SB/Mansky downgrade on STX/WDC/KOMG (couple days ago)
Data Storage Infrastructure
Citigroup Investment Research
HDD UPSIDE LESS CLEAR PRIOR TO 1H CY07; REDUCING STX & WDC TO HOLD
September 18, 2006 SUMMARY
* Reducing ratings on WDC and STX from Buy
Paul Mansky to Hold target price from $31 to $25.50
+1-415-951-1668 (STX) and $24 to $18.50 (WDC). Although
paul.mansky@citigroup.com further deterioration in the market is not
Christopher J Warner expected, the opportunity for seasonal
+1-415-951-1727 fundamental improvement appears
christopher.j.warner@citigroup.com constrained, leaving the shares
range-bound.
* Downside risk appears modest among each,
less at STX given product breadth,
acquisition-related cost savings and
buy-back.
* Demand is tracking reasonably well. At
issue is a slower than expected mix-shift
to high cap HDD's in PC, associated
(albeit moderating from June) pricing
pressure in DT and NB and inventory
overhang.
* Reducing HDD unit TAM from 15% and 17%
growth (CY06E & 07E) to 14% and 16%,
respectively. Expect end-market
reacceleration to commence ~CQ2 off
Vista/Leopard and attractive comps.
SUMMARY VALUATION AND RECOMMENDATION DATA
Expected Returns Earnings Per
Share
Company Price Price Div. Total Ratin Div.(E Targe LTGR Current Next Yr
(Ticker) g ) t Yr
Komag Inc $32.87 21.7% 0.0% 21.7% Cu 1H $0.00 $40.00 NA $4.71E $4.74E
(KOMG) rr
Pr 1H $0.00 $40.00 NA $4.71E $4.74E
ev
Seagate $22.09 15.4% 1.4% 16.9% Cu 2H $0.32 $25.50 5% $1.76E $2.61E
Technology- rr
(STX) Pr 1H $0.32 $31.00 5% $2.05E $2.62E
ev
Western $16.05 15.3% 0.0% 15.3% Cu 2H $0.00 $18.50 NA $1.76E $1.87E
Digital rr
(WDC)
Pr 1H $0.00 $24.00 NA $1.83E $1.92E
ev
OPINION
We are reducing our ratings and target price for both Western Digital and
Seagate, given our views that the opportunity for back half seasonal
improvement in fundamentals appears both narrower and less significant than
recent history and general expectations. For Western Digital, our prior Buy
rating and $24 target has been adjusted to Hold / $18.50. For Seagate, we are
reducing our Buy to a Hold while our target is trimmed from $31 to $25.50.
At the center of our concerns are the prolonged traction of 80GB desktop
drives, muted reflection of end-demand amidst inventory work-down, and ongoing
price instability in DT and NB. Although we continue to have a favorable view
for calendar 2007 as a whole (Vista mix shift, easy comps), the industry level
improvements are not expected to commence until the June quarter, or FQ4 for
both STX and WDC. Faced with this profile, and valuations that appear
reasonable, we prefer the sidelines during the next 1-2 quarters and would
consider accumulation at the beginning of the year.
INDUSTRY VIEW
We have adjusted our industry unit forecast from 15% and 17% growth in calendar
2006 and 2007 to 14% and 16%, respectively. The basis for the revision is
multi-faceted, including the softer June '06 quarter, its associated inventory
overhang and a modestly weaker than traditional back half demand profile. We
expect PC-related seasonality to be particularly pronounced this year, with PC-
builds drawing down sharply in Nov/December and remaining depressed (relative)
through the first quarter in advance of the anticipated OS refreshes from
Microsoft and Apple.
Historically, the industry has benefited from a positive mix shift during into
back-to-school and the holiday season as consumer PC purchases (which typically
carry higher capacity drives) outpace corporate demand. This year, while
overall demand appears to be tracking (according to our PC analyst Rich
Gardner), we believe the mix-up to higher capacity drives, particularly in
desktop, is progressing more slowly than anticipated. In addition to our more
recent primary checks, we point out that both Seagate and Western Digital
indicated a disproportionate amount of the June quarter overhang was associated
with high capacity drives while on September 6th Komag indicated that its
September quarter was tracking below plans, due in part to slower than expected
mix shift to >120GB media.
We believe this is primarily a function of the incursion of notebooks into the
desktop market continuing. With this, PC OEM's are attempting to segment the
market, with DT pricing being the primary lever. With the lower price points
in DT comes a resistance to a higher bill of materials, hence the widely
available trailing edge 80GB drives are proving to be "stickier" than many had
anticipated. Although pricing at the 80GB capacity point has not materially
degraded versus the difficult June, it does not appear to have improved as
Samsung and others continue to vie for Maxtor's redistributed market share.
Notebook unit volumes are expected to be attractive. However, with each of the
major HDD OEM's now in the market, pricing here has also been challenging.
Although we acknowledge that the company's yield and product positioning
challenges are such that uniform extrapolation is unwarranted, we point out
Hitachi's recent downward revision as another input relative to our moderating
industry level (near-term) views. Hitachi currently commands approximately 15%
of the market (units), with concentrations in notebook (31%), enterprise (14%)
and desktop (10%). For the December year (adjusted for March reporting),
Hitachi reduced second half unit targets by 14% while reducing ASP's by 8%
(~$9/unit), the latter representing an expected 9% ASP decline versus the first
half of the year.
Exhibit 1: Hitachi's revised HDD forecast
Source: Company and CIR estimate
We expect the dynamics presented above to persist, to varying degrees, through
the balance of the calendar year and into early 2007. From there, we expect
the Vista-equipped PC products will likely be the vehicle to re-accelerate
demand for higher capacity drives (160GB), which should be more broadly
available. Improved units and mix within PC-related HDD's coupled with an
anticipated easing of the competitive dynamic surrounding the Maxtor land grab
amidst more favorable year-year compares has our full year 2007 view continuing
to be favorable. Key milestones to watch that include: 1) channel inventory
levels entering December; 2) timing of the Vista launch; 3) Samsung's appetite
for low (to zero) margin share gain in desktop.
SEAGATE
We are reducing our rating and price target on Seagate from Buy / $31 to Hold /
$25.50. Of the disk drive manufacturers, we view the risk profile at Seagate
to be more attractive given the company's product diversification, opportunity
for acquisition related synergies and pending share repurchase. However, given
our more muted near-to-mid term views at the industry level, we are adjusting
our estimates downward. We see the downside risk as limited to ~$18, or 0.8x
NTM sales -- the company's recent two year low rolling NTM revenue multiple.
We are reducing our September quarter revenue outlook to $2.68B from $2.72B and
EPS to $0.19 from $0.35. For the full year we are reducing both our revenue and
EPS outlook, from $11.9B and $2.05 to $11.8B and $1.76, respectively. The
company is expected to continue to cost-optimize the Maxtor solutions over the
next 1-2 quarters, positioning itself well to engage the improved unit growth
profile in 2007, per our estimates. However, over the near-term Seagate is not
expected to benefit as fully as we had expected from two key programs. First,
with the slower than expected mix shift to 160's in the DT market, the company
will not fully be able to bring its PMR lead to bear on the market. Second,
the 1.8" drives missed the design window for CQ4, pushing the initial material
ramp into the seasonally weaker first half. Additionally, with Woodlands2 now
fully equipped, incremental media will need to be outsourced from Komag prior
to the construction of Woodlands3, not expected until late calendar 2007.
WESTERN DIGITAL
We are reducing our rating and price target on Western Digital from Buy / $24
to Hold / $18.50. Like Seagate, Western Digital lacks a clear catalyst in 2006
that would provide upside to the current share levels. Unlike Seagate, however,
near-term support for the stock in the form of a buyback is on hold until the
company can file its 10-K, which has been delayed until the board of directors
can complete its stock option grant review. We see the downside risk as
limited to ~$15, or 0.7x NTM sales -- the company's recent two year low rolling
NTM revenue multiple.
We are reducing our September quarter revenue and EPS outlook to $1.14B/$0.41
from $1.17B/$0.42. For the full year we are reducing both our revenue and EPS
outlook, from $4.9B and $1.83 to $4.7B and $1.76, respectively. The company's
dependence on the desktop market (78% of FY06 revenues), while improved from an
historical standpoint, still makes it more susceptible to our industry level
concerns regarding mix and demand air pockets. Additionally, consensus
expectations that WD would grab at least 50% of Maxtor's desktop sales appears
at risk after aggressive moves by Hitachi and Samsung to expand their own share
of the market.
QUARTERLY ESTIMATES PER SHARE DATA
Current Year Next Year Next Year + 1
Ticker Period Current Previous Current Previous Current Previous
KOMG 1Q $1.09A $1.09A $1.19E $1.19E NA NA
(FYE Dec) 2Q $1.21A $1.21A $1.19E $1.19E NA NA
3Q $1.12E $1.12E $1.20E $1.20E NA NA
4Q $1.28E $1.28E $1.15E $1.15E NA NA
Year $4.71E $4.71E $4.74E $4.74E $4.42E $4.42E
STX 1Q $0.19E $0.35E NA NA NA NA
(FYE Jun) 2Q $0.42E $0.52E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.53E $0.57E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.61E $0.61E NA NA NA NA
Year $1.76E $2.05E $2.61E $2.62E $2.57E $2.57E
WDC 1Q $0.41E $0.42E NA NA NA NA
(FYE Jun) 2Q $0.49E $0.52E NA NA NA NA
3Q $0.41E $0.43E NA NA NA NA
4Q $0.44E $0.46E NA NA NA NA
Year $1.76E $1.83E $1.87E $1.92E $1.92E $1.97E
VALUATION AND RISKS -- COMPANIES DISCUSSED
Komag (KOMG--$32.87; 1H)
Valuation
Our price target for Komag shares is $40. We employ both Price/Sales and
Price/Earnings as our valuation methodologies but reply upon our P/E output as
the primary price target determinant. Comparables for the company include
stand-alone disk drive manufacturer Seagate as well as component provider
Hutchinson Technology. Although the company competes against several
international companies including Showa Denko, Fuji Electric, Hoya and Asahi
Glass, given each derives the majority of their revenue from sources other than
the HDD media market, we do not view them to be relevant comparables from a
valuation perspective.
Based on our estimates, Komag is currently trading at 1x next-12-month (NTM)
sales and 7x NTM EPS (GAAP). On a comparative basis, the company's rolling
mean, high and low NTM revenue multiples over the prior two years have been
1.2x, 1.7x and 0.7x, respectively. Conversely, the shares NTM earnings
multiple range over this same period has been 10x, 12x and 7x, respectively.
With respect to our Price/Earnings valuation, we assign an 8x multiple to our
NTM GAAP EPS estimate of $4.78. The discounted multiple relative to the two
year mean reflects our views that the coming 12 months will likely capture the
bulk of the upside relative to the current cycle. The modest premium to the
trough (7x) reflects what we see as near-term upside associated with the
company's VPA relationships with Seagate, Western Digital, Hitachi and Samsung
(pending). Our rounded price target under this approach is $40 .
Had we opted to employ a Price/Sales valuation, our multiple assignment of 1.2x
would suggest a $36.00 price target. Our multiple assignment is in-line with
the company's two year mean, given our views that near-term operating margins
are depressed due to underutilized capacity, which will be quickly absorbed in
the coming quarters.
Risks
We rate shares of Komag as High Risk. Our risk rating reflects our views
related to the stock's price volatility (Beta = 1.8 weekly since 12/2003 per
Bloomberg), earnings stability (cyclicality) and anticipated cash flows.
Although we acknowledge the company's prior Chapter 11 status merits
consideration, with the improved capital structure including lower levels of
debt at more attractive terms and the sale of spare facilities, Komag's post-
restructuring operating efficiency has minimized the chance for recurrence.
* Incremental industry capacity coming on-line in calendar 2006/7. Throughout
calendar 2005 and early 2006, the dominant theme within the disk drive
industry has been tight supply amidst strong demand. In order to restore
balance, many of the media and substrate suppliers to the market, both
captive and merchant, are expected to increase capacity in the coming year.
Our current expectations are that, absent Komag, the bulk of this incremental
capacity will be in glass-based media at 2.5" and below. Although
considerable barriers are present related to redeploying capacity, most
notably the ability to procure substrate, should the market more aggressively
pursue aluminum versus glass, Komag's utilization rates and margins could be
negatively impacted. Similarly, should this incremental capacity be met with
lower than expected demand levels, the company would likely fail to meet our
estimates and price objective.
* Introduction of perpendicular recording could reduce disk-per-drive ratio.
We expect the industry to begin to more broadly introduce disk drives
utilizing perpendicular magnetic recording (PMR) technology during the latter
half of calendar 2006. PMR holds the promise of re-accelerating the areal
density curve, or the amount of data that can be stored per square inch of
surface area, which is required for the disk drive industry to maintain a
trajectory that is consistent with Moore's Law. However, should this
expected improvement in recording density not be offset by an equal increase
in storage demand, disk drive unit volumes will likely face deceleration.
Such was the case during the 1997-2002 period, during which a sizable
industry capacity build-up amidst strong unit demand was met with the
introduction of a new recording technology (MR, or magneto-resistive),
resulting in broad under-utilization of capacity and significant operating
losses. Given their exposure to both disk drive unit volumes and the average
number of disks per drive, this scenario was disproportionately negative for
component suppliers, including Komag. We believe that the industry and Komag
are better positioned versus the 1997 example due to a lower desktop disk-
per-drive ratio entering the transition (1.7:1 vs. ~3:1), new storage-hungry
end-markets (consumer) and tighter supply. Reflecting this, our estimates
assume only a modest contraction in the disk-per-drive ratio beginning in
calendar 2007. Should our ratio assumptions prove to be too aggressive, the
company's ability to achieve our estimates and price objective will be
materially challenged.
Customers are also competitors. In addition to procuring media and/or
substrate from Komag, several of the company's largest customers also have a
captive source of supply. Specifically, Maxtor/MMC and Seagate, which together
accounted for 54% of revenue in the September 2005 quarter, manufacture a
significant portion of their own media. Although each has recently entered
into multi-year volume purchase agreements (VPA's) with the company, there is
no guarantee and only limited recourse should said volumes fail to materialize.
If end-demand proves to be weaker than generally expected, or the transition to
perpendicular recording proves more disruptive to unit demand or the disk-per-
drive ratio, industry utilization rates will be materially negatively impacted.
Under this scenario, Komag's customers who have captive media operations would
likely source a greater percentage of their media and/or substrate requirements
internally. Related, Seagate recently announced its intentions to acquire
Maxtor. Our current assessment is that this acquisition poses little near- to
intermediate-term risk and only modest long-term risk for Komag. However,
history has demonstrated that consolidation in the HDD industry comes in waves.
Should this prove the case, we view Western Digital as the most acquirable
company remaining due to the company's status as the last remaining stand-alone
drive manufacturer of scale, excluding the combined Seagate/Maxtor entity. If
Western Digital were to be acquired by a third party that has alternative media
suppliers, our estimates and price target would likely prove unachievable.
Seagate (STX--$22.09; 2H)
Valuation
We employ both Price/Sales and Price/Earnings as our valuation methodologies,
with a $25.50 price target. Our prior price target of $31 had strictly
employed Price/Earnings. As a participant in a cyclical industry, we believe
the company is generally awarded peak multiples at cycle troughs and vice-
versa. Further, during cyclical upswings, we believe P/E becomes the dominant
valuation metric, with Price/Sales more broadly employed during plateaus and
declines. Give our view that the industry is likely entering at least a 1-2
quarter period of plateau, we have opted to take a more conservative stance by
reverting to a target derived by both P/E and P/Sales metrics.
Seagate is currently trading at 1.1x our next twelve month (NTM) sales estimate
($12B) and 13x our NTM EPS estimate of $1.75, which is inclusive of stock-based
compensation expenses but excludes acquisition related charges. On a sales
basis, this compares to two-year rolling NTM low, mean and high multiples of
0.8x, 1.1x and 1.4x. On an earnings basis, the company's two-year rolling NTM
mean is 15x, while its low and high have been 8x and 43x, respectively. Our
target P/E multiple of 15x represents is unchanged, and in-line with the mean.
We have opted to employ a mean versus low multiple, as would normally be the
case at the top of a cycle, given our views that non-systemic fundamental
improvement associated with he cost-optimization of the Maxtor acquisition
still lies ahead of the company. This view is further bolstered by the
company's repurchase authorization equating to ~15% of outstanding shares. Our
price target under this approach is $26.50 (rounded).
For our Price/Sales valuation, we are applying a 1.1x multiple versus 1.4x
previously. Our prior 1.4x represented the high sales multiple over the prior
two year, while our 1.1x currently employed represents the mean. Our 1.1x
assignment reflects a balance of our views related to the HDD industry entering
a period of fundamental deceleration, coupled with non-systemic room for
improvement at Seagate given the Maxtor acquisition, product introductions and
technology advancements. Our price target under this approach is $24.50
(rounded).
Risks
We rate shares of Seagate as High Risk. The company's balance sheet is in good
condition and profitability levels are improving. Additionally, the company's
relatively high trading volume provides ample source of liquidity. Under these
conditions a Medium Risk assignment would normally be considered. However,
with near-term visibility generally poor and having demonstrated a high degree
of earnings volatility, we believe a High Risk rating is warranted. Specific
sources of risk that may impede the shares from achieving our price target
include:
* Exposure to desktop market. Although revenue concentration is expected to
trend down from the 45% reported in FY 2006 to 41% in FY 2007, Seagate
continues to be significantly exposed to low-margin desktop drives that have
historically exhibited a significant amount of ASP erosion due to the
competitive nature of the industry. CIR's estimates suggest the rate of
growth in the desktop PC market (units) to slow in calendar 2006 versus 2005.
While new product traction is expected to drive revenue growth outside of
desktop, incremental price aggression could impede the company's ability to
meet our forecast.
* Longer product life cycles may increase competition. During periods of rapid
capacity increases, pricing curves have historically been steep while product
cycles have been short. More recently, as the rate of increase in areal
density has slowed, product cycles have elongated. Although currently offset
by favorable supply/demand conditions, as increased capacity comes on-line
these longer sales cycles may result in greater than historical ASP
pressures.
* Execution risk is significant. Given the sophisticated nature of disk drive
technology, product transitions carry significant risk. The market for disk
drive products is highly concentrated at a select number of OEMs, each of
which source drives from a number of manufacturers. Should technical issues
be discovered during the qualification stage for a new product, time to
market for a vendor's product can be delayed, resulting in lost share.
Additionally, with price curves aggressively sloped, these delays can impede
a company's ability to recoup development costs. Finally, the company is in
the midst of the integration phase of a sizable acquisition. Should the
company fail to transition manufacturing capacity to Seagate-standard
processes in a timely and orderly fashion, the company will likely face
market share losses and margin compression.
* Diversified competitors can subsidize drive business. Many of the existing
competitors in the HDD are captive within larger, more diversified companies.
As internally produced disks can be leveraged to increase profitability
within other business segments (i.e. PC/notebook, server/mainframe, and
consumer), these competitors can often overlook many of the industry
economics that the pure-plays must attempt to navigate.
* Faster Than Expected Migration to Higher-Capacity Drives. Our current
expectation is that the shift to 160GB PMR drives on the desktop will be a
multi-quarter event kicked off by the rollout of Vista in the spring of 2007.
If the migration to higher-capacity drives occurs at a faster than expected
rate, Seagate will likely see upside to our current EPS estimates.
Western Digital (WDC--$16.05; 2H)
Valuation
We employ both Price/Sales and Price/Earnings as our valuation methodologies,
with our $18.50 price target (rounded) reflecting an average of the two
outputs. Our prior price target had been $24.00.
Western Digital is currently trading at 9x our next twelve month (NTM) earnings
estimate of $1.76. The company's rolling NTM earnings multiple over the last
two years has seen a high of 19x, low of 9x and mean of 13x. With respect to
our Price/Earnings valuation, we have lowered our target multiple from 13x to
10x. We have adopted this more conservative approach given our growing
concerns over PC unit demand, mix and pricing during the next 9 months which
leave our estimates with an elevated risk profile. Our price target under
this approach is $17.60.
Western Digital is currently trading at .8x our next twelve month (NTM) sales
estimate of $4.7B The company's rolling NTM sales multiple over the last two
years has seen a high of 1.1x, low of 0.5x and mean of 0.8x. We have reduced
our target multiple from 1.3x to 0.9x to reflect the same concerns expressed
previously. Our price target under this approach is $19 (rounded).
Risks
We rate shares of Western Digital as High Risk. The company's working capital
metrics lead the industry. Additionally, due to tight cost controls and a
disciplined approach to the market, management has been able to deliver
improved earnings predictability versus the broader industry. While typically
characteristic of a moderate risk profile, the company's shares trade in
concert with the balance of the disk drive market, which carries a high degree
of volatility. Specific sources of risk that may impede the shares from
achieving or materially outperforming our price target include:
* Disproportionately exposed to the desktop market. Although the company's
diversification plans are tracking, Western Digital carries the highest
desktop concentration in the market. Inherent to this high level of
concentration, the company is subject to both elevated seasonality and the
risk of channel supply/demand imbalances. Additionally, notebook offerings
are expected to gain market share at the expense of desktop products.
Subject to this being the case, it is critical the company execute on its
efforts to penetrate the notebook market.
* Execution risk is significant. Given the sophisticated nature of disk drive
technology, product transitions carry risk. As Western Digital becomes
increasingly vertically integrated, technology risks multiply. Should
technical issues be discovered during the qualification stage for a new
product, time to market for the company's product(s) can be delayed,
resulting in lost share. Additionally, with price curves in the HDD industry
curves aggressively sloped in even the most attractive of cyclical periods,
these delays can impede the company's ability to recoup development costs.
* End-market growth and new product penetration. As is the case across our
coverage of the drive industry, end-market growth rates are the primary
inputs to our models. Should we overestimate the rate of growth among the
desktop, notebook, consumer electronics or enterprise segments, our estimates
for the company could be materially underachieved. Additionally, Western
Digital is entering into new market segments, most notably the enterprise,
notebook and small form factor markets. Should the company fail to achieve
our market share expectations, our estimates would likely prove aggressive.
* Faster Than Expected Migration to Higher-Capacity Drives. Our current
expectation is that the shift to 160GB PMR drives on the desktop will be a
multi-quarter event kicked off by the rollout of Vista in the spring of 2007.
If the migration to higher-capacity drives occurs at a faster than expected
rate, Western Digital will likely see upside to our current EPS estimates.
ANALYST CERTIFICATION APPENDIX A-1
I, Paul Mansky, research analyst and the author of this report, hereby certify
that all of the views expressed in this research report accurately reflect my
personal views about any and all of the subject issuer(s) or securities. I also
certify that no part of my compensation was, is, or will be directly or
indirectly related to the specific recommendation(s) or view(s) in this report.
IMPORTANT DISCLOSURES
Komag Inc (KOMG)
Ratings and Target Price History - Fundamental Research
Analyst: Paul Mansky (covered since January 3 2006)
------------------------------------------
Target Closing
Price Price
Date Rating (USD) (USD)
------------------------------------------
3 Jan 06 1H 43.00 34.73
26 Jan 06 1H *56.00 47.81
3 Aug 06 1H *50.00 38.65
7 Sep 06 1H *40.00 31.10
------------------------------------------
*Indicates change.
Chart current as of 16 September 2006
Seagate Technology (STX)
Ratings and Target Price History - Fundamental Research
Analyst: Paul Mansky (covered since December 17 2004)
------------------------------------------
Target Closing
Price Price
Date Rating (USD) (USD)
------------------------------------------
7 Nov 03 2H *25.00 NA
21 Jan 04 2H *20.00 NA
3 Mar 04 2H *17.00 NA
7 Apr 04 *3H *7.00 NA
3 Jun 04 3H *10.00 NA
21 Jul 04 3H *8.00 NA
20 Oct 04 3H *9.00 NA
8 Dec 04 3H *15.00 NA
22 Dec 04 *2H *18.00 NA
18 Jan 05 2H *21.50 NA
19 Apr 05 *1H *23.00 NA
19 Oct 05 1H *18.00 NA
4 Dec 05 1H *22.00 NA
19 Jan 06 1H *32.00 NA
19 Apr 06 1H *31.00 NA
------------------------------------------
*Indicates change.
Chart current as of 16 September 2006
Western Digital (WDC)
Ratings and Target Price History - Fundamental Research
Analyst: Paul Mansky (covered since December 23 2004)
------------------------------------------
Target Closing
Price Price
Date Rating (USD) (USD)
------------------------------------------
24 Oct 03 3H *11.00 12.84
13 Feb 04 Coverage suspended
22 Dec 04 *2H *10.50 10.59
28 Jan 05 2H *12.00 10.48
30 Mar 05 2H *14.50 11.17
28 Jul 05 2H *15.50 14.99
31 Oct 05 2H *13.50 12.10
29 Nov 05 2H *14.50 14.79
21 Dec 05 2H *19.00 18.45
3 Feb 06 *1H *27.00 22.71
27 Jul 06 1H *24.00 16.70
------------------------------------------ |
