Jim,
The world of perception is is built upon unsupported PRETENSE. If, in ordinary conversation we use the word "dog" in a discussion with each other, we conveniently assume that we are talking about the same thing. In actual fact, in my "personal subset" of mind there are particular ASSOCIATIONS which, taken together go to make up my "definition" or understanding of the word "dog". My set includes the names: Pomme, Zappa, Zephyr, Baxter, Iota, Scintilla, M. Your set might include the names: Rex, Champion and Millie. But for the sake of CONSENSUS REALITY we pretend that we know what the word "dog" means, even though the particular instances in each case might be quite different, and neither of us REALLY knows what the ESSENCE of "dog" IS. Nor can we know
(i) you are really addressing platonic forms or ideas when you talk of essences. Instead of dogs, i’ll discuss it traditionally in terms of chairs.
plato's question was " if you're sitting in a red chair with one leg, and i'm sitting in a black chair with 4 legs and he’s sitting in a purple chair with 3 legs, and so on, what is it about these different chairs that they have in common so that they are all called “chairs.” Clearly, it’s not color, the # of legs, the material, etc. Plato called what they have in common "chairness", which is the “Form” of a chair, sometimes called the “Idea” of a chair.
The next question is an ontological ( being ) one : “what is the nature of “chairness?” Since we don’t observe “chairness” in the empirical world and, obviously, it must be someplace, plato thought it must be in the non-material world, the heavens, I believe.
One error in plato’s thinking was to think that our use of linguistic concepts, the word “chair”, entailed the necessity of positing ontological significance to what all chairs have in common to be called “chairs”, i.e. “chairness”, or the Form of a chair. So, you’re right; we can’t know, because there is no such thing ! : - )
Our use of “chair” to describe various kinds of chairs is learned. Questions about how we learn concepts is the province of linguistics.
Another error is to assume that all chairs, or all concepts, have a set of necessary and sufficient conditions in common that can be articulated that uniquely define them. We learn to use “chair” properly without ever being taught or knowing “innately” what chairs have in common, if anything.
(ii) back to dogs. all of us know what “dog” means. your image of a dog may be different from my image of a dog when we talk about dogs. But there’s no pretense involved. When you 1st learned what a dog was and when I 1st learned, we both perceived a dog and understood the same concept. And the concept of a dog was invented to name a physical object so that people could communicate. Hence, why language exists. How we learn language is the province of linguistics.
In ordinary embodied sensory perception, NONE of our perceptions are absolutely direct, and NONE are absolutely in Real-time. The eye, for example picks up patterns of light, conveyed via the optic nerve, to the processing section of the brain. At that "point" the light patterns are INTERPRETED to generate what we understand to be a VISUAL IMAGE, which we ascribe to something outside "us". But the process is a CREATIVE one, and not an absolutely direct one. Further, there are some time lags between the reception of the original light impulse and the generation of the image--orobably measured in milliseconds--but a delay. Thus, via the senses, NOTHING is absolutely perceived in Real-time. There is always some time lag.
(iii) just because it’s not in real-time, doesn’t mean it’s not real (I assume that was the connection between your 2 paragraphs: reality/real-time)
so now you’ll ask me what’s real and what can we know.
Let me provide a response from the mainstream of contemporary analytic philosophy as practiced in universities in the US (of course, you can find people in universities, like on the street, who believe all sorts of things). Before I do so, some background. 2500 years ago, philosophy was trying to answer questions that today are viewed to be (a) philosophical, e.g., the traditional problems of free will, morality, epistemology, etc. and (b) scientific. Not looking to trace 2500 years of western philosophy to explain the reasons why, today, philosophy is practiced as analytic philosophy, which is the explication of philosophical concepts, or conceptual analysis - - what we mean, or should mean if we’re thinking clearly, when we speak of philosophical concepts. Today, philosophy’s main connection to science is through “philosophy of science”, a subject taught in universities, concerned with, e.g. why we choose one scientific theory over another.
Contemporary analytic philosophy believes that we know things about the physical world by observation, as practiced by contemporary science. As for the “mental” world, a lot of philosophers believe that whatever can be said about the mind can ultimately be translated into physical, observable terms - - the doctrine of physicalism. As for the “mystical”, if it can’t be described in physical, observable terms, it doesn’t exist. You may regard these beliefs to be false. My purpose is only to explain, not to convince.
And some philosophers believe that we can know, what kant would call, synthetic a priori truths: “synthetic” - - not true by definition, e.g. Jim is a member of SI, vs. “analytic” - -
true by definition, e.g., All white chairs are white; “ a priori” - - truths apart from experience, e.g. so called “innate ideas” - - the concept of a physical object , the concept of personal identity, 2+ 2= 4, etc., vs. “a posteriori” - - truths derived from experience, e.g. Jim is a male.
For a great site on contemporary science, with a philosophical bent, let me suggest www.edge.org , especially this link , edge.org with 119 answers to “what is your dangerous idea?” check out richard dawkins and daniel dennett’s essays on this site for the physicalist perspective.
One last point: if you think that contemporary analytic philosophy’s preoccupation with conceptual analysis must be bankrupt, either morally, philosophically, or spiritually, let me refer you to one of the 20th century’s most spectacular articles on a moral problem: abortion. The article discusses the right to life, obligation, various types of samaritanism, and supererogation. Even if you’re not interested in the topic, I think you’ll see how analytic philosophy has practical application.
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