<<Geopolitical Diary: Al-Sadr's Calculus
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Some 25 U.S. troops in Iraq were killed in a single day this weekend, making it the third bloodiest since the war began. Also, Muqtada al-Sadr announced he was ending his boycott of parliament and that he was therefore rejoining the political process. There is not a direct connection between these two events, but there is a connection nevertheless.
To begin, the deaths of the U.S. troops did not occur in any one sector, but in several. Twelve of the 25 were killed in the crash of a Blackhawk helicopter northeast of Baghdad. Some were killed in Anbar province by Sunni insurgents. Five were killed in Karbala, in Shiite territory. The geographical diffusion of the deaths is important: The United States is increasing the tempo of its operations around the country. Troops are moving around, they are holding meetings (as was the case in Karbala) and carrying out patrols. In the current phase of operations, as more troops move into Baghdad, the increase in troop strength is less significant than the increase in the tempo of operations. As the U.S. military becomes more aggressive, it will incur more casualties.
From the standpoint of al-Sadr and his Mehdi Army, there are three considerations in all of this.
First, the United States is clearly targeting al-Sadr and his organization. He cannot be sure that it won't be successful in that mission. If the U.S. military is prepared to take casualties, al-Sadr has to calculate that he can be, at least, badly hurt. The more damage the United States does, the less leverage the Mehdi militia has among the Shia.
Second, there is the potential for the opposite outcome. Assume that the United States surges the operational tempo, goes after al-Sadr, fails to take him out and takes massive casualties in the process. It is not inconceivable that domestic American politics will force the United States to reverse course and begin the withdrawal process that is being discussed by the Democrats.
In both of those cases, rejoining the political process makes sense for al-Sadr. If things go against him, being part of the political process in Iraq prior to becoming desperate allows him to negotiate a place for himself and his faction while still at full strength. If, on the other hand, U.S. troops attack and fail to destroy him, while taking massive casualties, his involvement in the political process puts him in a position to become a defining character in postwar Iraqi politics.
The third consideration involves the chance that al-Sadr could deter an American attack. After all, if he is now being a good citizen, participating in the government, the United States is going to find it much harder to justify launching an offensive against him. The United States cannot simultaneously demand that al-Sadr reach a political accommodation and try to destroy him while he is in the process of doing so.
In a way, al-Sadr is playing directly into the Bush administration's hands. U.S. President George W. Bush is hoping to revive the political process in Iraq by using the threat of attacks to motivate cooperation from the various factions. But al-Sadr is only partially playing into Bush's hands, because Bush is still running the huge risk that casualties will break the back of American will. Bush is on politically thin ice. If casualties were to rise to Vietnam levels (several hundred in a week) for an extended period of time, his runway might turn out to be too short. In that event, al-Sadr would have snookered Bush -- by showing himself capable of dominating the Iraqi political process and giving the Americans the worst possible outcome.
An uptick in American casualties and al-Sadr announcing that he is returning to parliament are, therefore, linked together. As the U.S. strategy unfolds militarily, al-Sadr's political strategy shifts to avoid and take advantage of the new dimensions. >>
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