Iran has offered to help the United States develop an Iraq exit strategy
May 09, 2007 23 28 GMT
Summary
Iran has offered to help the United States develop an Iraq exit strategy. While Iran likely has the intent to do this, it might not have the capability. The last four years of instability have exacerbated an already deeply factionalized Shiite community in Iraq, which is why the country is likely to enter another long and violent phase that might not be in keeping with any U.S. time table for disengagement.
Analysis
In an interview with the Financial Times published May 9, Abbas Araghchi, Iran's deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs, said his country is prepared to help the United States formulate an "exit strategy" from Iraq. Araghchi, the highest-ranking Iranian official to participate in direct public talks in March with then-U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad, added that Washington and Tehran have the "same interests" in a stable Iraq. He went on to say that direct talks between the two countries, leading to a "face-saving withdrawal" from Iraq, are possible -- provided the United States demonstrates goodwill.
This is the most direct and public offer that Iran has made to work with the Bush administration to stabilize Iraq. The offer was expected; the two sides have made progress in taking their lengthy back-channel dealings into the public arena. Iran and the United States have been forced by their respective national interests to finally agree to work together in a meaningful way to establish stability and security in Iraq. But it is unlikely they will be able to stabilize Iraq anytime soon -- deep divisions within the Iraqi Shiite political landscape will prevent Iran from bringing all factions in line behind a negotiated settlement. Of course, before an effective security/stability plan can be implemented, Washington and Tehran must first agree on the details of the plan.
The key to bringing all the Shia in line is reducing the number of political actors to a more manageable level, which can be accomplished through the power of money and violence. (A combination of the two tends to work best). But in the case of the Iraqi Shia, factionalism is hardwired into the community's structure. At one level are the three largest political groups -- the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution for Iraq, Hizb al-Dawah and the al-Sadrite bloc. These groups are very willing to work with Iran but cannot seem to work with each other. Then there are numerous smaller Shiite groups peppered across southern Iraq, most of which are at loggerheads with Iran or its allies, or both. Money could satisfy some -- but not all.
Violence, on the other hand, could backfire on the Iranians. The Persian Islamic Republic has used a pan-Shiite identity to maintain influence among Iraq's Arab Shia. Should Iran decide to use violence against those who do not toe its line, it could trigger latent Arab nationalist sentiment among Iraqi Shia, which could prove disastrous for Iranian ambitions in Iraq.
In other words, Iranian readiness to assist the United States on Iraq is one thing; its ability to actually influence events is quite another. Before any agreement can emerge in Iraq's fractured Shiite community, another long phase of violence probably will ensue.
That is the likely scenario regarding the intra-Shiite struggle in Iraq. Factor in intra-Sunni struggles, as well as those involving the Shia, Sunni and Kurds, and a much more violent picture emerges. Further complicating matters are Sunni and Shiite groups imposing deadlines on each other for containing sectarian violence and threatening to pull out of the political system if their demands are not met.
Neither Iran nor the United States has any better options than to work together at this point. In many ways, the current situation is the result of both countries playing the various Iraqi factions off one another in pursuit of their respective goals. In any case, their coming together on Iraq is just the beginning of the process toward stabilization, a process that is bound to conflict with Washington's preferred time table for disengaging from Iraq.< |
