<<But to reaffirm my point, I'm getting the sense that their military is pulling back and this causes me to wonder whether the folks in the ISI are getting the upper hand within the government power circles.>>
The following may help you to understand the dynamics a little clearer
..Unlike other intelligence agencies like CIA, RAW, MI-5, etc the ISI is not a career service. Civilian operatives do not rise beyond fieldgrade (ie equivalent of a major), never get involved in policy-making. Majors and above are rotated from the Pakistan Army for 2-3 years, during the Afghan war they did longer tenures. Successive DGs ISI starting with Lt Gens Akhtar Abdur Rahman, Hamid Gul, SR Kallue, Javed Nasir, Asad Durrani, Javed Ashraf Qazi, Nasim Rana, Ziauddin, Mahmood and Ehsan (the incumbent DG ISI), never served in the ISI before being appointed DG, some had served in MI.
It is ridiculous to suggest that the ISI is a State within a State and has an agenda of its own..............
The author of this article is Ikram Sehgul, who spoke as follows in 2003 in Karachi when Khaid Sheikh mohumad was I think not yet arrested ..so one can see how enlightened and brave he is as far his views are concerned..I will some weightage to his views ..
No harm in recognising Israel: Ikram Sehgal
Staff Report
KARACHI: Ikram Sehgal, chief editor of the Defence Journal, said on Saturday that there would no harm in Pakistan’s recognition of Israel if Tel Aviv could be pursued to refrain from a pro-Indian policy.
In a lecture at the Department of International Relations at Karachi University, he said if Jordan and Egypt could recognise Israel, why not Pakistan?
He said what he called the bankruptcy of the Pakistani leadership was adversely affecting the country’s foreign policy, which he criticised as unrealistic. He maintained that Pakistan’s foreign policy was based on individual preferences, than ground realities.
He said there was no scope for what he called adventurism after the Sept. 11 incident since the US now linked “jihad” with terrorism.
He said Pakistan should not try to become the champion of all causes.
“Our nuclear policy is very mature but we are not taking advantage of constructive engagement,” according to him.
He said on the one hand Iraqi president Saddam Hussain has killed more Muslims than Genghis Khan and even used poison gas against people. On the other, “we have emotional attachment with Iraq because it is a Muslim country.”
He said Pakistan’s foreign policy should be based on the premise that Saddam Hussain should go but a war should not be allowed against the Iraqi people. The US was exerting immense pressure but Pakistan should opt for Realpolitik, he said.
He said Pakistan became the host of three million Afghan refugees, out of which two million would never return.
He said there were no permanent friends and permanent enemies and experience has shown that the most reliable friend of Pakistan was China, although during the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, Iran and Saudi Arabia also sided with Pakistan.
He said Kashmir was of immense importance to Pakistan because it sits on three rivers, which were the lifeline for the country. He said Pakistan needed to make concerted efforts with India to resolve the Kashmir dispute in a pragmatic way.
He said there was no falsehood in the notion that India was a “dominant power” in the region with an ambition to become a world war. Let it become a world power but not at our cost, he remarked.
He said if someone thought that Russia would become Pakistan’s friend at the expense of India, he was wrong. The speaker said that as long as China was Pakistan’s friend, Russia’s policy would remain the same.
Rest of his original ISI article..
pakdef.info
By the time, the Taliban had chased the interim government out of Kabul in 1996 the ISI’s intelligence potential had gone into decline, diminishing drastically on the ground, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. On becoming Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC), Zia’s long-serving DG ISI, Gen Akhtar Abdur Rahman handed over to Lt Gen Hamid Gul.
The new Persian-speaking DG ISI’s visions were of a crescent of Pan-Islamic countries across Central Asia but he came to grief at Jalalabad. He was eased out of ISI by then PM Ms Benazir in early 1989 into commanding a Corps. Lt Gen SR Kallue, a retired officer, was brought in to head the ISI, essentially as an anti-coup mechanism. When the time came he badly failed his mentor, some of ISI’s own detachments were used under his nose to topple Ms Benazir in early August 1990. Gen Aslam Beg immediately moved his DG MI Asad Durrani to handle both ISI and MI concurrently for some time.
Asad Durrani lasted a year before the new PM Mian Nawaz Sharif requested the new Army Chief, Lt Gen Asif Nawaz for his then favourite, Lt Gen Javed Nasir, the Army’s Engineer-in-Chief as DG ISI. Despite his heart being in the right place, Javed Nasir attempt to create Pakistan’s place under an Islamic sun almost got us declared “a terrorist State”. Between Kallue and Javed Nasir, Afghanistan slid down the priority ladder. Lt Gen Hamid Gul was prematurely retired by Asif Nawaz. Soon after Gen Asif Nawaz’s demise, the new COAS Gen Waheed Kakar sent both Lt Gen Asad Durrani, and Lt Gen Javed Nasir home for violating the channels of command. Gen Waheed mandated the DG MI, Lt Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi (presently Federal Minister for Communications), not only to cleanse the ISI of “Islamists” but to rein in the “Jehadis” in Kashmir. Qazi went at ISI like knife through butter, bringing in another artillery officer Maj Gen Iftikhar (presently Lt Gen (Retd) Iftikhar Governor NWFP) to handle the External Wing. The ISI’s priceless intelligence network was dismantled, all Afghan veterans were posted back to the Army, most headed into retirement.
By 1995, the ISI had been totally purged, except for a handful of favourites, no officer who had physically served in Afghanistan remained in ISI. Lacking either Afghan or combat experience, the ISI hierarchy developed an inferiority complex that made them petty, including ordering the surveillance of those patriots who had fought so hard for their country, risking life and limb without asking for reward or recognition. Incidentally, the new hierarchy took the credit for creating the Taliban (now they don’t do so) whereas the Taliban were an indigenous self-made creation, later adopted by the ISI for support. Unlike other intelligence agencies like CIA, RAW, MI-5, etc the ISI is not a career service. Civilian operatives do not rise beyond fieldgrade (ie equivalent of a major), never get involved in policy-making. Majors and above are rotated from the Pakistan Army for 2-3 years, during the Afghan war they did longer tenures. Successive DGs ISI starting with Lt Gens Akhtar Abdur Rahman, Hamid Gul, SR Kallue, Javed Nasir, Asad Durrani, Javed Ashraf Qazi, Nasim Rana, Ziauddin, Mahmood and Ehsan (the incumbent DG ISI), never served in the ISI before being appointed DG, some had served in MI.
It is ridiculous to suggest that the ISI is a State within a State and has an agenda of its own. Their agenda is the pursuit of national policy, dictated by the Head of State and/or Government, politicians in power always look to the Army Chief for “advice” on Kashmir and Afghanistan. In any case, for more than half of ISI’s existence the Army has been in power. The Taliban’s arrival in Kabul in 1996 gave ISI an inroad back in Afghanistan after literally four years in the cold. Since Pakistan is always worried about a second front at its back when facing an implacable foe like India, the ISI shored up the Taliban with money and food. The Soviets had left hundreds of tons of arms in packed/crated condition, arms and equipment were never required. The Taliban almost never acquiesced to anything Pakistan requested of them, including not giving sanctuary to wanted terrorists like Riaz Basra.
Contrary to public perception, the ISI never had any control or influence over the Taliban, at most an open channel for dialogue. Till Sep 11, 2001 this channel was frequently used, the Taliban listened when it suited them. As recent events have shown, not only have the Taliban been their own masters, the ISI has very little field intelligence about them. By the time it mattered most to the world, the ISI had been emasculated of its superb potential. As a one-of-a-kind weapon par excellence, ISI has been badly misused by leadership of indifferent quality, its having personal ambitions but with a singular lack of vision for the country. |
