That article (posted again below) is the best current analysis I've read on the subject so far.
It is clear to me the politicians and their commissions and staffs bungled this one...and they continue to bungle it.
I thought SECDEF Aspin's refusal to provide the requested combat support in Somalia, prior to the big fight, was bad enough...It absolutely disgusts me to think that Clinton's two SECDEFS, Les Aspin and Bill Cohen, coupled with a few White House lawyers, placed us all in a box that not only precluded the prevention of, but actually enabled 9/11.
I have to wonder if the documents stolen from the National Archives by Clinton's National Security Advisor, Sandy Berger, were not part of a cover-up of their flawed policy of preventing time critical national defense information from getting to those with a need to know.
The worst of the worst is Congress placing some of the same idiots who created the flawed Clinton policy of "Report No Evil" on the very commission investigating the flawed policy.
Have to acknowledge General Shelton's wisdom. The only Chairman JCS, we ever had with a Special Forces background, got our own SF folks to identify the enemy. And look at the job our SF Intel folks did. They identified the bad guys by name, rank, service number and location.
The lessons we learned at Ft Bragg about independent thought coupled with thinking outside the box could have paid off big-time for the country we all swore to defend...If they only listened.
No ODA would ever brush off Intel developed by our own in-house folks. Instead, knowing how good they are, an ODA would study the data in deepest detail and incorporate the info in their attack planning.
There is a durn good reason we have an Intel NCO on every "A" Team. And there is a lesson to be learned here for other orgs.
Our congressional officials are exposed to huge amounts of data as they travel the country and the world. In these times of continuous high threat asymmetrical warfare, every US Congressperson should have an Intel Specialist on their staff. That person's sole job should be to ensure important Intel information is reported to the Congressional member and/or from the Congress member to other orgs with a need to know.
I believe our Special Forces today, coupled with other SOF Forces, have everything we need to delay, disrupt and dismantle terrorist organizations World-Wide. To accomplish this, they have to be able to respond immediately to info they develop. I believe GWB and Rumsfeld understand this better than any similar leadership team we ever had. I believe their decision to bring another SF warrior, General Schoomaker, out of retirement to be Chief of Staff of the Army, in these trying times, has proven to be an incredibly wise move.
unclewest
Commission: Able Danger Only Told Us About Atta
By Captain Ed on 9/11 Commission
The AP reports tonight that 9/11 Commission co-chairs Thomas Kean and Lee Hamilton have changed their story yet again. Now the two say in a joint statement to the press that they do recall hearing that Able Danger had identified Atta, two days after Hamilton categorically denied it -- and for a man who had supposedly never heard of Able Danger, Hamilton's recall of detail of the briefing appears impressive (via Tom Maguire):
In a joint statement, former commission chairman Thomas Kean and vice chairman Lee Hamilton said a military official who made the claim had no documentation to back it up. And they said only 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta was identified to them and not three additional hijackers as claimed by Rep. Curt Weldon, vice chairman of the House Armed Services and Homeland Security committees.
"He could not describe what information had led to this supposed Atta identification," the statement said of the military official.
They also said no else could place the other three hijackers with Atta in a purported terror cell code-named "Brooklyn" during the time period cited by Weldon.
Compare this to what Hamilton said on August 9th:
"The Sept. 11 commission did not learn of any U.S. government knowledge prior to 9/11 of surveillance of Mohammed Atta or of his cell," said Hamilton, a former Democratic congressman from Indiana. "Had we learned of it obviously it would've been a major focus of our investigation."
Now we hear Hamilton say the exact opposite. The Commission heard about Atta -- they just ignored it, claiming now that the evidence shown at the briefing did not match up with their timeline for Atta's first entry to the US. That would have been an interesting claim had Hamilton made it when first asked. Now, with his categorical denial still ringing in our ears, it sounds more like another excuse to wriggle out of a debacle they themselves made.
The only development this gives us is an admission that the Commissioners themselves had awareness of Able Danger's assessment of Atta as a terrorist a year before the 9/11 attacks -- and they didn't bother to mention it at all in their report, not even to refute it as contrary information that they could refute. For a group which wound up berating two administrations for only listening to that evidence and intelligence which fit their policies, it at least smacks of the pot calling the kettle black. At worst, it smells much worse than that. |
