Ok, I'd been meaning to get back to this. I think you are misreading Galbraith somewhat, I don't see any way he's a neocon apologist. A little point by point:
On the factual front, 300,000 Shia did not die during the rebellion; I think that was the figure of the dead during 8 years of Iran Iraq war.
The 300k figure is apparently sort of dubious, but it is mentioned in users.erols.com
Iraq, Shia rebellion in south (1991-92): 40 000
* War Annual 6: 40,000
* Ploughshares 2000 cites ...
o Rebel commanders: 50,000
o al-Hakim: 300,000
I got no idea who al-Hakim is, though.
The Sistani list did not win by a "narrow" margin, it was a huge win
What Galbraith wrote, precisely, was:
A Shiite list won a narrow majority in Iraq's January elections.
Which is true. A narrow absolute majority in a multiparty parliamentary election can safely be called a huge win, of course. But the meaning of that particular election is somewhat ambiguous at best, I'd refer back to another NYRB article, this one by Mark Danner:
On Election Day, Kurds voted for the Kurdish list, Shiites voted for the Shiite list, a relative handful, about 12 percent, voted for the Allawi list— and the Sunnis made their presence known by not voting at all. The election, in effect, was an ethnic census. (see Message 21219039 )
One more point:
US should push for a confederation in Iraq (instead of Federal system). Despite Peter Galbraith's implication that confederation is a bad thing, it is the best solution for Iraq's very diverse factions and if US resists it too hard, Iraq may well disintegrate into a bloody civil war with the end results of 3 states. Remember that the entity we call Iraq has no historical accuracy and was simply forged by the British from 3 Ottoman provinces. Why should they behave as one unified nation?
I don't exactly see where Galbraith disagrees. From the end of his article:
The Bush administration should, however, draw the line at allowing a Shiite theocracy to establish control over all of Iraq. This requires a drastic change of strategy. Building powerful national institutions in Iraq serves the interest of one group—today it is the Shiites—at the expense of the others, and inevitably produces conflict and instability. Instead, the administration should concentrate on political arrangements that match the reality in Iraq. This means a loose confederation in which each of Iraq's communities governs itself, and is capable of defending itself. It may not be possible to accomplish this in a constitution, since the very process of writing a constitution forces these communities to confront issues—religion, women's rights, ownership of oil, regional militaries— that are hard to resolve ideologically.
Just for historical perspective, I am appending another Galbraith article from a year ago in the next message. Again, he seems nothing at all like a neocon apologist. |
