That is only if you accept that weather is a chaotic system. Can you prove a system is indeterminant? Or, if it is determinant, that it is so, and not predictable? Has there been a Godelian pronouncement on this logic? If there has been, I guess we will have to vote for its progenitor as likely to receive a Nobel or two.
I reiterate, it is not enough to assume that some systems might be chaotic as they are indeterminate and complex.. as in bridges' joints, which are indeterminant, but engineerable nonetheless as is their failure predictable given modeling etc..
So you cannot have it both ways, either the system is determinant and predictable or determinant and unpredictable, and to know this you must show how it is, -or- it is random and unpredictable because of complexity, which is different .. and it is only theoretical and not rigorously logical yet that "seeming randomness" (which is really just obfuscation of patterns, or seeming unpredictability in itself), is unpredictable by any means.
I think weather is just complex, and multivariant. This is not the same as chaotic or random. I believe all Lorenz saw was complexity that he had not anticipated, which could be because of unaccounted for variables. i.e. jet stream disturbances or contrails of jet aircraft disturbing the upper atmosphere. wired.com
(However, testing this proposition has been tricky. Scientists can't just ground all the planes across, say, North America and then study the before-and-after data.
But, for three days starting last Sept. 11, meteorological researchers were presented with just such an opportunity when the FAA grounded commercial flights nationwide for three days following the terrorist air attacks.
And now it has emerged that the American climate was indeed noticeably different during those three days without air travel. )
Above they say climate when they really mean weather. Actually they are still right, as the weather difference observed could lead to climatic changes.
I will give you some equal time stuff here just to show that differentiating between determinacy and predictability is not a weak-minded concept.
"The diehard Newtonian can argue that fractal boundaries present no problems in principle, since complete specification of the initial conditions still completely determines the trajectory, even in the fractal regions. He is beginning to get onto shaky ground, however, since on classical views complete specification would require determining the real numbered values of the momentum and position for a real-valued time. Since there are more real numbers than can be specified by finite techniques, the difference between a point that leads to one attractor and a point that leads to another might not be finitely specifiable. This would mean that the attractor the trajectory leads to is in principle unpredictable.
On the other hand, the Newtonian is correct in saying that the trajectory is determinate. This shows that determinacy and predictability are not the same thing in classical mechanics, even with the fullest knowledge we could have. The distinction is not merely a practical one. In dynamical systems with multiple attractors and fractal regions, predictability is non-local. In order to know how the system will evolve, we need to observe its characteristics at more than one point. This is a major blow to Laplacian determinism.
It is tempting to identify mechanism with the possibility of Laplacian determinism. If so, the new physics undermines mechanism. This, in turn, undermines the rational for the Newtonian view of space as composed of independent points (or, to accommodate relativity theory, a spacetime composed of spatio-temporal points, or "events"). The need for a real physical space to account for dynamical effects is not eliminated, however, since these effects still need to be explained. Although the non-locality of space implied by the new physics in conjunction with identifying mechanism with Laplacian determinism is also characteristic of relational views of space, this conjunction does not imply relationism, which must still deal with the dynamical function of Newtonian space."
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