Major analysis by Barnett
Going through the Cold War paces:
Reading the Pentagon's annual report on
"The Military Power of the People's Republic of China"
I knew this report wouldn't match either the hype emanating from certain Pentagon intelligence circles or the generalized tough talk coming out of Congress. From what I've heard from my sources in the Building, Rumsfeld's tough talk to China in Singapore a while back was met with some awfully pointed criticism by our Asian allies, prompting the Secretary to return home and order the writers of this report to tone it down dramatically -- thus the whining of China hawks to mindless reporters like the Washington Times' Bill Gertz.
Still, even with that effect, this thing reads rather breathlessly in places, sporting a sort of un-self-aware hypocrisy that is stunning. This report is chocked full of quasi-finger pointing (always carefully worded) on all sorts of Chinese sins and aggressive tendencies, which, upon reflection, are easily outdistanced by our own in almost every instance.
I mean, we're like the parent who asks the kid, "Why you swear so f-king much?"
My favorite example is our harrumphing on China's "active defense" doctrine, which, even in its most nasty rendering, isn't even in the same zip code as preemptive war on Afghanistan and Iraq (although those clever Chinese are especially vague on what would trigger active defense, which is far worse than an America that's nice enough to tell you up-front exactly why we're invading your country). I mean, basically everything we accuse the Chinese of doing could be turned around as accusations and flung in our faces. And you know what? They be just as silly when tossed at us, yet this report sounds such solemn tones about the Chinese when -- in reality -- all we have is their obsession with Taiwan to cite.
Even there, you'd have to say, "Whoa dog! China's been hard over on Taiwan for how many decades now and hasn't really done anything but threaten here and there, build some stuff, and try to diss Taipei incessantly in diplomatic circles. Hell, we got hard over on Iraq in the late 1980s and since then we've invaded twice, occupied once, and in between the two invasions we bombed the place daily for 12 years."
I mean, frankly, if you look at it objectively, you'd have to say it's a helluva lot safer being on the receiving end of China's obsession with Taiwan than our far-shorter and yet so much more violent and destructive obsession with Saddam. But who's keeping track?
Oh yes, that would be the global community we keep trying to enlist in our Global War on Terrorism.
If the comeback is, "Hey buddy, we're defending the international order and China's just grabbing for some lost territory," I'd say you had a good point. But once you trigger that discussion regarding this report, then your take-away is even more depressing: this thing is full of references to China being at the crossroads strategically, developing military ties and cooperation with a host of our allies (UK, French, Indians, Israelis, Russians), and yet our military-to-military cooperation is minimal and going nowhere fast. Nowhere in this piece is there any suggestion of what the U.S. could be doing proactively with China to steer it in a better direction.
You can say, "But this report isn't supposed to do that," and you'd be right again. But then I have an even smaller take-away: this thing is just for show. Congress wrote the requirement for an annual report on China's military into the 2000 Defense Authorization Act because some China hawks there wanted a regular bully pulpit to push their pet peeves, pork-barrel desires, and general blow-hardiness on international security. That was the general function of the old Soviet Military Power reports in the 1980s, and since we can't do those anymore, China's just the next best thing.
In short, the whole piece has a weirdly antiquated feel to it. Hey, we could be doing something serious on the Global War on Terror, but since this is in our In-Box, let's wax scary on China's rising military threat. Yada-yada-yada. The whole thing comes off as more a domestic defense budget drill than a serious treatment of our relationship with China. If this is the closest thing we have to a serious strategic offering on China in the U.S. Government, then it's just pathetic. It's a laundry list, nothing more. It's the longest pole in the tent of the Big War crowd, nothing more. It's fear mongering by default, nothing more.
Me personally, I could never write anything this pendantic. I've tried, but I just can't do the list stuff and consider it analysis, much less all this "threat analysis" that never once makes any real comparisons to U.S. capabilities -- lest the entire enterprise seem too paltry and cheesy. Instead, we're treated in the data annex to a comparison of China's defense establishment with that of Taiwan. I mean, what if China put out an annual report on U.S. military power and had an annex comparing us to Cuba? Or even Canada? Or even Saddam's Iraq?
Again, this whole drill comes off as purely for domestic consumption. There is nothing of note on the Chinese-American strategic relationship, just a lot of statements that, on the face of them, are incredibly mundane when taken in the larger context.
Almost 60 percent of China's imports are raw materials, we are told, and almost 80 percent of the oil China imports comes through the Malacca straits. To me, it's amazing how little an effort China has made in the direction of a blue-water navy, given those stunning numbers. Instead, it contents itself to build an anti-Taiwan-and-U.S. Navy-defending-Taiwan navy, which should strike strategic fear in the hearts of every fishing vessel that regularly plies the Straits.
What's most weird about this report is the obvious mirror-imaging China is engaging in: whatever we're interested in, they're interested in. They seem to take all their military and strategic cues from the U.S. military -- of course always spiced with "ancient Chinese secrets" like strategic deception, some Delphic Confucian statements, and numerous clever wordplays that amount to recastings of Teddy Roosevelt's dictum of "speak softly and carry a big stick" (more on that last bit later). If you're a seriously skeptical (meaning rigorous) defense analyst, you can't help but walk away from this report rather unimpressed, with both our analysis and the "rapid" rate of Chinese military modernization (which consists mostly of buying stuff from allies whose equipment -- quite frankly -- comes nowhere near our own).
Here's a good example in the opening summary (p. 4 in the PDF version): we are told that the People's Liberation Army "is modernizing its forces, emphasizing preparation to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts along China's periphery." I mean, what's the alternative supposed to be: China is "modernizing its forces, emphasizing preparation to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity conflicts distant from its shores?"
No, wait a minute, that would be the avowed military strategy of the U.S.
We trumpet our own strategic security goals that are far more expansive than China's, waging war in open defiance of many of our key allies, and then we have the nerve to lecture the Chinese on their lack of military transparency, this from the administration that has jacked up classification of information like no other since WWII.
In the end, I wouldn't have any trouble with any of these statements if there was even the slightest offering in this report of what the Defense Department can and should be doing to improve the situation, but it's so clear from the tone here that the Pentagon is far happier with the threat of China than it ever could be with something more positive.
In the exec summary, we say that the "outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations" in all this defense spending. America, I guess, surpasses China's openness by a ways: we declare a Global War on Terrorism and jack up defense spending like crazy, invading two countries distant from our shores in the past 4 years. You can say one thing about us: the whole world knows our intentions!
And yet, you have to wonder, then, why Michael Moore's "Fahrenheit 9/11" was such a popular hit if the Bush Administration's defense policy is all that transparent. Yes, yes, intentions are hard to detect . . . from this White House.
No where in the report is there any acknowledgment that it may be the United States that is driving the dynamic of China's defense modernization, even though we cite their growing expressions of concern over our own rapid force modernization, and how they study our every military operation so as to provide guidance to their own. The tautological feel here is inescapable: China seems more obsessed with countering our military capabilities over time, and in their abject mirror imaging, we find cause for increasing concern ("My God, it's like they're trying to counter our every technology and capability! Quick honey, let's get Japan to join our defense guarantee on Taiwan.").
I mean, it's like my ten-year-old son constantly complaining that his five-year-old brother is always aping him and, by doing so, driving him nuts. Whom do we expect the Chinese to size themselves against?
Then there are the many references to China letting its need for foreign energy apparently drive much of its foreign policy and security strategy around the world. If you can believe it, it drives Beijing to cooperating with nefarious authoritarian regimes inside the Gap. I mean, really!
On North Korea, we're told that "China has a unique potential due to its historic ties and geography to convince North Korea to give up its nuclear ambitions."
Hmm, maybe Beijing would make a bigger effort if we weren't doing things like producing this report every year. If you were China, would you go out of your way to aid the big bad military superpower that keeps a file on you, constantly judging your intentions? Honestly, even with the pro forma diplomatic bitching from China over this report, it amazes me that we can crank something like this at the same time Beijing's hosting the 6-party talks on North Korea. Me, if I would China, I'd be sorely tempted to tell the State Department to shove off.
Here's another doozey: China is described, with ominous tones, as seeking economic integration in Asia that seems to exclude the U.S. Hmm, don't seem to remember any clauses in NAFTA or CAFTA about including the Chinese per se. Sounds pretty nefarious to me.
The bulk of the report is lotsa stuff on China's development of capabilities that threaten our ability to threaten their ability to threaten Taiwan. Apparently, China feels so safe in this world that virtually all of their good stuff is trained on Taiwan. Then again, we're such a generous superpower: keeping the world safe for China to focus on threatening Taiwan, and being willing to stand up to China at the same time on this very subject. Our commitment to global peace knows no bounds, nor apparently any strategic focus for Asia as a whole.
The report is smart enough to note that the biggest deterrent to China's invasion of Taiwan would seem to be that Taiwan is China's biggest external source of foreign direct investment. I mean, why slaughter the cow when you get the milk for free?
Ah, but we know that the Chinese are masters of the long view, except when they go totally mental. But we can never be sure, such masters are they of strategic deception.
I got yer ancient Chinese secrets!
My favorite part of the report is when it examines the strategic legacy of Deng's maxim known as the "24 character strategy." Here it is in a nutshell: "observe calmly, secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile, and never claim leadership."
My, that is some scary stuff. Beats "speak softly and carry a big stick" by a ways.
And so damn inscrutable!
But at least it explains why the China team did so well at The New Map Game. I mean, compared to "bring it on" and "let's roll," that's some impressive strategic word play. I haven't heard anything that cool since "Kill Bill."
Then there's the equally disturbing notion that, as China's military power grows, it may seek to use it "to press diplomatic advantage, advance security interests, or resolve disputes."
Wow. Good thing we never do that.
Even with all these breathless descriptions, the report admits that China has no real power projection capabilities, can't mount anything near our joint land-sea-air operations, and will be lucky to have an economy and a defense budget by the year 2025 that's roughly two-thirds the amount of America's current GDP and defense budget.
Oh, and I almost forgot: China should have Skylab up by 2020, putting them right on par with NASA, which seems intent on remaining trapped in the 1970s too.
I walk away wondering how anybody with integrity in Congress sides with the Air Force and the Navy on hyping the Chinese threat when American soldiers are dying in Iraq in numbers. I read this report and I find myself turning green with support for current Army and Marine arguments for bigger shares of the defense budget. If this is the big bad boogey monster report, then I say we're cheating the ground forces big time in the FY06 and Quadrennial Defense Review debates. |
