snips007 says, 'what IR tells me to post I post.'
From the treehouse -
snips007
Re: SLJB - Week of May 28, 2007
« Reply #555 on Today at 8:56am »
thats a fact we are in real time now and IMO reality is way better than fantisy.I have only posted facts on this board never opinions.what IR tells me to post I post.sometimes good sometimes not so good.but always the truth and if it causes anyone any pain then I will not post what I am told to all on this board.JUST A SELECT FEW OF WHAT I CALL LOYAL SHAREHOLDERS.
.........
I wonder who the "select few" are and why SLJB IR is releasing information in this way instead of keeping ALL shareholders informed as required by Regulation FD
what IR tells me to post I post.sometimes good sometimes not so good.but always the truth and if it causes anyone any pain then I will not post what I am told to all on this board.JUST A SELECT FEW OF WHAT I CALL LOYAL SHAREHOLDERS.
II. Selective Disclosure: Regulation FD
sec.gov
A. Background
As discussed in the Proposing Release,5 we have become increasingly concerned about the selective disclosure of material information by issuers. As reflected in recent publicized reports, many issuers are disclosing important nonpublic information, such as advance warnings of earnings results, to securities analysts or selected institutional investors or both, before making full disclosure of the same information to the general public. Where this has happened, those who were privy to the information beforehand were able to make a profit or avoid a loss at the expense of those kept in the dark.
We believe that the practice of selective disclosure leads to a loss of investor confidence in the integrity of our capital markets. Investors who see a security's price change dramatically and only later are given access to the information responsible for that move rightly question whether they are on a level playing field with market insiders.
Issuer selective disclosure bears a close resemblance in this regard to ordinary "tipping" and insider trading. In both cases, a privileged few gain an informational edge -- and the ability to use that edge to profit -- from their superior access to corporate insiders, rather than from their skill, acumen, or diligence. Likewise, selective disclosure has an adverse impact on market integrity that is similar to the adverse impact from illegal insider trading: investors lose confidence in the fairness of the markets when they know that other participants may exploit "unerodable informational advantages" derived not from hard work or insights, but from their access to corporate insiders.6 The economic effects of the two practices are essentially the same. Yet, as a result of judicial interpretations, tipping and insider trading can be severely punished under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws, whereas the status of issuer selective disclosure has been considerably less clear.7
Regulation FD is also designed to address another threat to the integrity of our markets: the potential for corporate management to treat material information as a commodity to be used to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors. As noted in the Proposing Release, in the absence of a prohibition on selective disclosure, analysts may feel pressured to report favorably about a company or otherwise slant their analysis in order to have continued access to selectively disclosed information. We are concerned, in this regard, with reports that analysts who publish negative views of an issuer are sometimes excluded by that issuer from calls and meetings to which other analysts are invited.8
Final Rule:
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
17 CFR Parts 240, 243, and 249
Release Nos. 33-7881, 34-43154, IC-24599, File No. S7-31-99
RIN 3235-AH82
Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading |
