"Japan did not surrender after the first bomb was dropped."
Some didn't want to surrender after the second. There was a failed coup attempt against the emperor to prevent surrender.
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The alternative...
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Operation Ketsugo
Meanwhile, the Japanese had their own plans. Initially, they were concerned about an invasion during the summer of 1945. However, the Battle of Okinawa went on so long that they concluded the Allies would not be able to launch another operation before the typhoon season, during which the weather would be too risky for amphibious operations. Japanese intelligence predicted fairly closely where the invasion would take place: southern Kyushu at Miyazaki, Ariake Bay, and/or the Satsuma Peninsula.[17]
While Japan no longer had a realistic prospect of winning the war, Japan's leaders believed they could make the cost of conquering Japan too high for the Allies to accept, leading to some sort of armistice rather than total defeat. The Japanese plan for defeating the invasion was called Operation Ketsugo (????, ketsugo sakusen?) ("Operation Codename Decision"). The Japanese had secretly constructed an underground headquarters which could be used in the event of Allied invasion to shelter the Emperor and Imperial General staff.
[edit] Kamikaze
Admiral Matome Ugaki was recalled to Japan in February 1945 and given command of the Fifth Air Fleet on Kyushu. The Fifth Air Fleet was assigned the task of kamikaze attacks against ships involved in the invasion of Okinawa, Operation Ten-Go and began training pilots and assembling aircraft for the defense of Kyushu where the Allies were likely to invade next.
The Japanese defense relied heavily on kamikaze planes. In addition to fighters and bombers, they reassigned almost all of their trainers for the mission, trying to make up in quantity what they lacked in quality. Their army and navy had more than 10,000 aircraft ready for use in July (and would have had somewhat more by October) and were planning to use almost all that could reach the invasion fleets. Ugaki also oversaw building of hundreds of small suicide boats that would also be used to attack any Allied ships that came near the shores of Kyushu.
Fewer than 2,000 kamikaze planes launched attacks during the Battle of Okinawa, achieving approximately one hit per nine attacks. At Kyushu, given the more favorable circumstances (such as terrain that reduced the U.S's radar advantage), they hoped to get one for six by overwhelming the U.S. defenses with large numbers of kamikaze attacks in a period of hours. The Japanese estimated that the planes would sink more than 400 ships; since they were training the pilots to target transports rather than carriers and destroyers, the casualties would be disproportionately greater than at Okinawa. One staff study estimated that the kamikazes could destroy a third to a half of the invasion force before its landings.[18]
[edit] Naval forces
By August 1945, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) had ceased to be an effective fighting force. The only Japanese major warships in fighting order were six aircraft carriers, four cruisers, and one battleship, none of which could be adequately fueled. The navy still had some minor warships, but their use would also be limited by the lack of fuel. They could "sustain a force of twenty operational destroyers and perhaps forty submarines for a few days at sea."[19]
The IJN also had about 100 Koryu-class midget submarines, 250 smaller Kairyu-class midget submarines, 1,000 Kaiten manned torpedoes, and 800 Shin'yo suicide boats.
[edit] Ground forces
In any amphibious operation, the defender has two options for defensive strategy — strong defense of the beaches, or defense in depth. Early in the war (such as at Tarawa) the Japanese employed strong defenses on the beaches with little or no manpower in reserve. This tactic proved to be very vulnerable to pre-invasion shore bombardment. Later in the war, at Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, the Japanese switched strategy and dug in their forces in the most defensible terrain. Fighting evolved into long battles of attrition, with very high American casualties, but no hope of victory for the Japanese.
For the defense of Kyushu, the Japanese took an intermediate posture, with the bulk of their defensive forces a few kilometres inland from the shore — back far enough to avoid complete exposure to naval gunnery, but close enough that the Americans could not establish a secure foothold before engaging them. The counteroffensive forces were still further back, prepared to move against whichever landing seemed to be the main effort.
In March 1945, there was only one combat division in Kyushu. Over the next four months the Imperial Japanese Army transferred forces from Manchuria, Korea, and northern Japan, while raising other forces in place. By August, they had fourteen divisions and various smaller formations, including three tank brigades, for a total of 900,000 men.[20] Although the Japanese were able to raise large numbers of new soldiers, equipping them was more difficult. By August, the Japanese Army had the equivalent of 65 divisions in the homeland but only enough equipment for 40 and only enough ammunition for 30.[21]
The Japanese did not formally decide to stake everything on the outcome of the Battle of Kyushu, but they concentrated their assets to such a degree that there would be little left in reserve. By one estimate, the forces in Kyushu had 40% of all the ammunition in the Home Islands.[22]
In addition, the Japanese had organized the Patriotic Citizens Fighting Corps — which included all healthy men aged 15–60 and women 17–40 — to perform combat support, and ultimately combat jobs. Weapons, training, and uniforms were generally lacking: some men were armed with nothing better than muzzle-loading muskets, longbows, or bamboo spears; nevertheless, they were expected to make do with what they had.[23]
One mobilized high school girl, Yukiko Kasai, found herself issued an awl and told, "Even killing one American soldier will do. … You must aim for the abdomen."[24]
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