Re: As far as I am concerned, Myanmar, like Darfur, is a media attention-grabbing diversion from the real hot-spots -- Israel/Palestine and Iraq.
It's nonetheless related to the Israel-Iran face-off. As the article below reveals, Myanmar is a big gas producer and, as such, could easily supply India's growing energy needs. However, because of China's tight grip on the former, India has been compelled to look elsewhere --westwards. Because of the China-Myanmar lock, India was forced to deal with Iran and Pakistan and their "gas-pipe-dream" linking the three of them... Of course, Iran is not gonna supply India with no strings attached. So, the current CIA-orchestrated mayhem in Myanmar is but an obvious plot to wean Myanmar away from China and sweat her into supplying gas to India. Of course, the endgame is to further isolate Iran and remove India from the Judeofascist warpath to the former....
Gus
Sep 11, 2007
China trumps India in Myanmar gas stakes
By Gideon Lundholm
Recent developments in the gas-field projects of Myanmar have highlighted the intense resource diplomacy in the region. The military government of Myanmar recently denied the Gas Authority of India Ltd's (GAIL's) status of "preferential buyer" on the A1 and A3 blocks of its offshore natural-gas fields in favor of selling the gas to PetroChina.
The offshore gas fields of the Shwe project in the Bay of Bengal are estimated to contain deposits of 4.8 trillion cubic feet. The controlling interests in the two blocks are Daewoo International (60%), ONGC Videsh Ltd (20%), GAIL (10%) and Korea Gas Corp (10%). The most viable of the proposed pipeline routes for moving the gas to India would have gone through Myanmar's Arakan state before entering India's Mizoram and Assam states and terminating in West Bengal at a proposed Jagdishpur-Haldia distribution line.
India has clearly lost an important diplomatic initiative in the attempt to counter Chinese influence in Myanmar. Even after the deal was sweetened with US$20 million in "soft credit" and the proposed construction of a power plant in Myanmar, it appeared that Indian influence was quietly denied by the inevitability of China's international support for Myanmar. Beijing's use of its veto to keep Myanmar's human-rights record off of the United Nations Security Council agenda this year turned out to be more important to the junta than the economic incentives.
Despite support from pro-India voices within Myanmar's upper echelon, such as that of Vice Senior General Maung Aye, the sharp turn in the sales decision serves to illustrate the depth of the relationship currently enjoyed by China and Myanmar. Maung Aye signaled as much as early as January when he refused to provide guarantees that India would gain access to the gas.
The economic implications of the snub are significant for India. Recent reductions in the estimates of offshore gas in their own eastern blocks have increased demand to find sources outside of India's borders. The Myanmar fields offered a strong possibility to replace these sources. In particular, the pipeline was destined for the northeastern states of India, which are among the most power-starved in the country.
If the gas was destined for domestic use, the development-security nexus suggests that the power and resulting development, along with greater cooperation on cross-border counterinsurgency efforts, may have had a strong chance of success in defusing the secessionist movements in the northeastern Indian states.
The pipeline seemed set to heighten attempts for greater integration and further military and economic cooperation along the Myanmar-India border. Trade initiatives have so far failed in India's northeastern border regions, while security initiatives have occurred in a stovepipe fashion with only communication between the two countries, rather than any truly cooperative exercises. India will likely make more overt efforts in the future to establish a stronger presence in the face of Chinese diplomatic successes in Myanmar.
It is also likely that joint military initiatives in the border region will be initiated and more direct military aid like the proposed sales of light attack helicopters by India to Myanmar will continue. Transfers of military equipment have increased significantly in the past two years between India and Myanmar, while joint counterinsurgency operations have been proposed that result in much higher counterinsurgency activities between the two countries. These efforts would have had a far greater chance of success if they had been combined with the pipeline development.
On the diplomatic front, Myanmar's junta has signaled where its strength lies. The military government has had a long history of a strong relationship with China, which it would not risk in this scenario. It is likely that the junta recognizes the desire for India to play a stronger role in the region, thus giving it a stronger position in its dealings with New Delhi. Myanmar's resources have allowed it to bypass international sanctions in the past and will now allow it to negotiate with its Asian neighbors to win necessary international support and recognition.
The risk of angering India to the point of withdrawal of support was minimal; indeed, GAIL was criticized by India's External Affairs Ministry for not pursuing the agreement more strongly. However, the junta must continue to walk a fine line among alienating neighbors, already suspicious of China's growing influence in the region, undermining its own sovereignty and losing the support of its largest strategic partner, China, by playing it off against other regional interests.
Additionally, recent efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to condemn the slow progress of national reconciliation inside Myanmar may have refocused efforts within the junta to place diplomatic pressure via China on certain ASEAN members. China has recently been increasing its influence within ASEAN and is more active than India as one of the peripheral players in ASEAN's orbit. By using its resources as a bargaining chip, Myanmar may have gained promises from China to use its influence to dampen ASEAN members' concerns over the reconciliation process.
The strength of Myanmar's position also lies in the strong economic demand for resources by all of its neighbors. Bids for the sale of the gas were competitive, and Myanmar will not lose much in economic terms for the decision to sell to PetroChina. While the decision may be deemed shortsighted for its apparent slight to India's recent diplomatic advances, it does little to reduce the reality that India, Thailand and China are all in need of energy to pursue economic development.
Another facet of the agreement is a proposed oil pipeline that would be built in conjunction with the necessary gas pipeline. This oil pipeline would be constructed by PetroChina as an alternative route to the Strait of Malacca. Its origin would be at a deepwater port at Ramree Island, Myanmar, built to accommodate large crude-oil tankers, and would cross the country to an undisclosed point on the China-Myanmar border (likely the Muse-Ruli border crossing point). The economic advantage for Myanmar would be an additional sale point for its onshore and offshore oil blocks, along with the economic spinoff of a major transshipment point. China's current reliance on the Strait of Malacca may well have driven the junta's decision to rescind India's preferential buyer status.
The recent price hikes in domestic fuel that sparked protests first in Yangon and later across Myanmar and resulted in the arrest of a number of former student leaders from the 1988 uprising demonstrate the thin line of economic vulnerability upon which the junta balances. The 1988 uprising that resulted in the suspension of the constitution was also sparked by a troubled economy.
The junta will need to balance its need for foreign currency, gained through resource rents, with the demands of a population that has not accrued much benefit from current economic policies. Much of the gas being exported to date and in the future would, arguably, be better used in domestic electric-power generation - something that the Indian offer would have included.
On the security front, agreements that have been developing alongside the gas-sale agreement with India will likely not be disturbed by the decision to sell to China. The pipeline route from Shwe would have brought fewer security implications for Myanmar than for India. However, the pipeline's route to the western region of Myanmar would have brought with it a larger military presence in an area with poor infrastructure on both sides of the border. What may have been lost is a considerable chance to improve the infrastructure and access to an area that has been historically nearly inaccessible.
In addition, the Myanmar military's ties to the considerable narcotics and arms trade that uses the porous border between Myanmar and India may have produced a conflict of interest between parties within the junta that forced the withdrawal of the pipeline project. The junta insisted that the gas decision was not political but simply business as usual in offering the sale to the highest bidder.
India's loss will likely not lead to a decrease in its attempts to win greater cooperation from Myanmar over counterinsurgency efforts, but it does reveal the deep connections between China and Myanmar. This relationship will prove hard for India to compete with in the long run, especially as long as the decision-making process within the junta follows the familiar route of political considerations at the expense of sound domestic economic policy.
An important consideration, unexamined here, is that India will not likely rock the diplomatic boat as long as its companies continue to enjoy privileged access to a country that is closed to US and European competition. Exploration, after all, is still ongoing in the offshore blocks, while Myanmar's onshore basins remain largely untapped.
Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.
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