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Central Asia: The 'Great Game' Heats Up
Sep 22, 2005
Summary
The Sept. 19-24 Russo-Uzbek military exercises in Uzbekistan are just one of many signs that the "Great Game" in Central Asia is intensifying as Washington faces Moscow and Beijing's combined strength. Russia and China are getting the upper hand in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while the United States seems to be prevailing in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in the near term -- but the longer-term outcomes could be different.
Analysis
Russia and Uzbekistan are conducting joint military maneuvers in Uzbek territory Sept. 19-24. This is just part of the mounting evidence that the "Great Game" in Central Asia, where Moscow and Beijing have joined forces against Washington, is quickly intensifying. As in every battle, each side has seen gains and losses. Now, and for the near future, Russia and China have the upper hand in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, while the United States has made advances in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. These trends could change in the longer run, but one thing is clear: Oil-rich, strategically located Central Asia is bound to serve as a geopolitical battleground for major world powers for years to come.
A key element in the "Great Game" is outside powers' security presence -- whether bases or joint exercises with host countries or arms deliveries -- in the region. Geopolitically, a security presence allows an outside power to exercise more control over a host country's policies and make sure the outside power's national interests are observed and promoted in the host country. Economically, a security presence allows an outside power to ensure that Central Asia's energy riches are exported in the direction the outside power wants; the outside power can also make sure such deliveries are safe and that other outsiders cannot easily reroute the region's energy outflow. In military-strategic terms, a security presence allows an outside power to project forces and power from a host country to other countries in the region, including the outside power's rivals.
Uzbekistan
Moscow and Beijing's positions in Uzbekistan are strong, and will grow stronger in the near future. Knowing well that Washington is working to overthrow him -- most likely through a popular uprising such as the Andijan uprising in May, in which pro-Western and Islamist elements joined forces -- President Islam Karimov quickly is developing military, political and energy ties with Moscow and Beijing, which Karimov sees as capable protectors.
The latest sign of a growing Russo-Uzbek alliance is the Sept. 19-24 joint counterterrorism exercises. The goal is to train Russian and Uzbek forces together to quickly put down an armed rebellion in Uzbekistan similar to the Andijan uprising but larger in scale, Uzbek military sources said. Through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Tashkent is entitled legally to receive such help from Moscow -- and from Beijing, for that matter. Two paratrooper companies from the 76th Russian Airborne Division and several special forces groups from the Russian General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate are participating along with the same number of Uzbek paratroopers and special forces groups. To emphasize the exercises' importance, the two nations' defense ministers are attending.
The exercises are being held in the Jizzax region, about 170 miles southwest of Tashkent, in the foothills of mountains. The terrain is similar to that of the volatile Fergana Valley, where the next Uzbek uprising is most likely. The Jizzax region itself has become restive, with Islamists and pro-Western activists fomenting anti-government sentiments and with some Jizzax clan leaders suspected of participating in a power struggle against Karimov.
Kazakhstan
Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, concerned with the prospect of a pro-U.S. "revolution" that could remove him from power, is moving closer to both Moscow and Beijing. This is especially true in the fields of politics and security; in addition to worrying about a "revolution," Nazarbayev sees his country facing a real threat from international and domestic Islamist militants and he realizes that Moscow and Beijing -- not Washington -- can give him quick and efficient help. Though Kazakhstan has been increasing its military cooperation with the United States regarding the Caspian Sea, that cooperation only involves U.S. funding for new maritime equipment and is significantly smaller in scope and depth than Kazakhstan's cooperation with Russia and Astana's SCO commitments. Economically, Astana is bent on customer diversification and is working with Western, Russian and Chinese companies.
Astana's closer relationship with Beijing was evidenced when visiting Chinese Defense Minister Cao Gangchuan and his Kazakh counterpart Danial Akhmetov agreed Sept. 19 that their countries' and agencies' military cooperation should be strengthened. Kazakh defense sources say the two ministers discussed joint high military staff consultations, Kazakh officers' training in Chinese military academies and proposals from the Kazakh defense complex to develop modern-arms systems for China.
The latest example of growing Kazakh-Russian security collaboration is a joint counterterrorism exercise that Kazakhstan's Pavlodar regional police department and Russia's Novosibirsk regional police conducted Sept. 13. The exercises, located in the Kazakh town of Karasuk on the Kazakh-Russian border, included a scenario in which terrorists took hostages and special forces troops stormed the hideout and released the hostages. Kazakh and Russian joint counterterrorism training has intensified vastly in the last couple of years, with police forces alone conducting 13 exercises. Kazakhstan is concerned with Islamist militants training in its southern areas to stage attacks against energy infrastructure, while Russia is concerned with jihadists coming from Central Asia to implement terrorist attacks within Russia.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan offers a curious example of how geopolitics can play tricks with expectations. The Bush administration thought Kyrgyzstan's pro-Western "revolution" in April would put the country squarely in the U.S. sphere of influence. Bishkek is maintaining good ties with Washington -- for example, Kyrgyzstan still hosts the United States' Manas Air Base -- but recent developments show the government is drifting further toward Moscow and, to an extent, Beijing. The underlying reason for this is that no matter what clan is in power, members of the Kyrgyz elite feel a pressing need to protect their personal and national security against Islamist militants and civil disturbances, and it knows U.S. troops from Manas are unlikely to interfere if a new uprising occurs, though Beijing and especially Moscow will be ready and able to oblige for their own interests.
The future of Manas Air Base is coming into question. On Sept. 21, Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev said Washington should pay a higher rent for the base and withdraw from Kyrgyzstan once the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes. Bakiyev said the terms and conditions of the lease agreement and current rent amount should be reviewed and were discussed when U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld toured Central Asia in July.
During a visit to Kyrgyzstan, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said Sept. 21 that Moscow is set to invest several billion rubles in a long-term program for its air base at Kant. Ivanov's announcement came as he signed an agreement with Kyrgyz Defense Minister Ismail Isakov to provide Kyrgyzstan with $3 million in military aid consisting of dozens of Kamaz trucks, an Mi-8 Hip helicopter, firearms and spare parts for support vehicles and armored vehicles. By providing the aid, Moscow is fulfilling Bishkek's wish list. In a mountainous country such as Kyrgyzstan, helicopters are very useful for transportation and logistical support -- and would facilitate support operations in the hills away from Kyrgyzstan's towns and cities, where Bishkek's control over the locals is tenuous at best. One feature of the Mi-8 is that gun pods and 57 mm unguided rocket pods can be mounted on the helicopter easily; thus a transport helicopter can be turned into a gunship. Also, armed with aging Soviet-made weapons and equipment, the Kyrgyz army needs spare parts from Russia.
Tajikistan
The Tajik government is balancing carefully between Moscow and Washington, with Russia maintaining a military base at Dushanbe and the United States hoping to get one to three air bases in the country to partly substitute for the loss of the large Karshi-Khanabad Air Base in Uzbekistan. Because some key Tajik officials could be under the influence of drug lords -- who are extremely powerful in Tajikistan and want to push Russia out of the country because Russian security forces interfere with their drug-trafficking operations that run from Afghanistan to Russia and Europe -- Tajikistan could tilt toward Washington.
There already are signs that Dushanbe is leaning toward the United States; on Sept. 16, a senior official in Tajikistan's ruling People's Democratic Party said Dushanbe is willing to host some of the U.S. military equipment and personnel that will have to leave Uzbekistan by early 2006. The statement indicates that Washington is having some success in its response to Russia and China's concerted efforts to roll back U.S. influence in Central Asia.
Turkmenistan
Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov traditionally keeps both Moscow and Washington at bay. Turkmenistan has been officially neutral since independence. Siding with either Moscow or Washington would shift the way that all of Turkmenistan's neighbors see the country and would force them all -- particularly Iran and Uzbekistan -- to reconsider their regional postures and strategic positions.
Niyazov so far has not allowed the United States to establish bases in his country, but he also has refrained from aligning firmly with Moscow by keeping Turkmenistan from joining security alliances with Russia or the SCO. Niyazov is not overly friendly toward the West, either, fearing the possibility of a pro-Western "revolution" in Turkmenistan. Despite Niyazov's attitude, Washington has been making overtures toward Ashgabat.
Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, visited Turkmenistan and Tajikistan in August in an effort to secure alternative bases after the U.S. leaves Manas and Karshi-Khanabad. Though U.S. and Turkmen officials denied the visit had anything to do with bases, it is difficult to otherwise explain Abizaid's visit; when he was busy commanding U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, Abizaid was not likely to go to Ashgabat with less meaningful goals in mind. German media reported that Washington was seeking bases in Turkmenistan and that Niyazov agreed to accept them in exchange for Washington's promise not to try to overthrow him. Russian intelligence sources say that agreement has not yet been made.
One of the Turkmen bases Washington reportedly is looking at is Mary, near the Iranian border. The former Soviet base was used heavily during the 1979-1989 Afghan war to stage Soviet bombing missions, and it has a long runway capable of accommodating large transport aircraft and strategic bombers. With some upgrades, the base at Mary would make an excellent regional logistics hub to support U.S. operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere in Central Asia. The base's proximity to Iran cannot have gone unnoticed; Washington knows that having a large U.S. presence on a third border will give Tehran something to worry about.
The other Turkmen base Washington is looking at is at Gusgy, on the Afghan border. During the Afghan war, Soviet troops used the border crossing there as a main transit point into Afghanistan, and there is still a small Turkmen-maintained air base there.
It remains to be seen whether Niyazov will allow U.S. forces into his country, or if the U.S. requests will be used only to further his policy of playing both sides of the fence between Washington and Moscow, though the latter is more likely. Overall, with the question of U.S. bases in Central Asia still unanswered, much of the "Great Game" still lies ahead.
Copyright 2005 Strategic Forecasting Inc. All rights reserved.
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