Kaddafi Has A Killer Plan That Just Might Work
March 24, 2011: Kaddafis ground forces have quickly learned that safety from air attack comes in the form of human shields, or just getting into a residential area and some place to hide from the warplanes. But the U.S. sensors are numerous and effective. That, plus the smart bombs, keep the Kaddafi forces vulnerable. The most effective defense is human shields, in the form of any local civilians that can be rounded up. Kaddafi's three most effective brigades are holding together under all this attack, but are shrinking each day from the casualties. Kaddafi troops have, in effect, lost the use of their armored vehicles and artillery. But they can still move safely in the open if they drive civilian vehicles, not in large convoys, and do not communicate on any radio device.
The urban fighting does not benefit much from the NATO air support, mainly because there are few, if any, NATO air controllers down there to call in the extremely precise attacks required in built-up areas. While Kaddafi has thousands of men with military training, and has then formed into well organized units, the rebels have neither. The rebels are not as united as the Kadaffi forces, and not nearly as effective when attacking (which is always more difficult than defending). Kaddafi troops still have some armored vehicles inside cities like Misarata, which are rolled out when thought safe (from attack) to attack rebel positions, or key sites like hospitals. Kaddafi has his secret police and street gangs in many cities in towns, who are able to harass the rebels, or even defeat them in some places. Kaddafi has cash and lots of promises to give out, and many Libyans with guns will listen.
The war may ultimately be decided by logistics. While the naval and air blockade keeps out new weapons for Kaddafi, that is not a problem for him. He has plenty of stuff already. More importantly, he holds hostage the populations of Tripoli and several other cities. NATO has to let through food and medical supplies, even though the Kaddafi troops and civilian supporters will be at the head of the line for this stuff. Unless NATO imposes a road blockade (no traffic between cities at all), Kaddafi can still move troops via sedan, SUV and van. NATO will not put troops into Libya (aside from the handful of special operations commandos already there), and dealing with the Libyan rebels is like herding cats. Kaddafi believes, with some justification, that he can wait out NATO, and work the sympathy angle via media manipulation.
Kaddafi has time on his side, as the Arab League, after initially backing attacks on him, quickly changed its mind when it saw that this would not be a quick, painless, process. Moreover, most Arab League members are dictators or monarchs, and don't really like the idea of some outsiders (be they the U.S. or the UN), telling them what to do, under the threat of attack.
Over the last five days, the number NATO air sorties over Libya have increased from under a hundred a day to nearly 200. During that same period, the fraction of sorties flown by U.S. aircraft have come to be the majority. This is a problem in the United States, because continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a large budget deficit, cannot afford to stay involved for long. So, although the U.S. organized the initial attacks, the Americans want someone else to take over command functions and, soon thereafter, provide most of the ships and aircraft. The other NATO nations, accustomed to having the Americans take the lead, and do most of the work, are unsure of how to proceed. |
