No, you don't have to say that. It's not at all certain, if we had been more reasonable with the Japanese, that there would have had to be such a loss of life. And of course blockade was viable and was discussed. The biggest reason that wouldn't have worked (if, indeed, it did not) was because of the stupid focus on unconditional surrender.
"There is probably no more controversial issue in 20th-century American history than President Harry S. Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb on Japan. Many historians argue that it was necessary to end the war and that in fact it saved lives, both Japanese and American, by avoiding a land invasion of Japan that might have cost hundreds of thousands of lives. Other historians argue that Japan would have surrendered even without the use of the atomic bomb and that in factPresident Harry S. Truman, November 1945 Truman and his advisors used the bomb only in an effort to intimidate the Soviet Union. The United States did know from intercepted messages between Tokyo and Moscow that the Japanese were seeking a conditional surrender. American policy-makers, however, were not inclined to accept a Japanese "surrender" that left its military dictatorship intact and even possibly allowed it to retain some of its wartime conquests. Further, American leaders were anxious to end the war as soon as possible. It is important to remember that July-August 1945 was no bloodless period of negotiation. In fact, there were still no overt negotiations at all. The United States continued to suffer casualties in late July and early August 1945, especially from Japanese submarines and suicidal "kamikaze" attacks using aircraft and midget submarines. (One example of this is the loss of the Indianapolis, which was sunk by a Japanese submarine on July 29, just days after delivering "Little Boy" to Tinian. Of its crew of 1,199, only 316 sailors survived.) The people of Japan, however, were suffering far more by this time. Air raids and naval bombardment of Japan were a daily occurrence, and the first signs of starvation were already beginning to show.
Alternatives to dropping the atomic bomb on a Japanese city were many, but few military or political planners thought they would bring about the desired outcome, at least not quickly. They believed the shock of a rapid series of bombings had the best chance of working. A demonstration of the power of the atomic bomb on an isolated location was an option supported by many of the Manhattan Project's scientists, but providing the Japanese warning of a demonstration would allow them to attempt to try toLittle Boy at Tinian Island, August 1945 intercept the incoming bomber or even move American prisoners of war to the designated target. Also, the uranium bomb (right) had never been tested. What would the reaction be if the United States warned of a horrible new weapon, only to have it prove a dud, with the wreckage of the weapon itself now in Japanese hands? Another option was to wait for the expected coming Soviet declaration of war in the hopes that this might convince Japan to surrender unconditionally, but the Soviet declaration was not expected until mid-August, and Truman hoped to avoid having to "share" the administration of Japan with the Soviet Union. A blockade combined with continued conventional bombing might also eventually lead to surrender without an invasion, but there was no telling how long this would take, if it worked at all. "
They wanted quick; they wanted to use their cool new weapon, and they wanted to fuck with the Soviets- who also wanted to fuck with us, and take Sakhalin island, which is why they didn't mediate any sort of peace process- though the US knew all about that anyway, since we had broken the codes.
Killing those hundreds of thousands of Japanese was all about expediency, controlling the Russians, racism, and revenge. Expediency I can understand, but in the context of war crimes I get leery about "the ends justifies the means" talk. Some things you should not try so hard to justify.
cfo.doe.gov |
