Forget the past, the present is what we are dealing with. And the present suggests we need to keep reducing American deployment in S. Korea. Surprisingly even the military agrees:
Korean Troop Withdrawal
Gordon Cucullu | October 27, 2005
Removal of American GIs from South Korea has been a hot-button issue for years. When Jimmy Carter won the presidency in 1976 one of his campaign promises was to remove all ground troops from Korea. In reaction Korean leader Park Chung Hee published an op-ed piece postulating that arbitrary removal of the American tripwire would likely precipitate a renewed Korean War with unacceptably high costs in casualties and resources. But that was then, this is now.
North Korea is an acknowledged dangerous foe. It has massed artillery poised to rain steel down on Seoul and forward-deployed American units. It fields a 1.2 million man army with massive reserves. Aircraft, logistical support, armor units, and special operations infantry units have been deployed into protected attack positions for years. We know about the missiles, the nucs-bugs-and-gas WMD that Kim Jong Il possesses and seems willing to use on military and civilian targets. But we also know that the hedonistic Kim regime has one foot in the economic grave and the other on a banana peel.
Without massive infusion of foreign assistance and revenue gained from illegal operations such as counterfeiting, narcotics, slave labor, and sale of weapons systems to other rogue states, it is likely that an economic implosion would have flushed his regime away. Thirty years ago analysts calculated that North Korea had upwards of 90 days supplies for a full-scale war. Given the economic disintegration of North Korea since 1994, it would be surprising if the North could mount an all-out war for more than 14-21 days. Nevertheless, in any conflict the North Korean wild card is the horrific damage it could inflict on the civilian population of Seoul even without using WMD.
That said, it is critical to recognize that the power balance has shifted on the peninsula, dramatically enough to require a reevaluation of America's roles and responsibilities. Furthermore, the South Korean military is as strong as it has ever been in manpower, equipment, and training. With its booming economy South Korean outspends the North in actual dollars while committing a significantly smaller percentage of its GNP to defense. It has approximately 600,000 regulars backed by large reserves and modern equipment. In a fight the South Korean military ought to be able to defend the country with air and naval augmentation from America and allies. At some point ground forces might need to be committed to the fight too, but the decades-long tripwire rationale for continued forward deployed American units seems to have faded.
In fact, without undue provocative response from North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, America has already extricated a brigade from the 2nd Infantry Division, relocating it in Fort Carson, CO after a combat tour in Iraq. Other units are slated to follow over time, bringing the level of US troops to fewer than 30,000, the lowest since wartime. Concomitantly a major redeployment in theater is underway as facilities and units move southward, out of range of the most immediate North Korean artillery and missile threat.
If American military deterrence is less vital now than it was several decades previously, the issue becomes primarily political. Is continue presence of American ground forces vital to the interests of the US? Of South Korea? The short answers are yes, and yes again, but not necessary at present levels or configurations. The methodology can be worked out to suit both nations, but there are still issues – some rational, others quite emotional – that will influence decision makers.
Many Americans are angry and frustrated by what they perceive as South Korean ingratitude for the 56,000+ casualties that the US alone took in keeping that country free. But it is important to realize that South Koreans are not monolithic in their political beliefs. The present incumbent party of President Roh Moo Hyun is decidedly anti-American in tone, and pro-appeasement in behavior. Roh and his predecessor, Kim Dae Jung, made conscious decisions to abandon human rights considerations for their fellow Koreans in the North in favor of “stability,” however false, and retention of political power.
The opposition party, led by Park Geun Hye, daughter of Park Chung Hee, is adamant about restoring harmony to the South Korean-American relationship, holding Kim Jong Il accountable for his aberrant behavior, and shining a spotlight on the horrific conditions for ordinary people in the North. A major presidential election is scheduled for 2007. Since 1997 the hard left has been running South Korea and it is probably time for the pendulum to swing back to center.
Meanwhile, from a resources and manpower perspective the question becomes, if American forces are now symbolic of a US commitment to security in Korea and on the Asian mainland, then how many need to be present to validate the symbol? Would a reinforced brigade do the job? A specially configured battalion task force? With units stretched to the max in a long, tough global fight and the costs of war-fighting rising sharply, these are not frivolous considerations.
It helps to recall also that we have a bond in blood with the South Korean military. We fought together in Korea, of course, and also in Vietnam, and now in Iraq with a 3,000+ man unit deployed there. Additionally, South Korea is one of our most important trading partners, supports us diplomatically, and is an international role model for the transformational power of freedom and democracy. A free South Korea is a necessary partner to solve current crises as well as those that will erupt in the future.
It is important that we first do no harm. By decreasing US troop presence we must make clear that it is not a sign of weakening resolve or commitment. That point made, we must recognize that we are in a different fight now and that circumstances have evolved into a new strategic paradigm. We must adjust our resources accordingly. And that is exactly what we are doing.
military.com |
