The Strange Case of Mullah Baradar
Dana M. Perino and Bill Burck
The Corner
Yesterday, the New York Times broke the story that one of the Taliban’s top military commanders, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, had been captured in Karachi during a joint raid by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the CIA. Baradar is reportedly second only to Mullah Omar in the Taliban’s loose hierarchy. The Times reported this as a huge victory, and the Obama administration took a few well-deserved bows.
At first blush, and based solely on the Times’s reporting and the administration’s reaction, this did indeed appear to be a major achievement. We noticed something odd with the triumphant tone, however. The article published yesterday noted that Baradar had been one of the Taliban’s “most approachable leaders” and one of the few Taliban commanders willing to negotiate with President Karzai's government.
This struck us as discordant with the dramatic raid, capture, and interrogation of Baradar initially described by the Times. Baradar was not captured in a spider hole, like Saddam Hussein was, or hiding out in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, like Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was. Instead, it appeared that his location was not much of a secret at all.
At first we wrote this off as more evidence of the on-again/off-again “cooperation” we receive from the Pakistani intelligence service, and Baradar’s capture was a good sign it was on again. But, according to new reporting by the Times today, the reality is far more complicated.
Today, the Times is reporting that the real story behind Baradar’s capture is that Pakistan wanted to gain a place at the table in negotiations between the U.S. and Karzai and the Taliban.
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