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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum

GLD 374.22

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Nov 21 4:00 PM EST

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To: maceng2 who wrote (45112)	1/10/2009 7:27:37 PM
From: elmatador	of 217927

This leads us to the second part of Olson's hypothesis, those nations with high numbers of special-interest or collusion groups have lower levels of economic growth. Olson writes, "Distributional coalitions slow down a society's capacity to adopt new technologies and reallocate resources in response to changing conditions, and they reduce the rate of economic growth" (65). First, distributional coalitions stymie technological adoption when such innovation stands to benefit a rival group. A present day illustration can be found in a labor unions vehement opposition to the implementation of labor saving machinery. Second, distributional coalitions will attempt to block policy initiatives that change the status quo. When policy needs to be developed to increase economic or social advancement, the special-interest groups are likely to feel a certain displacement and will act to prevent such policy. According to Olson, these actions, coupled with others, often lead to policies which promote policies which have the potential to stifle economic growth. collectibles411.com

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