted above, the information we obtain on an ongoing basis from around the world enables us to re-interrogate detainees more effectively. And that information, in turn, can enable us to hit al Qaeda elsewhere, thereby gaining intelligence from new sources which then can be used at Gitmo.
I can't quantify, or even confirm, the intelligence benefits of past and present interrogations of the Gitmo detainees. Neither can Friedman. But he might at least consider what these benefits are likely to be before proposing that we release this deadly crew. I'm reasonably certain that, coupled with keeping terrorists under lock-and-key, the benefits outweigh any gain public relations gain, which would consist of a few week hiatus while our enemies and the MSM figure out which new American "outrage" to trumpet.
UPDATE: MIchelle Malkin is disappointed that President Bush didn't defend our detention policies and practices vigorously enough at his press conference. Michelle promises to do so in her column tomorrow.
Meanwhile, my former colleagues David Rivkin and Lee Casey provide an excellent rebuttal to Friedman at NRO's corner.
nationalreview.com
powerlineblog.com
nytimes.com@Q2AQ51@Q2AjQ26Q2AgbcQ25cgQ25Q2AjQ26DQ3DcAn2Q24Q25Q5DfJ2Q3C
time.com
michellemalkin.com |
