Letter From Jose Gonzalez "Fred is friend of mine and he is Israeli-American. He told me that his relative, IDF (Israeli Defense Force) reserve officer, claimed IDF has [begun] study[ing] Second Battle of Fallujah on Nov. 2004 about house-to-house search, put soldiers on roof of the houses and etc. after IDF failed to secure 3 villages include Bint Jbail past week.
Analysis From Paul Danish Editor's Note: Mr. Danish's letter is dated July 28th but reached us only yesterday.
To repeat, Israel appears to be conducting a Gulf War I style air campaign in preparation for a Gulf War I style ground campaign, i.e. an attack in massive force after Hezbollah has been savaged for a month to six weeks.
At the same time, it is also conducting a Falluga campaign writ large in which Civilians are driven out of southern Lebanon so that Hezbollah's forces can be struck without civilians providing them with cover. Chances are that, in addition to killing as many Hezbollah jihadis and cadre as possible an objective of the campaign will be to inflict great physical destruction on those communities that have served as Hezbollah's enablers, been complicit in its campaign against Israel, and benefited from its largesse. The point of this is to make Hezbollah's presence less welcome. This too is reminiscent of Falluga.
The call-up of three Israeli reserve divisions now is entirely consistent with this timing. Get them in place and give them a couple of weeks to prepare.
So is this fact, buried in the depths of a Washington Post story: Lebanon has about a weeks' supply of gasoline left. Stopping road traffic in its tracks would obviously be enormously important in a ground campaign. It would limit Hezbollah's attempts at resupply to say nothing of its movements on the battle field. If Lebanon has about a week's supply of fuel left, figure a ground attack sometime after that -- like two or three weeks from now.
There's an old Irish Republican Army song that starts out "Come out you Black and Tans, Come out and fight me like a man..."
Israel's incursion into south Lebanon without moving deeper in the country is a challenge to the manhood of Hezbollah to come out and fight. And the poor fellows seem to be taking the bait. As a result they are on the wrong end of a 10 to 1 KIA ratio. Allah Akbar.
If things continue on their present course, Israel will likely take control of the border road network inside Lebanon that's dominated by Bent Jbail -- and with it control of Hezbollah's first line of defense -- in the next week to ten days. This would give it a series of excellent starting points for a major ground thrust, that it would probably be ready to start in the third or four week of August.
I don't see this war ending inconclusively. Israel has too much at stake.
August 28th:
The Israeli Army If you are an Israeli Army partisan, please don't read this. It comes from a senior military person with 40+ years of experience of Middle Eastern armies who is very pro-Israeli. This person's assessment is, we believe, completely on the mark, but if you are a person who believes in the Israeli Army for whatever reason, you don't need to read this. Given on background, summary.
The Israeli Army is a true citizen army, with all of the attendant virtues and flaws. The virtues include the involvement of every citizen in the defense of the state. When his country's survival is at stake, the Israeli soldier is second to none in his bravery and his willingness to die. But as is the case with any citizen army, when the issues are not stark black and white, the Israeli soldier does not do as well as soldiers from professional armies who fight because they believe in the warrior ethic.
The Israeli Army's reputation is a false one, built on victories over second-rate draftee armies belonging to countries without democracy or social equity led by third-rate generals answering to fourth-rate leaders.
It's level of training is seriously deficient in terms of the requirements for modern warfare. This cannot be otherwise when you have a citizen army. It is simply not possible to draft soldiers for 3 years, send them back to civilian life, recall them periodically for training, and mobilize them in emergency. There is just no way the Israeli army can be as efficient as, say, the US or British armies.
The training of the short-service officers and senior non-coms is seriously deficient.
The Israeli Army is mechanized, because the armies of its conventional enemies, past and present, are mechanized. The Israelis boast about their infantry; the truth is their infantry is the weakest part of the army and this was was evident in the first invasion of Lebanon, is glaringly evident in the Gaza operations, and is becoming unfortunately apparent in Lebanon. The Israeli Army is simply not equipped or trained for urban and CI operations.
The Israelis are relying so completely on armor as to be creating great difficulty for themselves. The fighting they are now engaged in requires skilled infantry to attack and fight on foot in extremely unfavorable conditions, where the defender has every advantage and the attacker none. It requires an absolute indifference to casualties, which obviously cannot be the case for a tiny country with a small army. It requires an endurance which an army conditioned to expect strategic victories in very short periods of time cannot be expected to display.
The Israeli military leadership, despite its public bravado, knows in detail the weaknesses of its army. Before now, however, those who focused on the weaknesses were not taken seriously because by and large, every Israeli believes no Arab can stand up to him.
The Israeli Army has now learned its mistake. You ask if it is not an absolute disgrace that two crack brigades and any number of special forces have still not cleared 3 villages/small towns defended by less than 200 enemy - the number may have changed if reinforcements have arrived, I have no information on this. But that is because you also attribute to the Israeli Army capabilities it has never had and you also subscribe to the myth of the cowardly, incompetent Arab. Hezbollah is Iranian trained: always keep that in mind. It is quite different from other Arab/Muslim forces in a variety of ways. Israel is facing a determined enemy fighting on his own ground. Given its capabilities which are not suited for this type of warfare, I believe the Israeli Army has done as well as may be expected.
You ask as a last point about the Israeli habit of firing on UN positions. What you have said in your blog and in our conversation is true. But there are 3 factors about which you are not sufficiently aware, and all three arise from your natural tendency to believe Israeli propaganda about their capabilities - I do recognize you have been saying their capabilities are overstated.
First, Israeli Army communications are not as good you think they are. The US Army has absolutely the best battlefield communications networks the world has ever seen, and even there there are problems at crucial times. Some of the UN-related incidents can be traced back to communications problems between HQ and front-line units; the problems become worse when a third party such as the UN is trying to communicate under combat conditions.
Second, as I have said earlier, the Israeli Army is a mechanized force intended for fast-moving operations in open terrain. Their natural tendency is to shoot first and ask questions later. I am not excusing the Israeli action, only noting realities. Since you are familiar with the US Army, I don't have to tell you about the US Army, which shoots first and never asks questions, and you should keep that in mind before coming down so hard on the Israelis.
The Israeli Army has poor fire discipline: this is not a criticism of the soldiers, they are not trained any other way. The Israelis have always given themselves a free hand when it comes to civilians, you are seeing that in Lebanon. So restraint is not something your Israeli tank troop commander or battery commander or infantry leader has been trained for.
Last, while Israeli border troops permanently assigned to a border may be quite familiar with the location of UN positions, units that come in for an operation may not have the same knowledge. I agree there is no excuse. At the same time, as you know quite well, the gap between theory and practice is never wider than is the case in combat. But when a combat unit arrives and prepares for an operation, about the last thing on the minds of the commanders is the precise location of UN posts and how they are to be avoided at all costs.
May I parenthetically remind you forward troops in contact with the enemy are always on edge. They see enemy where the enemy is not, they are often not able to precisely identify from where you are being fired on. If you have a predisposition to believe the enemy is using UN posts as safe spots from which to fire on you, you are all the quicker to call for artillery fire and air strikes - and often you can be tragically, completely wrong. Surely you have seen enough of that in the inadvertent US attacks on civilians in Iraq and Afghanistan. Also don't forget artillery by its nature is imprecise. The FOO can call for fire 500 meters to the left of a UN post and 1000 meters to its rear, and you can be sure that some percentage of shells in a heavy shoot is going to land exactly where you don't want them to land.
Please be careful to explain to your readers I have no knowledge of the recent incident. I speak generally, and also with long experience of the Israeli Army. Many attacks on UN positions are deliberate. Many are really accidents.
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