They became confused trying to determine where the center of the channel was. They confused the center of the bridge span as the center channel marker on the electronic chart displa.
Let me put it this way, when you cross under most bridges, the center of the bridge span opening is where the deepest water is and where a ship transits. That is not the case under the Bay Bridge. Inbound traffic transits to the right of the center span, and outbound traffic does the same thing. Sort of like a road with the center span marking the Island between highways.
Here's two good articles explaining the problem......Before you read them, check out Seattle AIS information. Pick your ferry Karen! :-)
live.aisparser.com
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News
11/29/2007 15:51:17 EST
Oil Spill Fuels Debate in Ship Industry By SCOTT LINDLAW Associated Press Writer
OAKLAND, Calif. – Eric Robinson stepped onto the bridge of the container ship Horizon Pacific and peered at a computer monitor depicting San Francisco Bay. Ship icons blipped clearly in the virtual water, but the meaning of some of the other symbols was murky.
Robinson, a San Francisco ship pilot, makes his living guiding supertankers, naval vessels and cruise ships through the bay’s treacherous waters, and his job is to adapt quickly. But he never knows what electronic navigation gear he will face when he takes the helm. And he thinks that should change.
The government, the International Maritime Organization and the shipping industry are exploring how to bring some order to the jumble of electronic navigation aids proliferating on the seas – a movement that has been given greater impetus by an accident in San Francisco Bay earlier this month.
On Nov. 7, a 901-foot container ship sideswiped the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, gashing its hull and dumping 58,000 gallons of sludge-like bunker fuel. It was the bay’s worst oil spill in nearly two decades.
While the cause of the accident is still under investigation, the pilot in that episode told authorities there was confusion between him and the ship’s captain over symbols on an electronic charting system while the vessel Cosco Busan made its way through a fog bank.
“An international standardization of bridge equipment like radars and electronic navigation equipment – to me, that would be the legislation I would like to see come out of this,” Robinson said during an interview as he set a course for Hawaii.
As the sun set over the Port of Oakland two weeks after the spill, and cranes loaded containers aboard, Robinson carefully reviewed the electronic charting system with the ship’s captain.
“You want to make sure you’re looking at what you think you’re looking at,” Robinson said.
Such a thorough briefing is not always possible in the high-pressure world of international shipping, where captain and pilot are often from different countries, as was the case aboard the Cosco Busan.
The National Transportation Safety Board and the Coast Guard are looking into the possibility of miscommunication, perhaps even a language barrier, in the Nov. 7 incident. The Cosco Busan’s pilot also said his two radar displays became distorted.
The nation’s 1,100 state-licensed pilots frequently board vessels out at sea for the last part of the inbound journey. Out there, the pilot is often confronted with busy shipping lanes, heavy radio traffic and poor visibility or darkness.
Robinson said fiddling with equipment in those moments is the last thing he wants to do.
“I’ve seen at least a dozen different electronic charts and dozens of radar displays,” Robinson said. “Bridge markings, buoy markings, depth contour curves, what measurements the depths are in, whether they’re in fathoms, feet or meters – basically every aspect of the chart other than the outlay of the land could be different.”
Some pilots, frustrated by the varying systems, have begun carrying their own laptops loaded with familiar charting software onto the ships, he said. The laptops can be plugged into the ship’s navigation equipment.
Robinson is eager to see a new system in which a pilot could hit a button that would prompt the electronic charts to revert to a “standard mode,” or default setting, that would be uniform across all manufacturers and show charts with standard symbols.
Many proponents of this system argue that “technology may be getting out in front and changing faster than mariners can keep up with it,” said Paul G. Kirchner, executive director and general counsel of the American Pilots’ Association. Kirchner emphasized he does not believe pilots necessarily need such a system, because they receive such extensive training.
Nevertheless, the pilots association is studying the standard mode approach. “We think there’s value” in this approach, Kirchner said.
Robinson’s primary tools of the trade are his eyes, and during his run aboard the Horizon Pacific, he referred to the electronic charts only occasionally. It was dark but clear by the time the container ship was fully loaded with Christmas trees, Army weapons cartridges, ice cream, wine and cars.
But when fog, haze or rain close in, pilots turn to radar and the electronic charts. The Horizon Pacific was equipped with a sophisticated electronic charting program called Coastal Explorer. A desktop computer ran software that flashed real-time data about the ship and others in the area, as well as hazards, depths, buoys, bridges and docks.
The Cosco Busan had similar gear. In its report on the incident, expected out next year, the NTSB will look at the role navigational aids played, and at the differences in symbols between charting systems across the industry, board spokesman Peter Knudson said. The board sometimes recommends policy changes.
The International Maritime Organization, the U.N. body that regulates the global shipping industry, is studying the issue of standardizing the devices and the symbols they use, Kirchner said.
One possible hurdle would be in getting manufacturers to agree on uniform standards when several have invested a great deal of money in proprietary systems, said Chris Philips, editor of Pacific Maritime Magazine.
“It’s hard for the Coast Guard to say, `Throw all your equipment away and buy from this guy,’” Philips said.
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Critical questions about oil spill remain Contra Costa Times Article Launched: 11/18/2007 03:00:19 AM PST
NOW THAT THE damage has been done by an ugly oil spill that has polluted most of San Francisco Bay and beyond, the finger-pointing has begun. But there is no escaping the ineptitude that resulted in a disaster that was preventable and likely confinable.
Let’s start at the beginning. Bar pilot Capt. John Cota boarded the Cosco Busan at its dock in Oakland at 6 a.m. He waited an hour and a half for the fog to lift (it didn’t) and notified the Coast Guard Vessel Traffic Service that he was about to leave.
Even though the ship’s radar failed before departure, according to Cota’s attorney, John Meadows, the Cosco Busan left. The radar failed again as the ship approached Yerba Buena Island. However, the ship continued on, with Cota relying on a navigation system in which the speed, location, track of the vessel and chart of the area were displayed on a screen.
Amazingly, according to Meadows, Cota said he was not familiar with the electronic system on the Cosco Busan. Why not? A pilot should have a working knowledge of the navigation system on any ship he or she pilots. Did Cota check it out before departing the dock? If so, why did he proceed? It he didn’t, why not?
Bay Area pilots are well-trained and have much experience before they get their licenses. They are highly paid, earning nearly a half-million dollars a year. One has to wonder why such an experienced pilot was unable to direct a ship through a wide channel under the Bay Bridge.
Cota allegedly asked the Captain of the ship to point to the center of the bridge span on the navigation display screen. Cota then had the ship head for that position. Evidently, the captain didn’t know how to use the navigation system, either. It seems he pointed to the wrong spot on the screen.
Here was a 65,000-ton vessel moving along at 13 mph in the fog with faulty radar, directed by two people who did not know how to use a navigation system that each should have mastered. Laurel and Hardy could have done better and perhaps avoided “another fine mess.”
At one time the pilot directed the ship to head way off course, parallel to the bridge and was warned about it by the Coast Guard. At first, the pilot disputed the warning, then had the ship turn sharply to the right, hitting the bridge tower and opening up a 160-foot-long gash on the left side.
Just what happened on the bridge of the Cosco Busan has yet to be revealed. A ship captain has the right to overrule the pilot but usually defers to the pilot’s judgment, especially if the captain is not familiar with the area. Did the captain order Cota to head in the wrong direction or not? Answers are needed.
Once the bridge was struck, Cota quickly notified the vessel traffic service about the incident and that oil was leaking. Less than a half-hour after the collision, people on a pilot boat noticed there was a considerable flow of oil coming from the ship. Shortly after, the Coast Guard sent a vessel to the scene.
About an hour and 20 minutes after the crash, a private cleanup firm sent a vessel. By 11 a.m., 21/2 hours after the incident, five oil-skimming boats were operating at the scene.
By then it was clear to some nearby yacht sailors that the spill was huge, with oil nearly 6 inches deep in some areas. But as late as 12:15 p.m., nearly four hours after the Cosco Busan hit the Bay Bridge, the Coast Guard reported that the spill was 140 gallons.
That ridiculously low estimate belies credulity. It wasn’t until late in the afternoon that the Coast Guard reported that the spill was 58,000 gallons. Why was the initial estimate so low, when it should have been immediately obvious that thousands of gallons had spilled?
If the Coast Guard and cleanup ships acted quicker, much of the oil spill might have been contained and pumped out of the Bay. The current was running southward under the Bay Bridge for a couple of hours after the spill. Thus the oil might have been removed before the current changed and sent tens of thousands of gallons of oil into the rest of the Bay and beyond.
It is critical that the National Transportation Safety Board, which is handling the investigation, find out exactly what occurred on the bridge of the Cosco Busan.
Equally puzzling is the Coast Guard’s gross underestimate of the spill’s size and the inadequate cleanup response.
Prevention of future such incidents depends on some clear and accurate answers. |
