Saudi Arabia: Girding for a Minor Attack against Ras Tanura
Summary
Western and regional naval units began patrolling the world's largest oil terminal off the coast of Saudi Arabia on Oct. 27 to guard against a possible attack. The tactical details related to a seaborne strike, the current capabilities of Islamist militants in the region and the security measures in place all indicate that such an attack would likely be a small one. The economic impact, however, could be considerable.
Analysis
The British Royal Navy said Oct. 27 that coalition naval forces were deployed to support Saudi and Bahraini units assigned to protect Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil terminal after the navy received intelligence of a possible seaborne attack against the facility. This development comes six days after the U.S. government issued a Warden Message regarding new information of a potential threat in Saudi Arabia against Westerners and oil facilities in the eastern province of the country, including those operated by Saudi Aramco.
Given the logistical requirements for executing such an attack, and the fact that security has been beefed up while Islamist militant capabilities on the Arabian Peninsula remain weak, any such strike against Ras Tanura or a similar facility would likely not be a major one. In fact, if past efforts are any indication, it is quite possible that any attempt to hit an oil facility in Saudi Arabia will not succeed, given the low level of militant capabilities and the security obstacles they face.
But an attack of even a minor scale against the world's single largest oil loading terminal, which is capable of simultaneously filling up to eight supertankers for a total loading capacity of 6 million barrels per day, will have immense repercussions for the oil markets. Though there are facilities in Saudi Arabia that are less well-guarded, easier to damage and perhaps even more important to the Saudi and global economy, none is more recognizable than Ras Tanura. After all, it is the point where the majority of Saudi oil exports leave the country for the world's oil-thirsty countries.
In terms of the mechanics of an attack, a seaborne strike involving an explosives-laden dinghy would have to be loaded and dispatched from the Saudi side of the Persian Gulf. This is assuming that the actual target point of the facility is not beyond the ferrying reach of the dinghy. Next comes the question of which al Qaeda operational node would undertake the operation and what its current capabilities are.
There are two nodes in the area -- one based in Saudi Arabia and the other based in Iraq. Ras Tanura and other such facilities along the coast of the Arabian Peninsula are too far beyond the tactical reach of the Iraqi node. Besides, Iraqi jihadists, if they wanted to comply with the recent call from deputy al Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri to hit Persian Gulf oil installations, would try to hit the ones on their side of the Persian Gulf, i.e., Basra.
This leaves us with the only likely actor being the Saudi node of al Qaeda, which has not pulled off a successful attack in more than two years, and its capabilities can be described as weak. That said, the Saudi node has continued to try to stage operations such as the failed attack against the Abqaiq oil facility in February, so it is likely that weakness will not deter it from planning and executing future strikes.
Regarding the intelligence that prompted the Warden Message and the move by coalition naval vessels to deploy units in support of the Saudis and the Bahrainis, it is quite possible that it was al Qaeda putting out false information on the actual target in order to divert attention.
Security-wise, Ras Tanura is not an easy target. The area surrounding it is generally restricted -- nothing like Aden or Singapore harbor, where there are good lines of sight and good stand-off distances in pretty much every direction. Moreover, additional security measures can be employed following a threat to Ras Tanura, and the security forces that would respond are generally lavishly equipped. The availability of night-vision optics would make this a fairly easy area to secure. But human resources could be the weak point, given that the security personnel, though well-equipped, are not the most well-trained or professional.
This means a black rubber raft at night could get through their security perimeter. But double-hulled supertankers have a much thicker skin than does a modern destroyer such as the USS Cole. Moreover, most crude oil is not flammable under normal circumstances. So whatever the effects an attack might have on the oil markets, the physical damage would likely be little more than a hole in the side of a tanker and some spilled crude.
There is certainly a precedent for maritime terrorism. However, there is now an especially heavy international naval presence in the Persian Gulf, including both a U.S. carrier strike group and a U.S. expeditionary strike group. A small stray boat in the major shipping lanes would be out of place and would be noticed.
Of course, al Qaeda's interest in staging such an attack is not based on the likelihood of its success. Even more important is the psychological impact in terms of political-economic stability. The jihadists know well that even a failed attack would still be considered a disaster by the global markets.
On the other hand, any actual attack, however minor, also would demonstrate that the jihadist ability to strike against the Arabian Peninsula and especially against energy-related facilities remains weak. In any event, Riyadh will react very harshly as it undertakes damage control and will use any attack to further rally the Saudi people against the jihadists. |
