... in the mean time, Stratfor thinks China is on the run, concerned about both the US and N.Korea, whereas I think the Chinese leadership is just dancing in enjoyment ... observation of facts and perception of truth does not come easily to agenda-ed outfits like Stratfor
stratfor.com
China's Diplomacy and North Korea's Increased Leverage
Jul 08, 2005
Summary
Tang Jiaxuan, Chinese state councilor and special envoy of President Hu Jintao, is scheduled to visit Pyongyang from July 12 to 14. The visit follows that of Liu Jingqin, vice president of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, and is part of the preparations for a visit by Hu later in July. Beijing is stepping up efforts to bring North Korea back to the bargaining table as part of a political and economic dance with the United States. This could leave Pyongyang in the driver's seat.
Analysis
Chinese State Councilor and former Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan is to visit North Korea from July 12 to 14 as special envoy to President Hu Jintao. Tang's visit follows that of Liu Jingqin, former vice minister of the International Department of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and now vice president of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, who visited Pyongyang on July 5.
Few details have been released of Tang's visit, but it is likely that he will finalize preparations for Hu's expected visit to Pyongyang. Through these visits, Beijing is seeking to regain North Korea's cooperation for the six-party nuclear talks -- something Chinese leaders need as they balance U.S. pressures with those at home. The increased attention, however, could give Pyongyang added leverage.
As Beijing faces growing economic and social issues at home, the increased pressure from the United States over the yuan, textiles and China's military might is squeezing the Chinese leadership, limiting its options and pressing it to take actions at home much sooner than it is comfortable with -- or capable of handling. China's leaders are at a critical moment in the economic reform process, and they are seeking as much breathing room to make adjustments and tweaks to manage the social ramifications and not lose political control.
In an effort to reduce the U.S. pressure on economic matters, Beijing has offered a trade: China will bring North Korea back under control regarding the nuclear issue if Washington backs off on economic issues. Washington has made a move in this direction, encouraging Congress to delay action on the Schumer Bill, which calls for a 27.5 percent tariff on all Chinese goods if Beijing does not move to revalue the yuan. Washington also is restarting talks on Chinese textile quotas.
But Washington expects Beijing to fulfill its half of the bargain -- bring North Korea back to the negotiating table and effect a solution to the nuclear crisis. Washington long has criticized Beijing for not doing enough to rein in North Korea. Beijing is now looking to do just that -- but in the more subtle Chinese fashion -- by arranging for Hu to visit Pyongyang. For North Korea, the impression given is that China views North Korea as important enough to visit. For Beijing, the visit gives Hu an opportunity to make some direct arrangements with Kim Jong Il.
Though this is likely to lead to the resumption of six-party talks before the end of July, and could even lead to a resolution of the current crisis before the end of the summer, it adds rather than detracts power from the North Korean position. Pyongyang's main concern is that Washington will use military, economic or clandestine means to undermine the North Korean regime, and this fear keeps any North Korean economic reforms (however minor they may be) on hold, as reform creates opportunities for malicious exploitation. China will have to give North Korea certain assurances in place of U.S. assurances.
This will give Pyongyang some sense of security. But Pyongyang also gains because it realizes the position China is in vis-a-vis the United States -- that Washington will cancel the quid without the Chinese quo. Thus Beijing's need of Pyongyang is, in some sense, higher or at least more immediate than Pyongyang's need of Beijing. With this knowledge, Pyongyang will return to the talks, knowing Beijing will encourage a solution that is in the North's favor. And if things do go sour for Sino-U.S. relations, Pyongyang will once again gain Chinese economic support, as Beijing will need it as a buffer to distract Washington's attention. Either way, Pyongyang is set to come out ahead.
Copyright 2005 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.
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