U.S. study on fighting terrorism finds flaws
By Thom Shanker The New York Times
FRIDAY, MARCH 17, 2006
WASHINGTON A classified Pentagon study analyzing the effectiveness of U.S. Special Operations Forces has found that the military's counterterrorism efforts are hobbled by duplication of missions across the government, with officials citing as an example the intelligence community's new National Counterterrorism Center, whose work is closely paralleled at a new military special operations center.
The study, ordered by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, also found resistance to the Special Operations Command's official counterterrorism mission in the government bureaucracy and across the military.
The findings were viewed as so provocative that the classified report has not been distributed widely, even among officials with the security clearance needed to read such internal reviews, Pentagon and administration officials said.
One example of duplication of effort cited by officials who have read the secret study is the National Counterterrorism Center, a new intelligence agency established to coordinate policy, plan missions and analyze the terror threat, and which answers to John Negroponte, who was appointed as the first director of national intelligence.
Missions of that center, officials said, mirror those assigned to the equally new Center for Special Operations, a large, joint military headquarters that answers to a three-star general at the Special Operations Command and is charged with planning and carrying out military counterterrorism missions and analyzing the threat.
According to Pentagon civilians and military officers who have read the study, conducted by a retired four-star officer, General Wayne Downing Jr., the review found "a tremendous duplication of effort" in the government and military that crosses assignments given the Special Operations Command in its new role as the military's leader in the counterterrorism mission.
More broadly, the Pentagon review found that the government-wide national security bureaucracy still does not respond rapidly and effectively to the new requirements of the counterterror campaign.
The report cited a broad swath of the civilian bureaucracy and military as needing to streamline its efforts: civilians in the policy office that reports to Rumsfeld and the office of the secretary of defense, the military organization that reports to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the regional combatant commanders and even the National Security Council staff at the White House.
The review grew out of a budget and strategy briefing last October during which Rumsfeld expressed grave concerns at the high cost, both in dollars and in soldiers killed or wounded, as the Special Operations Command carries out its broad, new global counter- terror mission - one that has come with a record influx of money and personnel.
"The Rumsfeld family crest probably says something like, 'More, and faster,'" said one senior Pentagon official involved in the policy debate over the role of the command, known as Socom in military circles.
"So what he thinks about Socom is, 'With all this new money and all these extra people and all this wider latitude to maneuver, why haven't you won the war on terror for me yet?'"
In frustration, Rumsfeld reached out to Downing, a retired four-star officer known for his blunt, independent style, to conduct the classified review.
Downing, a former Socom commander, also led the inquiry into the bombing at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia and served as counterterrorism adviser for the first President George Bush.
Contacted by telephone and e-mail, Downing refused to discuss any specifics of the review, citing the secrecy of his work.
But asked to summarize his personal views of the debate, he said: "Over the years, the inter-agency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it materially inhibits the ability to apply the vast power of the U.S. government on problems.
"You see this inability to synchronize in our operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan, across our foreign policy and in our response to Katrina."
The Downing report begins by recounting the Special Operations Command's efforts from 2001 to 2005 and tallying up what might be needed in personnel, money and equipment for future capabilities.
But the study continues with a series of uncomfortable findings, criticizing what one official labeled "the institutional back office" - Pentagon civilians, the military's Joint Staff, the regional war-fighting commanders, the National Security Council staff - for not readjusting their organizations to expedite the command's new global mission to synchronize the military- wide counterterrorism mission as ordered by President George W. Bush.
Under a Unified Command Plan signed by Bush, the Special Operations Command now "leads, plans, synchronizes and, as directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks."
But the Defense Department bureaucracy is still wrestling with how to transfer full authority for those missions to Socom from the military's Joint Staff and from the regional war-fighting commanders who previously carried out those, or at least very similar, tasks.
The report included one radical proposal: It advocated relocating to Washington the headquarters of the Joint Special Operations Command, which runs all of the "special-mission units" that carry out the most secret attacks to stop terrorists and to halt the proliferation of unconventional weapons.
Further, the review proposed that these highly trained units be put under Rumsfeld's direct, personal control.
Several readers of the Downing review expressed certainty that this proposal was an effort to call the bluff of those at the Pentagon who say these elite counterterrorism teams were not doing enough to find and capture or kill terrorist leaders - in effect saying that if the Pentagon's leadership, including Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, was so dissatisfied, then they should try being in charge of planning and executing those missions.
That proposal was rejected immediately, although the idea of elevating the Joint Special Operations commander to a three-star position from two stars and elevating the regional Special Operations commanders to two stars from one - all to give them more clout - was approved.
WASHINGTON A classified Pentagon study analyzing the effectiveness of U.S. Special Operations Forces has found that the military's counterterrorism efforts are hobbled by duplication of missions across the government, with officials citing as an example the intelligence community's new National Counterterrorism Center, whose work is closely paralleled at a new military special operations center.
The study, ordered by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, also found resistance to the Special Operations Command's official counterterrorism mission in the government bureaucracy and across the military.
The findings were viewed as so provocative that the classified report has not been distributed widely, even among officials with the security clearance needed to read such internal reviews, Pentagon and administration officials said.
One example of duplication of effort cited by officials who have read the secret study is the National Counterterrorism Center, a new intelligence agency established to coordinate policy, plan missions and analyze the terror threat, and which answers to John Negroponte, who was appointed as the first director of national intelligence.
Missions of that center, officials said, mirror those assigned to the equally new Center for Special Operations, a large, joint military headquarters that answers to a three-star general at the Special Operations Command and is charged with planning and carrying out military counterterrorism missions and analyzing the threat.
According to Pentagon civilians and military officers who have read the study, conducted by a retired four-star officer, General Wayne Downing Jr., the review found "a tremendous duplication of effort" in the government and military that crosses assignments given the Special Operations Command in its new role as the military's leader in the counterterrorism mission.
More broadly, the Pentagon review found that the government-wide national security bureaucracy still does not respond rapidly and effectively to the new requirements of the counterterror campaign.
The report cited a broad swath of the civilian bureaucracy and military as needing to streamline its efforts: civilians in the policy office that reports to Rumsfeld and the office of the secretary of defense, the military organization that reports to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the regional combatant commanders and even the National Security Council staff at the White House.
The review grew out of a budget and strategy briefing last October during which Rumsfeld expressed grave concerns at the high cost, both in dollars and in soldiers killed or wounded, as the Special Operations Command carries out its broad, new global counter- terror mission - one that has come with a record influx of money and personnel.
"The Rumsfeld family crest probably says something like, 'More, and faster,'" said one senior Pentagon official involved in the policy debate over the role of the command, known as Socom in military circles.
"So what he thinks about Socom is, 'With all this new money and all these extra people and all this wider latitude to maneuver, why haven't you won the war on terror for me yet?'"
In frustration, Rumsfeld reached out to Downing, a retired four-star officer known for his blunt, independent style, to conduct the classified review.
Downing, a former Socom commander, also led the inquiry into the bombing at the Khobar Towers housing complex in Saudi Arabia and served as counterterrorism adviser for the first President George Bush.
Contacted by telephone and e-mail, Downing refused to discuss any specifics of the review, citing the secrecy of his work.
But asked to summarize his personal views of the debate, he said: "Over the years, the inter-agency system has become so lethargic and dysfunctional that it materially inhibits the ability to apply the vast power of the U.S. government on problems.
"You see this inability to synchronize in our operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan, across our foreign policy and in our response to Katrina."
The Downing report begins by recounting the Special Operations Command's efforts from 2001 to 2005 and tallying up what might be needed in personnel, money and equipment for future capabilities.
But the study continues with a series of uncomfortable findings, criticizing what one official labeled "the institutional back office" - Pentagon civilians, the military's Joint Staff, the regional war-fighting commanders, the National Security Council staff - for not readjusting their organizations to expedite the command's new global mission to synchronize the military- wide counterterrorism mission as ordered by President George W. Bush.
Under a Unified Command Plan signed by Bush, the Special Operations Command now "leads, plans, synchronizes and, as directed, executes global operations against terrorist networks."
But the Defense Department bureaucracy is still wrestling with how to transfer full authority for those missions to Socom from the military's Joint Staff and from the regional war-fighting commanders who previously carried out those, or at least very similar, tasks.
The report included one radical proposal: It advocated relocating to Washington the headquarters of the Joint Special Operations Command, which runs all of the "special-mission units" that carry out the most secret attacks to stop terrorists and to halt the proliferation of unconventional weapons.
Further, the review proposed that these highly trained units be put under Rumsfeld's direct, personal control.
Several readers of the Downing review expressed certainty that this proposal was an effort to call the bluff of those at the Pentagon who say these elite counterterrorism teams were not doing enough to find and capture or kill terrorist leaders - in effect saying that if the Pentagon's leadership, including Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, was so dissatisfied, then they should try being in charge of planning and executing those missions.
That proposal was rejected immediately, although the idea of elevating the Joint Special Operations commander to a three-star position from two stars and elevating the regional Special Operations commanders to two stars from one - all to give them more clout - was approved.
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