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Politics : Israel to U.S. : Now Deal with Syria and Iran

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To: philv who wrote (10332)3/12/2006 4:57:17 PM
From: sea_urchin  Read Replies (1) of 22250
 
Phil > If you could impose a border, I guess you would stick to the post 1967 one?

Basically, yes.

> Even the original land, carved out of Palestine after WWII was disputed by the Arabs, was it not? Why then is that particular border important?

1967 marked the Six Day war and the pre-1967 border was "decided" in 1948 at the War of Liberation/Independence at the time when the UN recognised the State of Israel. The UN also stated that there should be a Palestinian state made simultaneously but did not mention where the common border should be. It is that omission which has been the bone of contention ever since and the cause of all the trouble. Nevertheless I, and others, argue that if only by default the border should be where it was at that time. It certainly wasn't geographically or strategically ideal for anyone, as you know, it just happened to be where they stopped fighting prior to the critical moment of recognition.

> but borders change over the years through military conquest. Have a look at the map of Europe before WWI. Or even before WWII.

Yes, that was the case prior to WW2 but with the creation of the UN that was stopped and it became a a violation of international law to keep land which was won in war.

> Because what is now Jordan was part of the British Mandate of Palestine until 1921, many Jordanians of Palestinian descent cannot be described as refugees. They never fled, or were forced to flee, their original homes because of war.

The situation with Jordan (formerly TransJordan) is very complex because Britain did not identify where the Jewish homeland would be that it gave in terms of the Balfour Declaration. In fact, it did not even make known the Balfour Declaration for a long time. Thus it is not clear whether the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan was intended to be for the Arabs and the West side of the Jordan for the Jews or the West side was for both Jews and Arabs. It simply wasn't mentioned. Clearly, Britain was duplicitous -- in fact, the land that Britain "gave" didn't "belong" to Britain in the first place.

britishempire.co.uk

>>To further complicate the diplomatic waters, the British entered into an agreement with the French and Russians to divide the entire Middle East into areas of influence for each of the imperial powers but leaving the Holy Lands to be jointly administered by the three powers. This was a secret arrangement that was known as the Sykes Picot agreement of 1916. It directly contradicted the promises made to the Sharif of Mecca

Indeed, the waters were even further muddied by a third commitment entered into by the British in 1917. the British government made a promise to prominent Jews in Britain that the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine would be looked on with favour by the British. The reason for this pledge is not exactly clear, but it seems to have been made for two reasons. The first was to secure financial support from prominent Jewish financiers in Europe. The second seems to have been a way of breaking their own secret arrangement with the French and Russians by promoting their own influence into Palestine at their expense. Whatever the reason for this diplomatic chicanery, the diplomatic timebomb of these conflicting promises was about to explode as a direct result of the Russian revolution. The newly formed Bolshevik government took great pleasure in releasing the imperialistic designs of the British and French governments by publishing the Sykes-Picot agreement publicly and in full. The idea was to expose these capitilastic nations as morally bankrupt in their prosecution of the war and these secret agreements seemed to confirm that fact.

The publication of the Sykes-Picot agreement was not to be as politically devastating as feared for the simple fact that, at this point in time, the Arabs were advancing swiftly and assuredly against their Ottoman enemies. The Arabs felt that if they could make even further gains against the Ottomans that they would have more leverage in dealing with the imperial powers after the fighting had finished. The British were also advancing steadily through Palestine, capturing Jerusalem in December 1917. The British decisively defeated the Turks at Megiddo in September 1918, although the Arabs managed to enter Damascus before the British were in a position to do so. The Ottomans capitulated soon after leaving all of their previous dominions up for grabs.

The peace conference was used to impose allied plans and ideas on the defeated Central Powers, amongst whom was the Ottoman Empire. Faisal travelled in person to the peace conference to set forth the case of the Arabs in the divisions of the lands that they inhabited. He was not to be successful in promoting Arab independence, but had some success in persuading a border commission that Jewish immigration was not a good idea. Unfortunately, by this time, the British had already been declared as holding the mandate over Palestine and had independently reaffirmed the Balfour declaration opening the way for a Jewish homeland.

Meanwhile, a group of Arabs convened a congress in Damascus claiming an independent Syria with Faisal as the king. Soon after, Abdullah was declared as king of Iraq. The League of Nations Council rejected both pronouncements, and in April the San Remo Conference decided on enforcing the Allied mandates in the Middle East. French troops occupied Damascus in July, and Faisal was served with a French ultimatum to withdraw from Syria.

As a response to this action, Abdullah raised a force of 2,000 tribesman and advanced towards Damascus with a view of returning Faisal to the throne. By the March of 1920 he had advanced as far as Amman and was about to invade the French mandate of Syria. At this point, the British High Commissioner for Palestine intervened, calling for a conference of Arab leaders at As Salt. The Arab leaders were open to the idea partly as a response to the success of the fundamentalist Wahabbis in Arabia under the leadership of Ibn Saud. His power and influence was growing throughout the region at the expense of traditional rulers and families. So, when the High Commissioner offered Abdullah the leadership of Transjordan and a hefty financial subsidy the Hashemite ruler quickly called off his invasion of Syria. As part of the deal, his brother Faisal was offered the position of king of Iraq. The advantages for the British were clear, not only had they prevented the invasion of their allies lands, but they had also formed a reasonably legitimate and a strong bulwark state to protect their other interests in Palestine and Egypt. This strategic thinking was confirmed by Winston Churchill at the Cairo conference on Middle Eastern policy held in 1921. Britain subdivided the Palestine Mandate along the Jordan River to Gulf of Aqaba line. The eastern portion, called Transjordan, was to have a separate Arab administration operating under the general supervision of the commissioner for Palestine and with Jewish immigration specifically avoided. The League of Nations agreed and confirmed the borders of this mandate the following year. Not for the first time, a state had been created for the express strategic convenience of the British. <<

> The outright hatred and obvious mistrust between Jews and Arabs makes any compromise very difficult.

I don't believe that for one moment. In fact, the relations between most Israelis and Palestinians is excellent. The trouble comes with extremists and, in Israel, most of those are American settlers in the West Bank and, of course, political opportunists like Netanyahu and his clique. Don't forget that Rabin nearly secured a land for peace deal and, in fact, would have had not a right-wing extremist killed him.

> I am not advocating an all out war of annihilation, simply stating that in Europe's case, it was effective. For a time at least.

Gee whizz, I certainly hope you are not. Whether we like it or not, and whether it suits Israel or it doesn't, the days of ethnic cleansing are past. That stuff may have been acceptable in the old days in the US "when the West was won" or in Australia or even in SA up to the time of the apartheid regime but the world, at least we are told, has moved on since then.
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