Let's briefly revisit the ROE. We have discussed the standing rules of engagement, the theater-specific rules of engagement for Iraq, and even the rules on the use of force. Our problems with the existing ROE and RUF are legendary, and include the insurmountable initial problem that they are constructed around defensive operations and personal and unit self defense and include no discussion or guidance for offensive operations. This is why General Kearney wanted to charge two Army snipers with murder for targeting a Taliban commander who didn't happen to be holding a weapon.
The two were actually Special Forces Captain and ODA Commander Staffel and his team sergeant, Master Sergeant Anderson. Both had unblemished combat records. Both left the army as soon as they could after Kearney's charges were dropped.
We cannot blame everything on the Rules of Engagement (ROE).
The fact that the ROE are not effective is a symptom of a much greater issue. It means our strategy and tactics are failing.
Sun Tzu explained the way to succeed in the "Art of War".
First attack the enemies plans; next attack his alliances; next attack their army; the lowest priority is to attack their fortified cities.
In Sun Tzu's time, fortified cities mostly referred to villages, towns and compounds. That is what Afghanistan has in abundance and that is what we keep attacking. That begs the question why.
I think it is because of West Point failing for decades to teach unconventional warfare including counterinsurgency to those who command our army today. No West Point General is going to forego his opportunity to direct kinetic battles in favor of attacking the enemies' plans. Our combat arms generals do not make more stars for attacking ideas.
This conference (see below) is a perfect example of the lack of knowledge. Here we are 8 years into unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency. You would think our army would be the world's best ever at it - but that is not the case. Most of our army still does not understand the problem. Finally they are going to talk about it with the USMC. The problem with that is the USMC doesn't understand it any better than the Army. The Army should go to Special Forces for expertise.
I doubt anyone at this conference will own up to making strategic and tactical errors on the battlefields. Instead they use word-smithing to the max. Even to the point of inventing new terms - like irregular warfare that required a 4-page definition. Another new word is IED. Nobody seems to know how to avoid IEDs. Even though they cause 80% of our combat losses. In the old days IEDs were known as anti-vehicle mines. We have very effective tactics (developed in WW II, Korea and RVN) against anti-vehicle mines. But nobody seems to have thought about using them against IEDs.
I'm still waiting for one of the brilliant new tacticians to define regular warfare.
Instead, they are going to try to figure out “What is counterinsurgency and how as a military, do we approach the problem?”
So here we are going back to old school terms like counterinsurgency. I predict the words unconventional warfare will be reborn too. I suppose this all means the term irregular warfare is a failure.
I propose changing the word IED back to mine. There is already an effective world-wide civilian lobby against mines. There is no world-wide lobby against IEDs
I feel certain we could activate the anti mine lobby against the Taliban and Al Qaeda if we explain that IEDs are in fact mines.
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US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Leaders Conference
October 27-29, 2009
BCTB Training Facility
Ft. Leavenworth, KS
The US Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center will be hosting a three day workshop focusing on Counterinsurgency Operations in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The conference will seek to answer the question, “What is counterinsurgency and how as a military, do we approach the problem?” |
