I generally agree with your post. I think it's very clear that not only did we come in on the wrong side of the civil war in Vietnam, but that our armed presence and our actions there created a strong cadre of nationalistic insurgents who were willing to die to make us pay for staying.
I'm not sure, however, that I buy the rationale that in Iraq it will take time for the Iraqis to get some backbone because they were oppressed by "decades of Saddam." It seems that there are a core of Iraqis who've demonstrated enough backbone to take on the strongest army in the world and they show little signs of quitting. I think we need to take a look at the ideas and politics for which the Iraqis, or at least segments of them, are willing to fight to the death, as opposed to the ideas and politics they're willing to support, but not strongly enough to fight and die for. After all, in a civil war it's only those people willing to vote with their lives who get counted.
And it is a civil war. The country is awash with arms and devout, oil rich, foreigners and former Bathists are pouring cash into the pockets of the insurgents. There are basic internal conflicts between what the three major ethnic/religious factions in Iraq want and there is yet another conflict between the concept that the Bush Administration seems to have of a "free and democratic" Iraq and the "Islamic nation of Iraq" that keeps creeping in.
As far as military comparisons between the US enemy in Vietnam and the US enemy in Iraq, there are many differences in support, logistics and organization. Having said that, it is my view that none of those differences are critical to determining the question of whether or not the insurgency can be "defeated." The answer to that question lies in examining the strength of the ideas that drive those insurgents and our ability to undercut those ideas. That, ultimately, will turn on our ability to react to them in ways that do not create a wave of support for their cause, [too late?] and the popularity of any solutions that we, through malleable Iraqi leadership, try to impose.
But it's a big risk or, as I've stated before, akin to betting the farm on a sucker bet. As Bush senior indicated in his book, Iraq is the kind of place where you can grab the tiger's tail but you'd better not try to hold on cause it's a losing battle that may leave you bloodied and dealing with an enraged tiger.
But the Bush people with the support of the majority of Americans, grabbed the tiger and what does that gain us? Assuming the Shiites and the Kurdish populations swallow their revulsion and continue to tolerate our presence because we are useful to keep the lid on the Sunnis, when we stop being useful we'll get tossed out because the forces of nationalism and Islamism are too powerful to accept our being there in force. In effect we are sending our young to die for someone else's cause, and that cause is one that we've spent far too little time analyzing in terms of our own national interests.
One thing, however, is clear; patience may not be a virtue. The history of foreign presence in insurgency infested nations is that time favors the local insurgents, not the foreigner. Ed |
