Why Should Iran Disarm?
By Sajjad Khan
Weapons of Mass Destruction have shaped the post 9-11 debate with respect to international peace and security. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, weapons proliferation continues to occur in countries such as North Korea. However it is Iranian policy and nuclear intentions which is now the central focus of western foreign policy. Sajjad Khan argues that the nuclear bargain explicit within the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty has now broken down. If nuclear nations are not going to disarm their own arsenals, then there exists very good security reasons why Iran should not forsake her own program. The author also argues that western ‘democracies’ claim to greater legitimacy in their justification for holding WMD’s needs also to be questioned.
A crisis in the Middle East; a tyrannical Muslim country is accused of breaking international agreements regarding alleged nuclear weapons. An opposition in exile makes sensational claims, intrusive international inspections are sought and denials are repeated. Like a bad old western it has some new characters, but the plot is all too familiar. All we are waiting for is the British Government to issue a dossier and Hans Blix to emerge from retirement and the storyline will almost be complete. Yet ignoring the caricatures, it is not beyond the realms of possibility that in eighteen months time we may witness another violent conflict in the Persian Gulf; this time in Iran.
Despite the increasing entropy in Iraq and Afghanistan, since the re-election of George W. Bush there has been much discussion on what the new focus of his foreign policy will be in the next four years. The issue of Iran has risen to the top of the agenda and speculation is now ubiquitous as to how the administration will attempt to curtail the nuclear ambitions of Tehran. Though the US has until now been prepared to support the ongoing diplomatic efforts of the EU3 the tacit threat of force has led to a sense of disquiet around the world. This unease has been created by the depredation of international law and the neo-conservative vision of global foreign policy that were the hallmarks of Bush's first term. Though some consider the ascendancy of neo-conservative doctrine as an ephemeron, others consider that if the US project in Iraq proves successful it will be the start of a relentless drive for reform and realignment in the Middle East and the wider Islamic world.
It has become accepted wisdom in the West that coaxing Iran away from its nuclear fixation would help to promote regional peace and stability and bolster the integrity of international agreements. However few people in the Muslim world share these sentiments. People cite what they see as hypocritical double standards and an aggressive Western foreign policy doctrine, which seeks to maintain a de facto nuclear monopoly. This article therefore seeks to address some key issues surrounding the often one-sided debate about Iran (a country the author acknowledges has severe shortcomings) and her nuclear ambitions. Specifically it aims to answer the following:
1. What obligations does the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) place on nations? 2. Has the explicit bargain of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty, predicated on the balance of commitments between nuclear and non-nuclear nations, broken down? 3. Is Iran's acquiring of nuclear weapons really a threat to international peace and stability, or a necessary step in her building a credible deterrent? 4. Must a country be democratic in order to qualify for membership of the nuclear club?
Obligations under the NPT
Formally known as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the NPT was signed in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The treaty defined Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) as those who had manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to January 1st 1967. By this criterion the nuclear club was limited forever to the United States, UK, France, China and the Soviet Union (and its successor state Russia). By mere coincidence these same nations hold veto power as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. Most countries in the world are signatories to the NPT, however there are four important exceptions: India, Pakistan, Israel and now North Korea, which recently withdrew from the treaty. While the initial duration of the treaty was 25 years, it was extended indefinitely in 1995. As a way of obtaining an indefinite extension, the NWS agreed to a package of non-binding principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament, as well as the instigation of a five yearly review conference. In 2000, the first review set key goals and targets in its closing document, in the form of 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament. The upcoming May 2005 conference will review progress on the achievement of these goals. Most commentators believe however that despite the progress of the last thirty-five years, the NPT currently faces an unprecedented crisis. Thomas Graham, a former Special Representative of the (US) President for Arms Control, Non-proliferation and Disarmament says,
"If the possession of a nuclear arsenal retains its high political value to NPT nuclear-weapon states, particularly the United States, the ability to persuade states not to acquire these weapons may diminish. Add to that the withdrawal of North Korea from the NPT in 2003 and its likely acquisition of at least several nuclear weapons; the increasingly suspect Iranian nuclear program; and the disclosure of an illegal secret network of nuclear technology supply headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "father" of the Pakistani program; and many are saying that the NPT is broken and must be fixed or, worse, is irrelevant. Heightening these concerns about the NPT is the threat of international terrorism and the possibility that terrorists may somehow come into possession of a nuclear weapon and actually use it against a large city somewhere. The NPT regime appears fragile, and many fear for its long-term viability."
Iran's stated programme of enriching uranium, which it has agreed to suspend unilaterally, is specifically allowed under the provisions of the treaty, though of course a nuclear weapons programme would not be. Consequently while we hear a great deal from western leaders on how various nations such as Iran are violating the provisions of the NPT through unproved covert means, very little is said about their own obligations under Article VI of the aforementioned treaty. Article VI states very clearly what these obligations are,
"Each of the Parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."
Has the NPT's explicit bargain broken down?
To answer this let us review the actions of two of the NWS, namely the United States and Britain. The former is at the forefront of attempts to prevent Non Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) such as Iran from joining the nuclear club. The prospect of a nuclear Iran is one of the few issues that generates transatlantic agreement, even if tactics differ currently. Though the US would prefer a stronger diplomatic response, both sides are in agreement that Iran should not be allowed to enrich uranium to any scale or produce plutonium, at any of its known or suspected nuclear facilities. Both sides of the Atlantic continually point to Iran's signing of the NPT as justification of their strong line, but as discussed before the NPT contains an explicit bargain, placing reciprocal obligations on states like the US and the UK. Yet both these states have shown a profound lack of interest in fulfilling their Article VI obligations as their current policies and strategic intent show. As Graham puts it:
"In the view of many of the NPT non-nuclear-weapon states, however, the NPT nuclear-weapon states have not lived up to their disarmament commitments. Most importantly, the nuclear "have-nots" point to the failure by the nuclear "haves", principally the United States, to put a permanent ban on nuclear-weapon testing in place-the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was finally opened for signature in 1996, but it is unlikely to come into force in the foreseeable future-and the political value of nuclear weapons remains as high as it was during the Cold War. The US Nuclear Posture Review of 2001 explicitly contemplated the use of nuclear weapons not only against Russia and China, but also against Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Syria, and Libya-at the time, all NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. If the possession of a nuclear arsenal retains its high political value to NPT nuclear-weapon states, particularly the United States, the ability to persuade states not to acquire these weapons may diminish."
The NPT was established by the nuclear nations primarily to stop nuclear weapons from becoming freely available. However, to ensure there was an incentive for NNWS to sign the treaty, the NPT contained an important bargain. It aimed to stop the spread of nuclear weapons by brokering a deal between the NWS and the NNWS, with the former agreeing to eventual disarmament and an end to the nuclear arms race, while the latter would agree not to embark upon nuclear weapons programmes. As an extra incentive, the NWS also agreed to provide the NNWS with assistance on the research and production of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 'without discrimination'. As Graham indicates, by making little or no progress on reducing their weapons, and in fact building the use of such weapons into strategic doctrine, the NWS undermine the rationale for NNWS to abstain from starting weapons programmes.
Some western commentators argue that the five recognised nuclear states are not contravening the NPT by not instigating unilateral nuclear disarmament. They claim that there is no moral equivalence between their actions and those of Iran. Other experts in the field consider that this view serves to dent the authority of the NPT. Richard Butler, the former chief UN weapons inspector in Iraq, told a seminar in Australia in 2002 that Americans do not appreciate the level of resentment that WMD apartheid has built. "My attempts to have Americans enter into discussions about double standards have been an abject failure - even with highly educated and engaged people," Mr Butler said. He went on to say that, "I sometimes felt I was speaking to them in Martian, so deep is their inability to understand."
The foreign ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, writing in the International Herald Tribune in September 2004, also argue that the nuclear states are failing miserably in their obligations. They write,
"The non-proliferation treaty cannot be complied with à la carte. It is a legally binding agreement, which relies on a fine balance between the commitments of the five nuclear-weapon states - China, France, Russia, Britain and the United States - and those of the non nuclear-weapon states. The heart of the treaty is that the latter will not develop nuclear weapons in return for which the nuclear powers will reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear weapons. In 1995 and 2000 this bargain was further refined. In 1995, the non nuclear-weapon states agreed to the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation treaty, provided that the nuclear powers pursued nuclear disarmament and that all worked toward the entry into force of the comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. In 2000, the nuclear powers made an unequivocal undertaking to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, and all parties adopted a practical plan for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Since then, however, very little progress has been made." While America and Britain cite Article 1 of the NPT continuously to condemn Iran, they pay lip service to their own commitments under Article VI. The clearest illustration of this double standard is the US government's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Drawn up by the Pentagon and sent to the US Congress on December 31st 2001, the document does not even mention the term disarmament. The NPR clearly advocates a permanent doctrine in which the use of nuclear weapons is an inherent component; a clear violation of Article VI of the NPT. The NPR originally commissioned by Congress went way beyond the congressional mandate in the wake of the attacks of 9-11 by developing a strategic posture for the twenty-first century. The NPR establishes a new triad comprised of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear), defences (both active and passive) and a revitalised defence infrastructure to provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats. The addition of more active defences means that the US is no longer as dependent on offensive strike forces to provide deterrence as it was during the Cold War. Following the Cold War, the NPR shifts planning for America's strategic forces from the threat-based approach of the Cold War to a capabilities-based approach; a broader array of capabilities are needed to dissuade states from undertaking political, military or technological courses of action that would threaten the security of the US and her allies. The NPR contains the following elements:
1. A "new mix" of nuclear, non-nuclear and defensive capabilities "is required for the diverse set of potential adversaries and unexpected threats the United States may confront in the coming decades." (p.7)
2. US military forces themselves, including nuclear forces will now be used to "dissuade adversaries from undertaking military programs or operations that could threaten US interests or those of allies and friends." (p.9)
3. Nuclear capabilities also assure the US public that the United States will not be subject to coercion based on a false perception of US weakness among potential adversaries (p.12)
4. Nuclear weapons could be employed against targets able to withstand non-nuclear attack (for example deep underground bunkers or bio-weapon facilities). (p.12-13)
5. In setting requirements for nuclear strike capabilities, distinctions can be made among the contingencies for which the United States must be prepared. Contingencies can be categorised as immediate, potential or unexpected. North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya are among the countries that could be involved in immediate, potential or unexpected contingencies. All have longstanding hostility towards the United States and its security partners. (p.16)
6. The United States will retain an inactive stockpile of nuclear weapons. (p. 32)
7. There are several nuclear weapons options that might provide important advantages for enhancing the nation's deterrence posture; possible options are modifications to existing weapons to provide additional yield flexibility in the stockpile and improved earth penetrating weapons (EPWs) to counter the use by potential adversaries of hardened and deeply buried facilities. (p. 34-35)
8. Today's nuclear arsenal continues to reflect its Cold War origin, characterised by moderate delivery accuracy, limited earth penetrator capability, high-yield warheads, silo and sea-based ballistic missiles with multiple independent re-entry vehicles, and limited retargeting capability. New capabilities must be devoted to defeat emerging threats such as hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT), to find and attack mobile, relocatable targets, to defeat chemical or biological agents and to improve accuracy and limit collateral damage. (p. 46)
9. The United States has not conducted nuclear tests since 1992 and supports the continued observance of the testing moratorium. While the United States is making every effort to maintain the stockpile without additional nuclear testing, this may not be possible for the indefinite future. (p. 55)
Despite a stockpile of more than 10,000 nuclear warheads, the Bush administration received $6.52 billion in its FY 2005 budget for researching, expanding and upgrading nuclear capabilities - a $300m increase from the 2004 position. Yet despite this the Bush administration had wanted even more money to assist in development of two new nuclear bombs. This doctrine even led to hawkish Republicans like Rep. Joel Hefley (R-CO), a senior member of the House Armed Services Committee, who voted against funding of some programs to say "We don't need new weapons, and in fact we cause more harm than good in our relations with other countries and in our moral position on nuclear proliferation." The FY 2004 budget which was passed by Congress included the repeal of the Furse-Spratt amendment to the 1994 Defence Authorisation Act, which had banned the development of smaller, low yield warheads of five kilotons (mini nukes) of explosive force or less. Five kiloton bombs in explosive terms are about a third of the power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, a weapon that killed 240,000 people.
The NPR and the repeal of the Furse-Spratt amendment does not only ignore US disarmament commitments; it advocates several new scenarios in which nuclear weapons could be used. The NPR outlines the possible use of nuclear weapons not only against Russia and China, but also non-nuclear states such as Iran, Syria and Libya. The strategic aim of developing a new generation of low yield nuclear weapons that can be used to bomb underground facilities as a first use tactical weapon also pushes the nuclear envelope yet further. Retired Admiral Robert R Monroe writing an op-ed in the Washington Post on November 16 2004 stated that, "to have a more effective deterrent against rogue states and terrorist groups, we need a new generation of nuclear weapons".
This new US doctrine, which significantly broadens the scope for the use of nuclear weapons beyond the cold war 'last resort' stance, is a major escalation within the strategic equation. According to some scientists, the use of even small nuclear 'bunker-buster' bombs would be disastrous. The Union of Concerned Scientists stated that
"A commonly held fallacy is that an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon can penetrate deeply enough to contain all the radioactive fallout. This is not the case. The depth at which even a small nuclear weapon must be buried to ensure that it is "contained" that is, that no radiation is released when it explodes is much greater than the achievable penetration depth, so that it is impossible to prevent radioactive fallout from a nuclear EPW."
Despite Congress eliminating the modest funding requested for some of the more controversial projects in late November 2004, the Bush administration has made it clear its strategic intent will continue to be the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons in accordance with its NPR. David Smith, the chief operating officer of the National Institute for Public Policy, a conservative leaning think tank, remained undaunted after Congress's rejection and said "This will come up again and again and again."
The UK has also not taken any significant steps to eliminate its nuclear weapons (currently around 200 operational warheads), despite its obligations, refusing to decommission its own Trident submarine programme. This commitment to Trident inevitably clashes with Britain's claimed support of the NPT. Britain could also rule out plans for future nuclear weapons systems once Trident is decommissioned, but such an undertaking has not been made. Tony Blair claims that tackling weapons of mass destruction is one of the key objectives of British foreign policy, but it seems the UK's own nuclear arsenal is not part of that agenda. Iranian nuclear weapons: a threat to global peace or a legitimate deterrent?
In January 2002 in his State of the Union address, President Bush described Iraq, Iran and North Korea as an Axis of Evil. In March 2003, one member of the Axis was invaded and nearly two years later almost 150,000 US troops continue to occupy Iraq. Following this spectacle, one could argue that one rational response from Iran or North Korea would be to accelerate their nuclear weapons programmes, not for offensive intentions but rather to discourage America from future aggression. Indeed the contrasting approaches that the US has taken towards Iraq, a country whose WMD status was disputed, and North Korea, which has admitted possessing them, is revealing. While the former was invaded, the latter has been party to countless rounds of multilateral talks. This is despite the fact that the North Koreans could provide at any moment the necessary nuclear material to any non-state actor with a grudge against the United States. So why has the US not taken a military approach to Pyongyang? The answer presumably is because of fear of a North Korean nuclear reprisal, which could target South Korea, Japan or the plethora of US bases which house nearly 100,000 US troops in the region. All are within range of North Korea's nuclear weaponry.
Consequently, one doesn't have to be an expert in international relations to understand why Iran, labelled a member of the axis of evil and possible target of an attack by a nuclear Israel, would want to join the WMD premier league. Contrary to the claims of many in the West, this would not be to intimidate or actually attack states in the region and beyond, but as a reasonable defence and deterrent against future US and Israeli aggression or nuclear blackmail. This is the same rationale that was used to justify NATO possession of nuclear weapons in the Cold War when faced with the threat of the Soviet Union, despite some such as the UK Labour Party who were then calling for Britain to unilaterally disarm. The irony is that those who today support multilateral disarmament as a nuclear doctrine want Iran to unilaterally disarm in the first instance, a policy they have comprehensively rejected for themselves.
While America's nuclear posture review contemplates using nuclear weapons against Iran as well as increasing the number of scenarios in which the use of nuclear weapons would be permitted, the US expects Iran not to pursue its own programme despite pre-emption being the core of the US's National Security Strategy published in 2002; is this really a viable proposition? At the end of the first Gulf War, India's Chief of Staff was asked what lessons he had learned from observing the conflict. His revealing response was, "Don't fight the Americans without nuclear weapons."
Is it only democracies that can be trusted with nuclear weapons?
'A world without nuclear weapons would be less stable and more dangerous for all of us.'
This is not a statement of Osama bin Laden, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or Saddam Hussein. The author of the above quote was in fact former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Since nuclear weapons can act to discourage unbridled aggression, it is common to hear the argument that they actually act as guarantors of peace. However in the post-Cold War world, with a neutered Russia in place of the formidable Soviet Union, it seems that nuclear appetites have been renewed in some Western capitals. After all it was liberal democratic America that was the first to use the world's worst weapons in 1945, when there was no other nuclear power to threaten her in return. With the strategic balance heavily in her favour at present, the US feels able to contemplate a whole new range of nuclear options, involving new weapons and new uses. Furthermore, the administration opposes the ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The reality is that the United States is not interested in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction per se, but in preventing a challenge to its military domination in the post-Cold War world. This fact is evidenced by the US raising no objections against Brazil building an active fuel cycle with the aim to enrich uranium, while vociferously protesting against any attempt by Iran to do so.
In view of all this, what could or should prevent Iran from seeking to acquire a nuclear arsenal, something it can do legally by exiting the NPT with ninety days notice? It is a sovereign country, and as a sovereign country it should have the right to devote its resources to whatever it felt would most enhance its national interests. Iran surely should not have to 'meet a global test or require a permission slip' from the international community to defend her homeland. In Britain there is passionate debate on whether too much of this nation's power has been given to the EU, yet Britain has maintained its independent defence and foreign policy, and will continue to do so even under the proposed new EU constitution. It is contradictory for western states like Britain, who guard their sovereignty so jealously to insist that Iran follow international dictates without complaint.
However the position towards countries like Iran is often justified with the argument that, whatever the faults and double standards involved in nuclear proliferation issues, there is no moral equivalence between tin pot third world dictatorships and first world democracies. It is claimed that in democracies the rule of law, political accountability, a healthy civil society and a free media provide the necessary checks and balances to prevent irrational policies. As George Bush stated in his recent meeting with Tony Blair, "democracies don't fight other democracies". Many commentators echo this line; John Sheldon, of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies, wrote the following in a recent letter to The Times,
"Moral equivalency also falls down when we compare the command and control arrangements of the NPT-recognised nuclear states to Iran's. In a country where foreign policymaking is akin to reading tea leaves, we all have good reason to fear a nuclear armed Iran."
Ignoring the tea leaves gibe (to which I will return later), Sheldon's doctrine is more or less along the lines that 'no democracy equals no nukes'; a reiteration of the standard argument that a full and functioning democracy should be a pre-condition for getting the bomb. However it is hard to see how these standards apply to the regimes in Beijing and Moscow; the first is not a full democracy and the other is barely functioning. While it is the case that western democracies do not fight wars against each other any more, they have and do engage in brutal military campaigns. Democracy wasn't able to prevent mass killing in Japan, Vietnam, Algeria and modern-day Fallujah, where the use of force was disproportionate and at times involved the use of WMD. With utilitarianism as their philosophical heartbeat, the value that democracies place on human life is often prone to fluctuation and commercial Benthamite calculations. This is clearly the case in Iraq where the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom can rattle off statistics about electricity wattage, voter registration numbers, the numbers of textbooks in new schools, but have no clue about that little matter of how many Iraqi civilians have been killed since March 2003.
The principle of equality of influence forms the bedrock of democracy and yet it is not apparent in today's corporate-dominated western states. Britain went to war in Iraq not at the behest of the majority of ordinary citizens, but due to a much smaller group who believed that the war was essential in bringing political change and a new paradigm to the Middle East. In that sense, Blair's policy was no more representative, legitimate or wise than the decisions taken by the leaders in Iran. The fact that Blair can be freely criticised by opposition politicians and the free press had little effect on how the Iraq policy was formulated or how it has been implemented on the ground. Accountability to an electorate at a future election is no safeguard against an incorrect or reckless decision being carried out now, as policies such as the Iraq invasion are often irreversible and may have security consequences far sooner than any future election. From Bernie Ecclestone to Lakshmi Mittal, or Lord Sainsbury to Rupert Murdoch, it is clear that the rich and powerful have far more say in the running of Britain than the general populace. Decision-making at the highest levels in London, Washington or Paris is therefore not much more representative than it is in Tehran. Professor Honderich of UCL states the following about representation within western democracies;
"If we make an uncontroversial list of the liberal democracies, certainly including the United States and Britain, and if we then try to conceive of or understand them in a general way, we may arrive at what can be called the Ordinary Conception of them. It boils down into three propositions. The people, legitimately influenced during an election, choose representatives who promise certain policies, and afterwards the people legitimately influence the elected representatives. There is universal suffrage in the election -- one person, one vote -- and approximate equality in both the influencing of the people during the election and their subsequent influencing of the elected representatives. The society's actual policies are chosen by the representatives in accord with their promises, and the policies do take effect. The Ordinary Conception is no good. For starters there is the embarrassing electoral fact that in liberal democracies it is typically not the people who vote and thereby choose the representatives, but only about half the people. There is also the fact, partly having to do with governmental structure and perhaps a Supreme Court, that the society's actual policies can rarely be regarded as just the policies promised by the elected representatives. A third fact is that the choosing of representatives in the election is far better seen as made not by individuals, as the Ordinary Conception supposes, but by groups of individuals with a common interest -- interest-groups. "
As Ted Honderich notes, modern democracies are hierarchical and the ability to choose the policies that will be actually followed in a society is very much in the hands of a small minority, those who have most of the society's economic resources. As for elections, beyond the theatre and spectacle, he believes they are ineffective because wealthy individuals can buy their way into office via expensive advertising campaigns and because wealthy individuals form coalitions designed to promote their interests. For Honderich, hierarchical democracies are better than oligarchies and dictatorships but they still lack genuine legitimacy and need to be fundamentally transformed.
It is manifestly true that open and intellectually vibrant societies should make better decisions than societies that are less open, due to the vigorous debate that can challenge erroneous opinions and expose the facts. This should lead us to conclude that shaping public opinion in western societies, and hence winning a mandate for policy, requires a higher standard of proof than in closed, oppressive Iran. However, in a world where there has never been so much information available it is a paradox of globalisation that there is still such an unprecedented paucity of understanding and wisdom. The United States is considered as the world's most open society, yet there are still significant numbers of Americans who believe sincerely that Saddam Hussein was behind the events of 9-11 and many others who believe that WMDs were actually found in Iraq. However the intellectual malaise is not confined to ordinary citizenry.
It was also reported recently that even in the US Congress, most lawmakers do not bother to read the legislation that they are passing - neither do any of their officials or staff. Instead, more often than not, members of Congress rely on summaries prepared by the bill's authors or by special interest groups whose judgment they trust. Rep. Brian Baird, (D-Wash) writing in the Washington Post recently penned an Op-Ed titled "We Need to Read the Bills." The op-ed at first glance reads like something emanating from Michael Moore, yet it systematically, and in a serious fashion, highlights a notable gap between what most people think is a painstaking and deliberative legislative process in Congress and what actually happens. Baird's op-ed was in response to a particularly embarrassing episode, in which an anonymous individual inserted a provision into a large spending bill that was passed, allowing congressional staff to examine any individual American's income tax returns. The lack of legislative deliberation and scrutiny is not unique to the United States, as the passing of section 23 the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act illustrated in the United Kingdom. A piece of legislation which allowed the detention without trial for foreign nationals and which now the House of Lords calls unlawful, disproportionate, discriminatory and in fundamental breach of the European Convention on Human Rights was passed by both houses in less than two months in 2001.
The decision to invade Iraq and the vision of a new Middle East paradigm were therefore not the machinations of millions of people living in South Dakota, Alabama or Missouri or even the 535 elected members of Congress, but the machinations of a small coterie of neo-conservatives largely based in Washington DC. Thanks to their numerous corporate sponsors, a largely misinformed public and allies in the media, they enjoy unprecedented influence in the current administration. Their brand of right wing politics is coupled with a fervour and through Bush's re-election, the "democratic" process has given them power once more; yet this small group frightens as many people as the Iranian leadership purportedly do. Ron Suskind notes the following about this group in the New York Times magazine,
"In the summer of 2002, after I had written an article in Esquire that the White House didn't like about Bush's former communications director, Karen Hughes, I had a meeting with a senior adviser to Bush. He expressed the White House's displeasure, and then he told me something that at the time I didn't fully comprehend -- but which I now believe gets to the very heart of the Bush presidency. "The aide said that guys like me were 'in what we call the reality-based community,' which he defined as people who 'believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.' I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. 'That's not the way the world really works anymore,' he continued. 'We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.'"
I don't know about you, but after reading that approach to foreign policy, I might prefer the guys with the tea leaves
Sajjad Khan Editor of New Civilisation Magazine www.newcivilisation.com |
