JJ, those numbers are truly startling. Given the promiscuous nature of Internet Protocol and its agents (routers, switches, etc.), do you suppose a model based on the use of dedicated channels (encrypted IP, tunneling, pseudo-wire, etc.) between end nodes and Proxy Service Providers (PSPs?), and similar dedicated links between PSPs, would do anything to mitigate these forms of scourge?
Of course, once you go a far as I have described above, one could always argue: Why not go all the way and return to an entirely switched paradigm? Some are thinking about this approach, too, albeit for reasons that are not entirely focused on security, and in some cases for applications requiring a relatively-limited reach, in terms of the number of reachable end points, and scope.
My growing sense (and this departs somewhat from the residential space, but as I've frequently stated, what begins in the enterprise ultimately finds its place in the home, and very often vice versa) is that some entities --large enterprises, especially -- had bought into the Internet Protocol transition prematurely, hoping to converge many different clouds into one, and are now having second thoughts concerning its true value for certain of those applications.
Some applications scream for dedicated pipes and have no good reason to be exposed, yet they were tossed into the fire with the rest of the logs.
Thoughts? Anyone?
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