Since it would be in Bush's interest to *find* documents that would support at least part of his preinvasion claims one possible scenario is that these documents are not seen as the legitimate reports you think they are. The presence of documents in and of themselves does not guarantee the legitimacy of the documents- nor does it guarantee the legitimacy of what they appear to express.
Listen.. these documents were collected in boxes from actual offices of the IIS, or from document "stashes" where they hoped to hide them. Sometimes we'd put a thousand boxes full of papers out of these sites, so if they were fraudulent, someone went to one hell of lot of trouble perpetrating the fraud.
And again, I personally read thousands of reports related to Al Qai'da in Iraq leadership who were former IIS or Special Repbulican Guard members. Former bodyguards for the Hussein family.. etc..
And my personal opinion, based upon my experience, is that the IIS during the '90s, was becoming increasingly infiltrated (or directed) by religious fanatics willing to assist Jihadist groups like Al Qai'da.
This view was quite controversial over there amongst Analysts. I numerous debates with several of them over what we were discovering. But we really never got a grasp on what came first, pre-war involvment and coordination with Al Qai'da, or post-war alliance with them (or possibly an outright invitation by the Ba'thists for Al Qai'da to operate against Coalition forces).
But pure logic dictates that a Jihadist group would be hesitant in purely aiding a return of a Ba'thist government that did not fulfill the Jihadist agenda.
What we must remember is that Saddam wanted to stay in power and his Ba'thist government was clearly humiliated by their defeat in Kuwait and the subsequent sanction regime. Thus, in order for Hussein to remain in power, he needed new foundations of support. Whereas previously (pre-Desert Storm)the Ba'thists persecuted the Jihadists, after that war Saddam was seen to adopt a far more Islamic tone in his public speeches, going so far as to place "Allah Ahkbar" on the Iraqi flag.
Additionally, the decriminalization of "honor killings", were instituted in the '90's.. a hallmark of the encroachment of Jihast values as Saddam sought new fountains of support for his continue rulership.
Now.. of course, I'm not ever mentioning the fact that there was a major effort to oppress the Shi'a "heretics" after Desert Storm, (certainly after the Shi'a rose up in rebellion against Saddam) greater than previous years, and this opened up the opportunity within the IIS for many Jihadists to enter service and become religiously indoctrinated (since Shi'ism is a major threat to Wahhabist/Salafist beliefs).
So it's not much of a stretch to believe the IIS, and SSO, as "guardians" of Iraqi internal security, would become more religiously indoctrinated over the past 14 years.
Which suggests that it's not much of a stretch that, within boundaries of preserving "deniability" that the IIS was encouraged to develop new ties with Al Qai'da in order to 1). Prevent Al Qai'da from targeting Saddam, and 2). finding means of striking out at Iraq's enemies, including the US.
Now.. let's turn to 1998, when it appears the IIS invited Bin Laden to come to Baghdad to discuss their common enemies, the US and Saudi Arabia:
telegraph.co.uk
Papers found yesterday in the bombed headquarters of the Mukhabarat, Iraq's intelligence service, reveal that an al-Qa'eda envoy was invited clandestinely to Baghdad in March 1998.
The documents show that the purpose of the meeting was to establish a relationship between Baghdad and al-Qa'eda based on their mutual hatred of America and Saudi Arabia. The meeting apparently went so well that it was extended by a week and ended with arrangements being discussed for bin Laden to visit Baghdad.
What's truly interesting about this invitation is that in the previous month, Bin Laden had issued a Fatwa denouncing the US enforcement of the UNSC sanctions against Iraq:
ict.org.il
Now if one understands the "dance" involved when governments and organizations "court" one another, it's clear to see that Bin Laden's Fatwa was a display of his desire to seek an alliance with Iraq, if only to seek a financial supporter. And the IIS Top Secret memo inviting Bin Laden to visit Iraq was a clear signal of Iraq's receptivity to such an alliance.
Now X,... ask yourself just what it takes for you to perceive collusion with Al Qai'da and a threat to the security of the US on the part of Iraq? Do you require "beyond a reasonable doubt" type of evidence such as some signed public proclamation that Saddam and Bin Laden were mutually supporting one another out of vested self-interest?
I know I don't...
All I need to know is that Saddam was actively entertaining an alliance with Bin Laden. They didn't even have to meet one another. Certainly Saddam would be hesitant to have it discovered that Bin Laden had visited Iraq. This would have brought down almost immediate wrath upon his government given it would have absolutely violated the cease-fire accord.
But you, and everyone else, will have to decide exactly what constitutes a threat.. And you'll have to ask yourselves whether there is any truth to whether Iraq had contacts with Muhammad Atta, the Hamburg Student, and whether it suggests Iraqi complicity with the 9/11 attacks, or just a chance for a Iraqi case officer to have tea with some other "Hamburg Student":
Al-Ani scheduled a meeting in April with a "Hamburg student" according to an appointment calendar subsequently turned up by Czech intelligence in a surreptitious search of the Iraq Embassy (presumably after the defeat of Iraq in April 2003.)
edwardjayepstein.com
Yes.. you'll have to ask yourself WHY the liberals aren't asking these pointed questions about why the Bush administration isn't producing this information in a concise manner for the American people to understand.
Maybe because the liberals don't care, and they are just as intent on misinforming the public as they alleged Bush was.
Hawk |
