"So what is it that we, a nation of "unbelievers" thousands of miles away with ideas and standards that many of them detest so much they would die rather than adopt, can do to stop "brutal oppression" there?
I'd really like to hear something from you that addresses the tactics, strategies and short term goals that "our continued involvement" could utilize and achieve.
I don't think you'll come up with ONE SINGLE concrete suggestion. Not one. I don't think there is one."
It may be difficult for you to deal with ideas coming from me because, as you know, I base my view of things on principle first, which in turn provides direction for action.
In principle, if we are to help at all, it will be by extending our efforts to improve the well being of Iraqis with the same genuine concern we would have for ourselves in a similar circumstance.
So at the far reaches of a continuum we have a choice between conquering the Iraqis and remaking them in our image or throwing our hands up and letting all hell break lose. Either of those are doable if we were willing to accept the consequences. Neither of those choices are acceptable in principle. If we conquer the Iraqis we have lost our cause. If we throw our hands up, we open the door for our enemies to strengthen and unleash unimaginable destruction upon us at some later date, not to mention the genocidal annihilation that would take place within Iraq.
Our strategies, therefore, must fall some place in the complex middle of those extremes. We don't abandon the cause and we don't win by defeat of some entity. In addition no subgroup of Iraqis can win by defeating some other entity that is in part defined as Iraqi, for the very same reasons. How does that work?
For starters the ownership of success is from an Iraqi persective, not a subgroup perspective but a general outcome that no subgroup owns in isolation of some other subgroup. When and if this can be achieved America becomes incidentally successful, but would not be able to legitimately claim any sort of win over a particular enemy.
As I mentioned earlier, Iraqis know who they are. So it is Iraqis who must distinguish between those who would strive for a common goal vs those who would seek dominance as a subgroup. Some stability must be obtained so that Iraqis themselves can make a decision where they stand. There is still quite a bit of personal vascillation because they aren't sure they would be safe under the new government. We can facilitate this by using our military to make it as safe as possible for Iraqis to distinguish and isolate the oppositional forces. The option of agreeable particians is also within the realm of consideration to achieve this same outcome. Then, we continue to bolster the Iraqi security forces so that the need for our military support is gradually reduced. In the mean time the Iraqi culture has to be invitational toward those who've been marginalized by the conflicts so that there are realistic venues to build a stable and inclusive community.
We can continue to help in the rebuilding of Iraqi infrastructure and institutions, and we can facilitate international improvements toward economic strength.
Of course, we are talking about a nation not a marble match so the details and conflicts are a million times more complicated than that. |
