Impasses in Honor Killing
Soma - By Dr. Denise Natali
International criticism of honor killings in the Kurdistan Region has pressured authorities and local populations to take measures against this heinous crime. The honor killing law passed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2000 created more stringent punishment for offenders while encouraging women’s and human rights organizations to mobilize on behalf of the victims. Since then, civil society groups have conducted conferences, established women’s centers and homes, and lobbied Kurdish authorities to crack down on perpetrators. Yet, despite these measures, honor killings remain an integral component of the socio-political landscape. Alongside more severe punishment is the need to dismantle the institutional barriers that tolerate honor killing, such as the loopholes in the legal system and customary traditions.
To be sure, in addressing the honor killing crime, the KRG specifically targeted the 1969 law of the Iraqi penal code (art. 409). The law states that if a man kills one of the women in his family in the case of adultery, his action is treated as a crime. This crime, however, was considered as a ‘special case’, which often left those complicit in the killing unpunished, while failing to condone the crime itself. The KRG, still bound to the legal system governing the entire country, has no authority to alter Iraqi laws. Thus, while the 1969 Iraqi penal code remains in existence, the KRG could only change the nature of the punishment so that honor killing is now considered and tried in courts as murder.
Still, harsher prison sentences are a necessary but insufficient response to the honor killing crimes. The root of the problem rests in legal, institutional, and cultural constraints in the Kurdistan Region, which preclude the rule of law. For one, the Kurdish judiciary system is not independent. The Judicial Organization Law (law no. 14), passed in 1992 by the KRG, provides the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) with complete authority over the judicial system.
Absence of an independent judicial system hinders implementation of the honor killing law, as well as other legal issues, because it allows the political elite to use their privileges and powers indiscriminately. Although the MOJ cannot legally override the decision of the judge, it has no check on its power. Kurdish judges have powers of contempt and subpoena, however, the overall responsibility to enforce laws remains with the MOJ. The MOJ can and does change court decisions, alongside the influence of the political parties, who fill the selection of judges with party quotas. Although the separate KDP and PUK ministries have finally merged in the Supreme Court of Cassation in Erbil, the political party influence and “wasta” continue to define the legal system.
Nor is there a constitutional court in the Kurdistan Region, which offers alternative legal outlets to individuals who desire to challenge the constitutionality of legislation or a court decision. The new Federal Supreme Court in Baghdad does not have jurisdiction in the Kurdistan region as it can only decide upon the constitutionality of national legislation. It is also highly unlikely that a Kurd would or could take his or her case to a Baghdad court at this time.
Consequently, in the rare event that a family makes an accusation against an honor killer, the legal system prevents condemnation and punishment of the crime. Despite the role of prosecutors in bringing issues like honor killing to the courts, they do not have the same authority or power as the judges, who can run their courts as ‘one-man shows’. Some refuse to hear the prosecutors’ cases or limit the time in which a prosecutor can speak. Additionally, there is no single legal code in which honor killing can be clearly defined. Although the punishment for honor killing is tried in criminal court, the case can overlap with the personal status code, which is influenced by Sharia law and deals with issues of rights from the contract of marriage and family.
Even if an independent judicial system was present in the Kurdistan Region, the influence of traditional social norms, rooted in tribal and customary law, would allow honor crimes to continue. The very basis of honor killing has not been undermined because social norms dictate that a man's honor is implicitly defined by the women in his family. A young girl or woman has no distinct identity or right to life outside this conception of honor. Thus, those villagers and security officers that watched, applauded, and videotaped the killing of Dua two months ago actually believed, and continue to believe, that their actions were noble, and that were upholding the family honor. The persistence of this sense of honor also explains why the body of a 12-year-old girl was recently dumped in front of the Ministry of Human Rights in Erbil, and why dozens of honor killings occur monthly in the region without even entering the legal system.
Given these deeply embedded traditions, political culture, and institutional constraints, what can realistically be done to address this heinous crime against women?
Despite the noble intentions, the honor killing law and the new constitution of the Kurdistan region will have no serious impact on the status of women or the rate of honor killings in the region. Rather, honor killing must be part of elite-engineered change of norms, individuals, and society. The KRG must specifically target tribal community leaders and traditional families through education campaigns and political pressures. It must make every effort to alter the attitudes and everyday thinking so that honor killing will be unimaginable as part of Kurdish tradition and social behavior.
Legal reforms are also mandatory. The KRG must revise the Judicial Organizational Law to allow for greater judicial independence and a real role of the courts to enforce human rights and law. It must de-link honor killing from the personal status code and make it part of civil law. It must also engage in high-level training for judges, with special quotas for women. With only three female judges out of one-hundred and fifty six in the Kurdistan region (1.9 percent), it is not surprising that the victims’ voices cannot be heard.
Finally, the international community, including foreign governments, must continue to pressure the KRG and put pressure on those institutions, groups, and individuals that tolerate and condone the killing of women. With the breaking down of the sovereignty regime and human rights issues as a driving force for state interventions, external actors can shape policies and programs. Conditionalities must be made part of certain external aid packages so that local behaviors and attitudes can be restructured. Engineering social change is a long term process that can no longer be neglected in the Kurdistan region and must be seen as an urgent priority.
Denise Natali is an honorary fellow at the Institute for Arab and Islamic Studies, Exeter University, and currently teaching at the University of Kurdistan- Hawler.
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