Re: I am far more inclined to believe that Russia's best interests are served by using Iran as a buffer or a proxy against any US attack.
Nonsense. In case you haven't noticed: the Cold War is over! Ever since Sept 2001, the US is at war with Islam, not Communism, much less anarcho-capitalist Russia...
Re: As you well know, the US has designs on Central Asia and therefore Russia needs all the allies it can get.
As I put it years ago, the US's only designs in Central Asia are to contain the expanding influence of both Pakistan and Iran --a geopolitical task that actually behooved Russia. However, following the collapse of Gorbachev's regime, Russia proved unable to keep Afghanistan under control... Hence the need for the US firefighter to join in and help "police" the squall line in Central Asia. Somehow, as the article below shows, Afghanistan is to Pakistan what Canada is to the US: remove Québec and you're left with nine Canadian provinces that all speak English, are predominantly Judeo-Protestant, and enjoy an American lifestyle --why couldn't they merge with the US? Likewise, in the late 1990s, Afghanistan was in a merging process with Pakistan. Pakistan is now a nuclear power with 150 million people, that is, about 10 million more than Russia. Pakistan and Afghanistan share a common religion, Sunni Islam, a common language, Pashtun, so, why couldn't Afghanistan turn into a satellite of Pakistan? Because both Russia and her American buddy have other designs for her....
Gus
The Yearnings of the Pashtuns
By VARTAN GREGORIAN
Published: November 15, 2001
As the Taliban's position in Afghanistan continues to crumble, the political future of the Pashtuns -- a plurality of Afghans and a majority within the Taliban -- has become a crucial issue. All sides recognize that it must be resolved if reconstruction of Afghanistan is to begin. To develop an effective strategy, the United States will need to understand some of the Pashtuns' past and aspirations, and in particular how these have affected Afghan-Pakistani relations.
About 13 percent of Pakistan's population speaks a version of Pashto, the Pashtun language. The Pakistan-Afghanistan border -- the Durand line -- was drawn by the British more than a century ago but Pakistan's Pashtuns feel little separates them from their Afghan cousins. The border was considered by the British as binding, by successive Afghan governments as imposed and by Pashtuns as ''a line drawn on water.'' Negotiations today with Afghanistan's Pashtun leaders have been taking place on both sides of the line.
Based on its objections to the Durand border, Afghanistan cast the sole vote against Pakistan's entry into the United Nations. From 1893 on, British India's and later Pakistan's policies toward Afghanistan have been greatly influenced by anxiety over the Afghans' claim to a ''Pashtunistan'' that would unite the Pashtuns of both countries and give Afghanistan easier access to the Indian Ocean.
In the 1950's, the Soviets supported Afghanistan as it constantly agitated Pakistan on the question of Pashtun self-determination. In 1971, when East Pakistan broke away and became Bangladesh, Pakistani strategists faced the grim prospect of their shrinking country being squeezed between a hostile India and an expansionist, Soviet-backed Afghanistan. The insecurity of Pakistan -- a very young state -- reached alarming heights. It only got worse with the Soviet Union's increasing involvement in Afghanistan.
The Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided Pakistan with a unique opportunity to assert leadership in the region and neutralize the Pashtunistan issue. It did so by backing the resistance to Soviet rule and doing so in the name of Islam. Having artfully gathered the right list of enemies, Pakistan was able to count on the political, financial and military help of the United States, Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states and the Islamist mujahedeen.
Pakistan's turn to Islamization was meant to stabilize Pakistan itself as much as to redirect Pashtun militancy and undermine the Soviet Union's exploitation of it. Pakistan envisioned itself as a bulwark of Sunni Islam against Iran's Shiite fundamentalism, India's policies in Kashmir and Soviet atheism to the north in Central Asia. Saudi Arabia was Pakistan's great backer in this effort, which brought fundamentalist Wahhabism forcefully to the area; Pakistan's other backers, like the United States, went along with it for reasons of their own.
After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan aided various Pashtun factions in the Afghan civil war, finally supporting the Taliban -- a movement emanating primarily from Pakistan's religious schools, established under President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq and his successors, and guided by Pakistan's intelligence services.
By supporting the Taliban, Pakistan thought to solidify its position as the dominant foreign power in Afghanistan. The country provided a training ground for Pakistani surrogates to prepare for their war in Kashmir and a safety valve for draining the energies of Pakistan's own fundamentalists. The Islamist, explicitly antitribal appeal of the Taliban also had the great benefit of neutralizing the Pashtunistan issue.
The Taliban, however, were restive protégés -- and Al Qaeda offered backing without all the Pakistani strings attached. The Taliban thrived not only in Afghanistan but in Pakistan, especially through their ideological cohorts (again, mostly Pashtun) in the cities of Peshawar, Quetta and Karachi. These remain vital centers of Pashtun activism.
After Sept. 11, with options and allies in short supply, Pakistani leader Pervez Musharraf agreed to cooperate with the United States against the Taliban. Both countries now face the thorny issue of the Pashtuns. Wiping out the Taliban won't end the prospect of Pashtunistan -- it may even energize it. If a government dominated by the Northern Alliance denies the Pashtuns power in Afghanistan proper, they will exert power elsewhere. Taliban forces could retreat into Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province and form alliances with their Pashtun cousins.
If, on the other hand, Pashtuns were to become a dominant power in Afghanistan in the post-Taliban era, Pakistan could face a revival of Afghan interest in expanding into Pakistani territory.
Pakistan cannot afford any movement that threatens to fragment it, and it cannot withstand simultaneous challenges in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Nor can it afford a civil war between disappointed fundamentalists and disappointed nationalists -- particularly given its possession of nuclear weapons.
What is the solution? The United Nations must lead the rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan and guarantee the country's neutrality. It should secure nonaggression pacts to assure Pakistan that a new Afghanistan won't pursue Pashtun dreams -- and to assure Iran that Afghanistan will not become a platform for anti-Iranian militants. Finally, it should persuade Pakistan to help landlocked Afghanistan gain reliable access to the sea.
With some stability and enough trust, the Central Asian states, Pakistan and Afghanistan may be able to form a workable common market that would help minimize the divisions upon which so many outside powers have played over the past century and more. Saudi Arabia, the United States and Russia, having spent so much on sending guns and bombs since 1979, might at last send some more useful help.
Within Afghanistan, a reconciliation government must be established that is truly inclusive. Returning King Zahir Shah as a symbol of unity is welcome, but he must not be perceived as a puppet of the United States or the Northern Alliance. Pashtuns won't easily relinquish two centuries of memory and power. Without a major Pashtun role in the future of Afghanistan, there will be no viable peace.
In Afghanistan, the easy solutions have consistently had terrible unintended consequences. The country has endured war upon war, but its history demonstrates that what may prove to be far more dangerous than the shooting of weapons is the backfiring of policy.
Vartan Gregorian is president of the Carnegie Corporation and author of ''The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946.''
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