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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices

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To: combjelly who wrote (258522)11/5/2005 1:58:17 PM
From: i-node  Read Replies (3) of 1572953
 
>>> So that is nonzero evidence right there.

There is no law against leaking the name of a covert agent. There are other criteria that have to be met to make such a leak "criminal", and those criteria are not easily met. Unless the requisite intent can be shown, and the other criteria area satisfied, no crime was committed.

Before a person can be indicted of a crime there has to be some evidence that the crime was committed. It is unclear that such evidence exists.

That said, if it is shown that Rove did personally leak the name of a covert agent, regardless of his intent, I think he should be gone. I have some doubts about whether this woman was a "covert" agent, however.

Section 421. Protection of identities of certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources

(a) Disclosure of information by persons having or having had access to classified information that identifies covert agent

Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified information that identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.

(b) Disclosure of information by persons who learn identity of covert agents as result of having access to classified information

Whoever, as a result of having authorized access to classified information, learns the identify of a covert agent and intentionally discloses any information identifying such covert agent to any individual not authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the information disclosed so identifies such covert agent and that the United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such covert agent's intelligence relationship to the United States, shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(c) Disclosure of information by persons in course of pattern of
activities intended to identify and expose covert agents
Whoever, in the course of a pattern of activities intended to
identify and expose covert agents and with reason to believe that
such activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence
activities of the United States, discloses any information that
identifies an individual as a covert agent to any individual not
authorized to receive classified information, knowing that the
information disclosed so identifies such individual and that the
United States is taking affirmative measures to conceal such
individual's classified intelligence relationship to the United
States, shall be fined under title 18 or imprisoned not more than
three years, or both.
(d) Imposition of consecutive sentences
A term of imprisonment imposed under this section shall be
consecutive to any other sentence of imprisonment.
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