Tehran's stated plan to develop badder weapons is troubling. It is their intent with these weapons that is admittedly scary. Do they really think that they will not get as much problem from fallout drifting back into Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, surely with whom they are not inimical? Do these nations not see that they are threatened by possible nuclear attack in this area by the unclean nukes the Iranians would be able to develop? So what are these weapons really for? A deterrent to people who would invade the country if Iran openly sponsored widespread attacks in the ME and sent conventional attacks against the Israeli and allied targets.
I am not so sure that even this scenario would deter allied attack in a general manner against Iran. After all, at that point the general risk/reward for limited relatively clean micro nuclear reply would be mitigates and point in the direction favouring attack. It would not be pretty, but it would get a necessary job fast done at that point. Or is all of this sabre rattling rhetoric from Iran just the usual, only more honest than the usual double talk? I am sure a lot of ME leaders think what the Iranians are saying, they just hold back. The SA leaders joined up a few years back with Egypt to do just that, destroy Israel. Iran's rhetoric is nothing new, or really changed from previous policies, just more clearly stated. It is also basically honest to say that they want nukes or at least deserve to have them, if they are not actively developing them.
Are these centrifuges aiming at peaceful enrichment? You still need even richer U, Plutonium or Americum to trigger a nuke. That requires a reactor. Reactors that are peaceful can used enriched U. More efficient nukes use non enriched Uranium such as the Candu, but they produce even better Plutonium. The Russians offered to sell then the hot stuff, but the Iranians balked. They want to supply themselves. That points to clandestine uses. Are they or aren't they on a program? Nobody who has done that, France, South africa, Canada or Russia have ever told anyone. But when they get them, they have to test them, and then the cat is out of the bag. There is still time at that point, and until they get delivery systems that are threatening, to kill it, but not much time. Portable sites are very hard to find and kill.
If Iran wanted peace and no nukes they would allow inspection. Pride does not explain a resistance to this amongst rational prudent people. Would Pakistan comply? Of course not. Russia finally did because they worked out the scenario. Finally they could see that they would cause as much destruction to themselves for no gain, with their own nukes even if they won, so they decided that peace and capitulation with honour was far less expensive and they still had self determination.
It all points to the partial efficacy and advisability of a defensive system for missiles. At this point MAD is not operative and anyway the enemy in this case thinks the loose cannon ploy works better than negotiation. It might buy you time, or it might buy a real loose cannon that is bigger than your loose cannon.
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