AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS: USN Creates a New Marine Corps
Strategy Page
July 20, 2005: The U.S. Navy feels it is in need of more “soldiers of the sea.” But since the U.S. Navy has lost control of the U.S. Marine Corps, the navy is assembling a new force of sailors serving as naval infantry. This is not really new. For example, the toughest troops in the Navy Department are not the marines, but the sailors who belong to the SEALs, an organization formed in the 1960s. But the process of regenerating the American naval infantry is accelerating. There was a time, not too long ago, when the marines where what marines had always been, soldiers who belonged to the navy and served on ships. But since World War II, the U.S. Marine Corps have developed into a truly separate force, no longer available to the navy.
While marines like to think that the Marine Corps has, since 1798, been a separate service, this did not actually happen until quite recently. Until World War II, the Marine Corps was so small, and dependent on the navy (for amphibious ships and, well, work to do), that in practice, marines tended to do whatever the navy asked them to do. But after World War II, the much larger marine force became, gradually, a truly independent service. The marines were still intertwined with the navy, but increasingly, able to defy the admirals. Thus we have the navy forming the SEAL commandos, in the early 1960s, using sailors, rather than marines. Over the next few decades, the navy slowly stopped using marines for their traditional job of providing onboard ship security. By the end of the century, the navy was content to let the marines be whatever they could get away with, and the navy would basically do without them.
After September 11, 2001, when the navy sought to increase its security force for ships in port, it did not turn to the marines (who long had taken care of that sort of thing), but greatly expanded the number of “Masters at Arms” (previously a job category, not a force). Now comes the ECG (expeditionary combat battalion) of high quality sailors who could fight on water or land in coastal operations. The ECG would obtain its manpower from those who apply to join the SEALs, but don’t make it. The SEALs are a very selective organization, accepting less than one in ten of those who apply. Now the navy wants to do something with those high quality rejects. The recent navy announcement that it is putting together a “brown water (coastal and rivers)” force mentioned an infantry component, and that these troops would be sailors, not troops from the Marine Corps. This new force also makes it clear how much the navy and marines have grown apart.
But the ECG is expected to be higher quality than the marines, something close to U.S. Army Special Forces. The ECG would be trained in foreign languages and cultures, and be part of the force that provided training to foreign navies. But the ECG would also take over some SEAL functions, like providing boarding parties for dangerous interdiction missions. Most of these boarding operations are not dangerous, and are handled by specially trained sailors and Masters at Arms. These folks are also doing a job that has traditionally belonged to “marines.” But since the U.S. Navy no longer has control of the U.S. Marine Corps, and needs marines, it has to rebuild the force under a new name. Or, rather, several new names.
The new marine force will be only a few thousand strong, which is more in line with the proportion of marines in other navies. The U.S. Navy lost its original marine force because the U.S. Marine Corps got so large during World War II that it was no longer a part of the navy, but a truly separate entity. This new force of naval infantry also revives another old navy tradition; infantry training for sailors. Until about a century ago, infantry training for sailors, and even infantry exercises on land, were a regular feature of navy life. All this had faded away by the 1930s. The navy stopped issuing field manuals for naval infantry in the 1960s. But the war on terror, and increased emphasis on brown water operations, has returned many sailors to the old ways. The new naval infantry will perform many of the traditional marine functions, without being called marines.
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ARMORED WARFARE: The Truth About FCS
July 20, 2005: The U.S. Army has an ambitious, and expensive, plan to replace much of its Cold War era weapons and gear with a new generation of stuff. That’s what the FCS (Future Combat Systems) is all about. FCS gets a lot of media attention because it promises to incorporate all sorts of neat new technology, and cost over a hundred billion dollars. While that sounds like a lot, it’s not when you consider that the current Cold War era heavy weapons (armored vehicles, artillery) and other equipment (radios, and all sorts of electronics) are wearing out and will have to be replaced, even if the FCS project didn’t exist. Four thousand new tanks, at a cost of $5 million each (current cost of an M1) is $20 billion. But new generations of gear rarely cost the same as the stuff they replace. So you can see how FCS grew into a hundred billion dollar baby.
While commentators, and critics, tend to concentrate on the ambitious proposals for new tanks and other armored vehicles, the true heart of FCS can be seen in every home and workplace in America. What the army wants is a battlefield Internet, with everyone from the individual infantryman, to the highest ranking general, tied into the same, real time, network. Moreover, the biggest problems with all of this are not hardware, but software. This battlefield network has to achieve a new level of reliability, because in combat, a system crash can be fatal to the user. The army is even building its own operating system (SOSCOE, short for “System of Systems Common Operating Environment”), in an effort to obtain an operating system less lethal than Microsoft Windows, and more reliable than Linux. Already, the software for the new digital radios is causing headaches, as is development of SOSCOE. This is where the real struggle to make FCS work will take place. But with a networked force, the army will be far more lethal, and far less likely to take casualties. This is already being proven in Iraq and Afghanistan, where prototype versions of FCS are in action.
There are some other new wrinkles in FCS. Aside from a new tank, infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and self-propelled artillery (which, again, will be needed in the next decade or two anyway), there will be some new vehicle types. For example, the old command and control vehicles, which were customized IFVs with more radios and gadgets, will be even more customized, and available down to the company level (previously, battalion level.) In addition to a new armored ambulance (like the current one, based on an IFV, but without a turret), there will be a similar medical vehicle equipped for more extensive treatment of the wounded. Speed saves lives when it comes to treating the wounded. The battlefield Internet would allow the doctor in the treatment ambulance to get expert advice from other surgeons anywhere on the planet.
Another new armored vehicle (based on a rather more limited one used now) will be reconnaissance, surveillance and target acquisition armored vehicles, which will use the growing number of air and ground based sensors to find the enemy and immediately pass the information on to commanders and artillery and bombers.
Another growing category will be robots. Not only more UAVs and ground robots, but also “mules” (small, low slung, cargo carrying, golf cart like), which will have sensors and software that enable them to find their own way on the battlefield and, well, do the heavy lifting. Another battlefield robot will be autonomous mines that launch missiles, instead of top-attack anti-tank weapons (like the WAAM has been doing for over a decade). The new “Intelligent Munitions Systems” will be tied into a network and act as sensors as well as weapons. Combat robots are a major part of FCS that no one wants to talk about. Probably because combat robots are really, really scary, and the army doesn’t want to take a lot of heat for the battle droids before it can show them succeeding in combat. That will happen in Iraq and Afghanistan before too long.
The individual infantryman is getting new weapons, commo gear, sensors and "wearable computers." FCS is also about radical changes for the way all troops operate.
So, when you see any coverage of FCS in the future, remember that the really important stuff is networking, software and combat robots. And don't forget that the army is taking advantage of all the fighting it is doing in Iraq and Afghanistan to implement FCS. The fighting causes equipment and weapons to be destroyed or worn out at a high rate. The new gear is often FCS class stuff. The army is also testing a lot of the FCS ideas in combat. This is nothing new, as wartime always creates a call for new ideas and equipment. The army had actually tested many of the basic FCS commo ideas before 911, or the Iraq invasion, so using the stuff in combat (like Blue Force Tracker and all the UAVs) simply allows the troops to perfect the ideas and gear. Thus FCS is more than the hundred billion dollar procurement contracts that Congress concentrates on. FCS is slowly evolving within the army right now. |
