Talking Turkey with Ankara's Islamist prime minister.
BY ROBERT L. POLLOCK
Saturday, March 18, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST
ANKARA--"They might ban you from re-entering the United States," Tayyip Erdogan says with a smile. I've just told him I've been to see the anti-American, anti-Semitic, anti-Christian Turkish blockbuster "Valley of the Wolves--Iraq." And the Turkish prime minister deflects my follow-up about whether he's seen it as well. "What did you think of the movie?" he says, turning interviewer himself. To which I reply that it made me sad. While there are many things one might criticize about U.S. policy in Iraq--and I do go out of my way to concede this point--the suggestion that U.S. troops are murdering and dismembering Iraqis to facilitate a Jewish organ-selling scheme isn't one of them.
"Maybe they made this movie without going and living in Iraq," Mr. Erdogan replies. "Because it's very important to live the country to experience the country. That's why I saw the article you wrote about us in this manner. Because it was an article written without knowing Turkey and without knowing us. I was very sad when I read that." The exchange is typical Erdogan--clever, confident and, although obviously evasive, also human. Put these traits together with a roaring economy and an utterly hapless opposition and it's pretty obvious why the prime minister is the most popular Turkish leader since Turgut Ozal and has no serious rival ahead of elections due by next year.
As for that "article" he's talking about, there's a story there. Only a year ago many intellectuals and politicians in Turkey seemed to be in the grip of anti-American madness. Headlines calling U.S. soldiers "Murderer Johnny" were the norm atop newspaper articles describing imagined atrocities such as the use of chemical weapons--and, yes, organ theft--committed against civilians in Iraq. Turkey's opposition leader accused the CIA of plotting an internal party coup against him. And there were reports that secret U.S. nuclear testing had been the real cause of the Indian Ocean tsunami. Needless to say, this wasn't exactly becoming behavior for a NATO ally--and I said so, in a February 2005 op-ed piece on these pages (available here) that might be described, fairly, as having pulled no punches in its account of Turkish anti-Americanism.
I suspected that for most Turks--on average the best-mannered and most civilized people one will ever meet--the mere realization that the world was actually paying attention to this ridiculous discourse would have a curative effect. And it did. "I cannot remember any instance of so powerful a public outcry generated by a newspaper article, not by me, not by any others in Turkey," wrote a veteran Turkish columnist of my op-ed. But it also generated a fair amount of honest soul-searching, and a vast improvement in the content and tone of public debate.
And yet . . . a year later I am sitting in the prime minister's office and organ-selling is being discussed again. Although most writers and intellectuals disavow "Valley of the Wolves" and profess not to have seen the film, it was surely last year's headlines that inspired it.
To his immense credit, Mr. Erdogan does not himself traffic in anti-American rhetoric. And he reaffirms the value of Turkey's "strategic partnership" with the U.S. But neither will he just come straight out and condemn this movie, which is probably the most religiously and racially divisive film to reach mass audiences in Europe since World War II.
"I believe the people who made this movie took media reports as their basis . . . for example Abu Ghraib prison--we have seen this on TV, and now we are watching Guantanamo Bay in the world media, and of course it could be that this movie was prepared under these influences," Mr. Erdogan says. "Of course," I reply, "but do you believe that many Turks have such a view of America, that we're the kind of people who'd go to Iraq and kill people to take their organs?"
Mr. Erdogan: "These kind of things happen in the world. If it's not happening in Iraq, then its happening in other countries." Me: "Which kind of things? Killing people to take their organs?" Mr. Erdogan: "I'm not saying they are being killed. . . . There are people in poverty who use this as a means to get money. But of course the things portrayed in the movie are different things." Well, thanks for clearing that up!
I am a little disappointed. Mr. Erdogan tells me he wants an "alliance of civilizations, not a clash of civilizations." He tells me he wants Turkey to be a "bridge" between East and West. But that role would seem to require a little more leadership on such obvious cases of defamation.
I move on to the issue of what America can do to improve its image in Turkey. Mr. Erdogan cites "developments in Iraq" as the main source of the problem. I ask if he's uncomfortable with the U.S. strategy of promoting democracy in the region. He tells me that "As Turkey, we are trying to convey our own deep experience with democracy to the region. That's why we have taken part in the [U.S.-backed] Greater Middle Eastern project. . . . We're working on democracy, human rights and the rule of law." But he stresses that "we believe that all problems can be solved and should be solved at the negotiating table" and that "pushing, pressuring is not going to give any results." The bottom line: "We have the same idea as the United States regarding the goal of the project but maybe the method which should be used is different."
One specific area where the U.S. and Turkey now differ over method is the Israeli-Palestinian issue. The U.S. and Israel have sought to isolate Hamas diplomatically until it renounces violence and recognizes Israel. But in February the Erdogan government invited Hamas to Ankara for a high-profile--and controversial--visit. What did he hope to accomplish?
"There was an election in Palestine and there was a result of this election," Mr. Erdogan says. "This is the choice of the Palestinian people. And isn't it respecting democracy when you respect the wish of the Palestinian people? After the election has been done we cannot say the result was not as we wanted so we are not going to accept it." He continues: "So what we have to do here is support these people, to make them give up their arms and also make them accept that Israel and Palestine have a legitimate right to exist." He adds, finally, that "maybe even my friends have told them things that no other country could tell them." These arguments are not without merit, although his government certainly might have displayed more confidence in them by not dissembling about the visit until the day it actually happened.
I want to give Mr. Erdogan an opportunity to explain his undeniable domestic achievements. What has he tried to accomplish? He tells me about tackling the "three Ys": The letter "y" begins the Turkish words for corruption, poverty and prohibitions. Let's start with the latter. It's worth recalling that Mr. Erdogan was initially unable to claim his election victory after falling afoul of Turkish laws banning overly religious political expression. That needed to change, and Mr. Erdogan can justly brag that "no person has entered jail for expressing their thoughts during my term. Turkey is a country of freedoms."
On poverty, too, there is little doubt Mr. Erdogan is making much progress. I comment on how much richer Turkey seems since I first started visiting in the late '90s. Mr. Erdogan boasts that growth over the past three years has averaged 8% annually, and that per capita income has risen to about $5,000 (it's much, much higher, of course, in cities like Ankara and Istanbul). A major factor here has been that Turkey has finally beaten inflation, which was down to 7.7% at the end of last year from more than 30% before. This has fueled an unprecedented expansion in consumer credit and some Turks believe it's a "bubble." But I think they're more likely witnessing the real and permanent benefits of a stable currency.
Another factor is that Mr. Erdogan has helped make Turkey much more friendly to entrepreneurship. He tells me that the corporate tax rate has dropped to 20% from 33%, and that the top personal tax rate has fallen to 35% from 45% and "it will go down" further. And when I ask about his hopes for a legacy, it is interesting that he answers first in economic terms: "At the end of the next [government] term--2012--a Turkey which achieved $10,000 per capita income." He sounds like a fervent supply-sider!
But time is running short, and I can't let him go without asking about Iran. Is he worried about the nuclear program? "Why should we be scared? As you know we are a member of NATO. And as well we were neighbors of the Soviet Union for a long time. We weren't afraid in those days, why should we be afraid now?"
In other words, you've got our backs. It just so happens that during the middle of this exchange one of the prime minister's advisers receives word that International Atomic Energy Agency chief Mohamed ElBaradei wants Turkey to play a mediating role on the issue.
As we take photos and exchange pleasantries at the end, Mr. Erdogan asks about my marital status, and then my prospects. I'm told he asks that of a lot of people. It is a revealing habit.
Ever since Mr. Erdogan's Islamic-oriented Justice and Development Party swept to power on 35% of the vote in 2002 elections (amazingly, only one other party passed the 10% threshold for parliamentary representation), people have questioned whether his smooth manner wasn't cover for a more radical agenda to fundamentally change the secular character of the Turkish Republic established by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. I see no reason to believe this is the case.
Socially, Justice and Development might be best analogized to "family values" conservatives here in the U.S.--albeit a bit extreme, perhaps Mormonesque, in their dedication to clean living. (No alcohol, obviously, and smoking, too, is frowned on.) Economically, Mr. Erdogan would fit comfortably into the mainstream of American conservatism. His is the most effective government to lead Turkey for more than a decade, and he has used his large majority in Parliament to pass the hard but necessary reforms needed to prepare Turkey for membership in the European Union and in the modern world generally.
No, if there is any cause for concern here, it would be the undeniable fact that Turkey's first successful overtly Islamic prime minister has cultural and foreign policy compasses different from those of earlier Turkish leaders, who have inclined steadily toward the West. I sense a deeper estrangement at work than mere disagreement over Iraq, and whether or not to use force to remove roadblocks to democracy in the Middle East. "When we took office there was a Turkey which was not having talks with its neighbors. Now Turkey is having a dialogue with all of them. That's why we don't want any bombs to fall anymore in our region," Mr. Erdogan says.
But can he really believe this saccharine rhetoric, and that "all problems" can be solved at the negotiating table? (It's been less than a decade since Turkey nearly invaded Syria.) Or is it mere cover for the theories of advisers who believe that Turkey can be a bigger player on the world stage by distancing itself from the U.S.? And does he not recognize the import of the concession that his somewhat cavalier confidence on Iran is possible because NATO (i.e., the U.S.) ultimately stands behind Turkey? After all, such "strategic" alliances are not written in stone. They are dependent over the long term on public attitudes in the countries involved. As I leave his office I wonder how carefully he has thought through what would seem to be a most pressing question: Of what value will Turkey's opinion really be in a world of increasing or unresolved tension with the U.S. and where, God forbid, the mad mullahs next door have nukes?
Mr. Pollock is a member of The Wall Street Journal's editorial board.
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