Thanks for the source. It points out that no maps were presented at the talks. So the only realistic way of looking at the maps is to ask who has the most to gain by the maps they produce.
Clinton's map: Insures that he wasn't the bad guy.
Palestinian Map: Insures that they weren't the bad guys.
Israeli Map: Insures that they weren't the bad guys.
What we need to see is a transcript of what was said. Which won't happen.
So we end up believing instead of knowing. And getting nowhere.
I believe that the underlining reasons for Israel's existence is anti-semitism. The Balfour declaration is a good example of European anti-semitism in that by supporting a Jewish homeland and having Jews move to that homeland removes Jews from Europe. The nazis with the silent agreement of many European governments created the holocaust and thereby created the ground work for western guilt to operate and create Israel in an area of the world which had no westerners and therefore no rights in their eyes. The Arab protests at the UN were vociferous, and with reason. The west was dumping a European problem into their laps. The Europeans should have had the fortitude to say that Jews had a right to live in Europe and that restitution for crimes committed against Jews(not only by the nazis but also by anti-semites prior to WWII) would be made. That didn't happen and we got Israel instead.
The Ross interview was very interesting in that it brought forward a far more subtle picture of the ME than is usually portrayed in the western media. Thanks for pointing me in that direction. Here is a section of the Ross interview.
"DENNIS ROSS: I have been able to restrain my enthusiasm not for the Roadmap per se but for the diplomacy behind the Roadmap. It was negotiated with parties who don't have to carry it out, which would have been fine if we had then gone to the Israelis and the Palestinians and negotiated what the implementation would be.
If you are not prepared to do that, then you have to do something else. Having established the mutual obligations in the Roadmap, what you then had to do is at a minimum establish what would constitute performance. No set of performance standards were ever created. The Israelis interpret all the Palestinian obligations maximally and their own obligations minimally, and the Palestinians interpret all of the Israeli obligations maximally and their own minimally. There was no relationship whatsoever in their own eyes as to what they were supposed to do, and nobody ever established what constituted performance.
What a surprise that the Roadmap has been stillborn. I'm always asked the question, "Is it dead?" I respond, "How can it be dead when it hasn't been born?"
The quartet could be useful, but nothing has prevented anybody from going in and playing a role during the life of the Bush Administration. The Bush Administration disengaged.
If others were prepared or capable of playing a role, they had every opportunity to do it. It didn't happen. I was accused of "keeping the Europeans out." I used to say, "I'm not keeping them out. If I want them in and the Israelis and Palestinians want them out, they're out. If I want them out and the Israelis and Palestinians want them in, they're in." You can establish whether you will do something by proving that you can be effective.
Does it mean that there is no role for others? No. If this Administration says publicly to the Palestinians, "We will help if you do the following and we will not help if you don't," no one will listen. But if the Europeans say that publicly, it makes a difference because they are seen as instinctively sympathetic to the Palestinian cause.
This means that the Europeans and the Arab leaders have leverage, but they have to be prepared to use it, and that, for our part, we should be working with the others to orchestrate this."
cceia.org |
