Hi John, I'll take a shot at it too.
* Can you "encourage and promote" change in the culture of another nation by occupying that nation and using force of arms to effect that change?
Worked in Germany and Japan.
I can accept with the "worked" part of that argument only in it's broadest sense. I think the real lesson that history offers is that we must try to understand why our soldiers were accepted into post war Germany and Japan and why they were forced out of VN and are required to wear body armour and ride around in armoured vehicles in order to survive in Iraq.
Maybe it's because Germany and Japan were exhausted by years of bloody war where millions of their countrymen were killed. Maybe it's because of the respective cultures and majority religions of the countries. Maybe it's because there was a sense in Germany and Japan that they brought it on themselves with their own attacks and aggression. Maybe it's because the motives of the US were accepted as benevolent by the Japanese and the Germans but not by the Iraqis or the Vietnamese. Maybe, but the "whys" aren't as relevant as the fact that there is very little about the occupation of Germany and Japan on the one hand and Iraq on the other that is similar.
The Germans and Japanese didn't start killing our troops within weeks, didn't start killing their countrymen who were trying to aid in restoring order and rebuilding, didn't hide, shelter and fund those who were violently opposing the occupation, and didn't dance in the streets in celebration of the deaths of our soldiers. Maybe that's why we didn't have to kill them to "help" them.
In Iraq, real world facts showed us that it was more like VN and very dissimilar to Germany and Japan early on and we should pull our heads out of the sand, (or is it the clouds?) and pay attention to reality.
even if the insurgency was 100% internal - its constituency only represents 20% of the population. Since it is unlikely that the 80% will be willing to go back to the prior status - success is more likely in the long run than not.
Just looking at those numbers I'd say you had a point. After all, if 4 out of 5 people refuse to support an insurgency then it might well fail. Those numbers, however, even if correct are somewhat misleading.
Iraq is a society divided into at least three major religious and political factions. Throughout large areas in Iraq the support for the insurgents is much higher than 20% and may approach 100%. In addition the Sunnis that support the most violent insurgents are generally the the most educated and wealthy of the Iraqis. In those conditions an insurgency can hide, operate and survive no matter what the other factions want.
Even among the Shiites, however, there are some insurgents and some support for the insurgency. At times we've walked a fine line that might have tipped to a full fledged Shiite supported insurgency but we avoided that because we managed to satisfy the demands of the powerful cleric Sistani. When you have to cater to the demands of an Islamic cleric in order to continue an occupation designed to remake an intolerant, religiously oppressed society, maybe there's a problem.
The facts in Iraq keep telling us that Iraq will find her own way, or ways. Iraq facts keep telling us that we can't "train" Iraqis to want to fight and die for the Iraq we envision. Iraqi facts keep telling us that American soldiers employing the use of American force will not mold Iraq into the "free and democratic" society we say will change the middle east. We, however, keep ignoring those facts and comforting ourselves with platitudes, saying things like "we have to have the will to prevail."
The problem with platitudes is that reality has a way of walking right through them and creating the need for a plan B. After all, in any fight the other guy has some say in it too and even if he's an idiot, the cumulative power of a lot of determined, tough men willing to vote with their lives is very, very large. Ed |
