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Afghanistan: The Russian Monkey Wrench
Stratfor Today » August 27, 2008 | 2130 GMT
JOHN THYS/AFP/Getty Images
Russian Ambassador to NATO Dmitry RogozinSummary
Russia said Aug. 26 that it will end or curtail peacekeeping cooperation with NATO in several areas, but will continue to work with the West in Afghanistan. This is a veiled threat, of course; Russia is letting NATO know that its cooperation is not assured. There are a number of ways in which Russia could hamstring the West’s operations in Afghanistan, but none of these options is without risk for Moscow. Russia also benefits from having the U.S. military commitment in Afghanistan continue both because it consumes U.S. military capacity and because it helps contain and focus Islamist extremism in the wider region — and Russia also has its own internal problems with such extremism.
Analysis
Russian envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin said Aug. 26 that Russia will end or curtail peacekeeping cooperation with NATO in several areas, but will continue to work with the West in Afghanistan, which he called “a shared problem.” He noted, however, that Moscow could impose further limits later if events should warrant it. His comments follow an Aug. 21 statement by Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that Russia does not need NATO as much as NATO needs Russia.
Following the conflict in Georgia, the Russians are working hard to make sure the West is aware of just how many cards they hold in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow is doing its best to take full advantage of the window of opportunity created by the effective absorption of the U.S. military in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is trying to ensure that that window stays open as long as possible.
In this context, Rogozin’s and Lavrov’s comments are delivering a threat to NATO, quite thinly veiled: Russia can compound the already-complicated logistical nightmares facing Western military operations in Afghanistan if its wishes are not respected — and is reminding Washington that there are benefits to being agreeable with Moscow. Although there are a number of reasons why Russia would rather not make good on this threat (or might in practice prove unable to), it is a warning that NATO cannot afford to dismiss.
Russia’s wishes are clear: Western acknowledgement of Russian primacy in the former Soviet region, and, in particular, an end to NATO overtures to Ukraine, Georgia and other former Soviet republics. There has been no indication, however, that the United States and its allies are prepared to grant that. If anything, U.S. and European rhetoric has run the opposite way, condemning Moscow for its moves in Georgia and threatening reprisals (which, however, have not yet materialized). Russia’s focus, then, is on drawing Western countries’ attention to the pressure points where Russia can hurt them most. One of the most important of these is Afghanistan.
Russia could begin by refusing to allow the transit of supplies and equipment through its territory to NATO forces in Afghanistan, just as two agreements in recent years have begun to become established. Moscow also could exert influence in the former Soviet republics of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan and attempt to pressure them to shut down or complicate NATO supply routes, as well as attempt to pressure Kyrgyzstan to shut down the U.S. air base at Manas.
The war in Afghanistan already presents a significant logistical challenge for NATO and U.S. forces even without Russian interference. The country is landlocked and surrounded by mountains, with few good roads and even fewer road links to the outside world, and no rail links — which creates difficulties for the United States, whose key logistical strength is its command of the seas.
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Early in the war, it was possible to use air power to supply the few Marines, special forces and CIA operatives in the country. But there are now more than 50,000 NATO troops under the aegis of the International Security Assistance Force, in addition to other U.S. forces. These include platoons of fuel-guzzling 60-ton main battle tanks and even more light-armored vehicles. Though there is a steady flow of C-17 Globemaster III strategic airlifters into Bagram Air Base north of Kabul, it is nowhere near enough to sustain a force of that size purely from the air.
As such, land supply routes are essential to the conduct of the war. Without a direct connection to either China or India, and with transit through Iran being out of the question, both the United States and NATO are forced to rely logistically on a southern route through Pakistan or on a longer northern route through Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.
The vast majority of the fuel used by U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan is refined in Pakistan and shipped by truck. It is worth noting that, on any given day, there are some 300 trucks carrying a total of more than 3 million gallons of fuel on the road en route to military bases in Afghanistan. Even the Pakistan route — the most efficient route — is a long supply chain. Almost all other supplies come in through the port of Karachi and transit two routes into Afghanistan. Most travels north through Pakistan and only crosses over into Afghanistan near Kabul. The rest crosses farther south on a road near Kandahar. Rail links connect nearby Pakistani towns to Karachi, but do not continue into Afghanistan.
Pakistan is problematic as a logistical hub, however. It is plagued by increasing political instability and faces its own mounting insurgency — connected in many cases with the Afghan insurgency and known to monitor and target NATO convoys.
The remainder of U.S. and NATO fuel is refined in Azerbaijan and in Turkmenistan, and shipped by truck directly from Turkmenistan or through Uzbekistan. All of these countries, like Afghanistan, are landlocked and lack direct links to the outside world. Significantly shifting the logistical load northward (if, for example, Pakistan should cease to be a viable route) might involve transporting supplies by ship into the Black Sea and then eastward across the Caucasus, through the Caspian and into Turkmenistan. However, this would dramatically increase the length of the supply lines and would require the acquiescence either of Georgia and Azerbaijan (and, by proxy, Russia) or of Russia itself.
Russia already allows nonmilitary cargo to transit its territory to reach Afghanistan through Central Asia under a 2006 agreement and also permits the leasing of both Russian and Ukrainian transport aircraft for NATO use. But its direct contributions to the Afghan supply chain are only a small part of the picture.
So long as existing supply arrangements hold, the United States and NATO will continue to rely on Pakistan for the bulk of their logistics. The links are established and are far shorter than any alternative. Indeed, with a small surge of troops into Afghanistan very likely over the course of the next year, the timing is extremely poor for any attempt to curtail supplies running through Pakistan.
Though the key route runs through Pakistan, a Russian move to shut down the northern supply chain would create further stress on a system that is already under great pressure — especially if Pakistan should destabilize to the point where it is no longer a usable route.
But Moscow can also complicate matters in Afghanistan in other ways. The Russians have ties to a number of ethnic minority figures in the country, including Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and others, as well as some former communist elements. Some of these are in parliament and are in charge in their respective regions. The Tajiks in particular control the speakership of the Parliament and they have a dominant position in the main opposition alliance called the United National Front. While not all of these actors are necessarily willing to do Russia’s bidding without question, Moscow can use some of them to create political friction in the country.
There is also the option of supporting the jihadist forces NATO and the United States are fighting in Afghanistan. Russia still has deep connections in Afghanistan dating back to the Russian occupation, and Russian organized crime groups (which have ties to the state) have a strong presence in Afghanistan as well.
Interdicting the northern supply route requires that Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan agree to work with Russia against the United States, but these governments may be unwilling to do that for their own national security reasons. Working against NATO and the United States in Afghanistan will by default empower their enemies, the Taliban — even if Russia does not attempt to aid the jihadists directly. All three of these Central Asian states face threats from Islamist militants, and are not eager to see those threats increase, much less spill across into their own territory. Russia can certainly bring pressure to bear on these governments, but it remains an open question whether they are in a position to resist that pressure or how hard Moscow is really willing to push them.
Perhaps more importantly, Moscow remembers fighting the Taliban’s predecessors, the Afghan Mujahideen, in the 1980s and will not want to go too far in this direction for fear of seeing Islamist militancy spread in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia has already fought an Islamist insurgency within its own borders in Chechnya — an insurgency that was fueled in part by the Taliban — and does not want to see militant ideology exported to its own growing Muslim population. Moscow wants the fight to stay in Afghanistan and the best way to achieve that is to let the Americans fight the Afghan war. Additionally, bolstering the jihadists in Afghanistan would create problems between Moscow and its traditional allies in the country, who are enemies of the Taliban.
Russia may not need to do much else, however. The threat has been made, and the West has no choice but to take it seriously. NATO and the United States are well aware of their logistical issues in Afghanistan, and they also see instability increasing in Pakistan. They cannot afford to have Russia actively working against them, and so they are now faced with a decision about how to respond.
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