CNOOC in HK rose yesterday due to rumor that a bid is being prepared for Chevron. Do not know how credible the possibilities are, but the rumor is moving prices.
On another front of the empire, or a corner of the rebellion ...
Kazakhstan: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Looks For Deeper Cooperation
June 28, 2005 21 43 GMT
Summary
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is scheduled to meet in the Kazakh capital, Astana, on July 5, with Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Vladimir Putin among those expected to attend. This meeting is likely to herald a new chapter for the organization, which seeks to redefine itself as capable of concrete action in response to aggressive U.S. efforts to gain influence in the region.
Analysis
On June 28, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said that the upcoming Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit will see efforts by member states to establish concrete steps to increase cooperation on security and, for the first time, economic issues. Leaders of the member states -- including Chinese President Hu Jintao and Russian President Vladimir Putin -- will attend the summit, planned for July 5 in the Kazakh capital of Astana.
So far the SCO has been little more than a talking shop for regional security issues -- such as terrorism and separatism -- which has led to some intelligence cooperation among members, but not much more. The coming summit is likely to change that, as the leaders of all of the member states (with the possible exception of Kyrgyzstan) simultaneously find themselves confronting a threat to their security that they take very seriously: the United States.
With the jihadist war declining in importance, the United States has returned to its more traditional geopolitical concerns of restraining Russia and China. In doing so, Washington is more aggressively seeking regime change in Central Asia as well. This directly pressures not only the Central Asian governments, but also on Russia's southern flank and China's western flank -- and Russia and China have found it very disconcerting. Furthermore, with the United States already pushing hard against Russia and China -- and Central Asia as well -- the SCO members' governments undoubtedly recognize that they must act quickly to collectively bolster their regional positions if they are to block the United States, which is another reason for action at the July summit. For the first time, then, all the countries in the SCO have a specific and unifying motivation they can use as a basis for turning the organization into a significant regional entity.
Another reason for the likely push to invigorate the SCO is that neither Russia nor China is likely to publicly declare a willingness to directly confront Washington at Putin and Hu's June 30-July 1 summit in Moscow. Both countries are highly concerned about the United States, but neither is prepared for such a confrontation. The SCO meeting, therefore, offers each country an ideal opportunity to express its intention and willingness to combat U.S. influence, but in a limited way -- based on specific regional interests -- that will not arouse significant alarm in Washington.
The use of the SCO as a vehicle for resisting the Untied States has received yet a further push following the French and Dutch rejections of the EU constitution, as the European Union demonstrates complete inability to rein in Washington. Both Russia and China had counted on a unified Europe as a partner in restraining the United States, and they now need to search for other options. The SCO is one such option.
Regarding the expansion of the SCO into the military sphere, at a June 24 meeting of defense ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Dushanbe, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov urged the creation of a rapid reaction force for the region under the SCO banner. Kazakh and Russian government sources confirmed their interest in such a force. The SCO already has the beginnings of a command and control structure, with a headquarters and 10 offices in member countries staffed with liaison officers. This structure could easily be upgraded to support the needs of a rapid reaction force.
It is likely that such a force will be established at the Astana summit -- though its potential size remains uncertain, and its units would most likely be placed either in Osh, in southern Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan. SCO members are increasingly concerned over the instability in the Fergana Valley after the March "revolution" in Kyrgyzstan and the uprising in Uzbekistan in May. Both Russia and the Central Asian states have reported of late that illegal border crossings by Islamist militants coming from Pakistan and Afghanistan into the region are on the rise, and they claim that some of these participated in the uprising in Uzbekistan. Both Russia and China fear that militants will not target U.S. interests in the region as much as their own.
An SCO force placed in either Kyrgyzstan or Tajikistan would likely consist of Kyrgyz, Tajik and possibly Kazakh troops, along with Russian paratroopers. The Chinese would likely not send troops -- as their presence could be excessively provocative for local populations and for the United States -- but they at least would send liaison officers to any SCO base and would participate in planning.
The Kyrgyz have denied that they would establish any new foreign bases in their territory, but the Kyrgyz government is highly concerned about its own stability. Unlike the Uzbeks, who possess sufficient domestic security capabilities to put down armed uprisings as they did in Andijan, the Kyrgyz are well aware that they do not have such forces and that the country remains highly unstable. A force under a multi-national banner and with the participation of Kyrgyz troops could be depicted not as a foreign base, but more of a domestic one geared toward addressing domestic interests. This would go some way toward disarming any U.S. pressure to prevent the establishment of a new foreign base, and a multinational force would also dilute the influence of any single country, which could serve to mollify domestic critics concerned about foreign influence.
Another possibility for an SCO rapid-reaction force is that it could consist of dedicated units in each country that would be dispatched to potential theaters of operation, such as Kyrgyzstan, for joint training and exercises, and that could be rapidly deployed if needed. This is a more gradual integration approach, which is the kind of course Beijing usually chooses -- and therefore also a possibility.
The economic component of the summit announced by the Chinese Foreign Ministry is also noteworthy, as the SCO has never had such a component in the past. China and Russia are already important economic players in the region, but if the SCO is able to provide some basis for further economic integration, this could also help to combat U.S. influence in the region. Economic issues, however, have been more a source of conflict than cooperation among these states, so it would take more effort to achieve economic cooperation than military cooperation. Also, these countries collectively lack significant sources of funds for major infrastructure and development projects, making real progress in the economic sphere less likely.
Of additional importance in the Chinese announcement was the expectation that India, Pakistan and Iran will have applications for observer status in the group approved at the summit. Bringing on powerful regional players who are also interested in limiting U.S. influence, though to varying degrees, could further the organization's ability to work against Washington and could potentially be the seed of a far larger grouping. The flip side is that the larger any such group gets, the more difficult it becomes to harmonize the interests of each with the others, meaning that a significant expansion of the group that sees India, Pakistan and Iran as potential members is more likely to lead to its devolution into an anti-U.S. talking shop. The more distant future aside, the SCO's likely strengthening indicates the potential impact of U.S. efforts to assert its influence in other regions of the world.
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