Charles Duelfer, who led the official U.S. search for
     weapons of mass destruction after the war, says the tapes
     show extensive deception but don't prove that weapons
     were still hidden in Iraq at the time of the U.S.-led war
     in 2003. "What they do is support the conclusion in the
     report, which we made in the last couple of years, that
     the regime had the intention of building and rebuilding
     weapons of mass destruction, when circumstances permitted."

     So Iraqi intelligence conducted "covert offensive
     operations" involving "poisons" as well as explosives,
     carried out "sabotage and assassination" outside of Iraq,
     and trained agents in "the use of terror techniques"
     abroad. Not bad for a single eight-page document.

     "The Eight Directorate is responsible for development of
     materials needed for covert offensive operations. It
     contains advanced laboratories for testing and production
     of weapons, poisons and explosives."

     "is one of the most important directorates in the
     Mukhabarat. Most of its work is outside Iraq in
     coordination with other directorates, focusing on
     operations of sabotage and assassination."

     The Saddam Fedayeen also took part in the regime's
     domestic terrorism operations and planned for attacks
     throughout Europe and the Middle East. In a document
     dated May 1999, Saddam's older son, Uday, ordered
     preparations for "special operations, assassinations, and
     bombings, for the centers and traitor symbols in London,
     Iran and the self-ruled areas [Kurdistan]." Preparations
     for "Blessed July," a regime-directed wave of "martyrdom"
     operations against targets in the West, were well under
     way at the time of the coalition invasion.

     While it would be a mistake to put too much weight on any
     single document, the Mukhabarat's seeming endorsement of
     FAS's description of its activities would appear to
     confirm, among other things, Iraq's production of poisons
     for use in "covert offensive operations," and its training
     of terrorists for "clandestine operations abroad."...

     Why was Iraqi intelligence fearful of a "foreign attack"
     in December 2001? Why was the agency so intent on
     preventing its documents from being captured by an enemy
     in the event that Baghdad fell?

     IIS [Iraqi intelligence] report on Kurdish activities,
     mention of Kurdish reporting on Al Qaida, reference to Al
     Qaida presence in Salman Pak.

     "remove correspondence with the atomic energy and
     military industry departments concerning the prohibited
     weapons" and "remove prohibited materials and equipment,
     including documents and catalogs and making sure to clear
     labs and storages (sic) of any traces of chemical or
     biological materials that were previously used or stored..."

     [O]n the eve of the U.S.-led invasion....  details of a
     U.S. plan for war.... was disclosed to the Iraqis by the
     Russian ambassador....

    [T]he Russian ambassador was Vladimir Teterenko -- the
     same Teterenko that figured in the Oil-For-Food scandal...
    ....received over a million dollars in oil allocations 
    from Saddam Hussein.

     "There may well be--and probably will be--additional
     intelligence coming in from interrogations and from
     analysis of captured records and so forth which will fill
     out the intelligence picture. This is not phrased as, nor
     meant to be, the definitive word on Iraqi Intelligence
     activities."