Have they finished counting votes in Florida yet? Before i forget , here's a good book on Military Analysis you might like Thomas E. Ricks
The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today
amazon.com
This review is from: The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (Hardcover)
This is the work of the best of our historians. He culls American military history for not just the most instructive examples available, but also the best examples needed to make his point: Which is that American military leadership has gone soft.
In a step-by-step: war-by-war comparison of past "good old generals" versus the "bad new Generals," with only a few exceptions, the latter do not stand up well against the former. He notes that in past wars, generals were fired, not just for being incompetent, but also for being unable to get the job done.
During WW-II no less than thirteen generals were fired just for not being able to get the job done. Then, everything was "on the job training" with a short time fuse and the vital interests of the nation on the line. Today, with longer timelines, where our wars are wars of choice, and the military environment is a more "general-friendly" political environment, the only incentives generals have are to CYA and veer as close as possible to mediocrity.
The author notes that there are some exceptions to this pattern. General David Petraeus for instance gets high marks despite being born in the wrong era. General Colin Powell gets a mixed review -- being likened to an Eisenhower without a General Marshall.
As to what makes up the difference between the "good old generals" and the "bad new ones," the author says the issue may lie in the sliding scale that has widened since WW-II in the difference between "performance" and "accountability." Although the author did not make this particular case, it is easy enough for the reader to read between the lines and see that this is a motif that could just as easily be expanded to apply to the civilian leadership to which the generals must report.
Arguably, from Wall Street and the corporate board rooms to the individual State houses, there is no more such a thing as accountability in U.S. leadership. America has gone from a meritocracy to a smooz-otarcy. Its "who you know" that can allow you to escape accountability and get away with poor performance
The author marks the point in the sand that signaled the shift from the good to the bad as the Vietnam war generally and the My Lai massacre in particular. According to him, no one should be surprised at Abu Ghraib and Tommy Franks screw-ups in Iraq, given what we tolerated in the Vietnam War, where our troops on the ground won every tactical battle and our Generals behind the lines lost every strategic one.
This is a solid read that will tickle the fancy of military history buffs and thus will become a valued reference guide for military historians, well into the future. My friends at NWC will be salivating over this book. Ten Stars
"The Generals" comes as a needed wakeup call for America, particularly in how we hold our military leadership accountable. "The Generals" is a fitting coda to Ricks's most recent works, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005 and The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008. While both explored the Iraqi War with a clear unbiased eye, "The Generals" examines the current state of the U.S. Army's leadership and how it has changed and evolved from World War II to the present. There are few journalists with as much experience and knowledge on the subject as Ricks and he advances a rather shocking hypothesis here: that the Army's generals have increasingly been held less accountable for their failures. In a sense "The Generals" harkens back to Ricks's 1996 monograph "On American Soil" which explored the increasing disconnect and gap between the military and society in general. As Ricks correctly pointed out in that book and here again in "The Generals" society and its view of the military has changed and evolved repeatedly over time and the military is certainly not immune to these changes, not just within society but the political leadership which embodies these society changes and creates the resultant pressures on the military. The "great man" era of political and military leadership during World War II meant strict accountability as the Army was comprised of draftees with career line officers. These were not career soldiers and officers felt a duty and responsibility to ensure sons and fathers came home from the war to return to civilian life. The generals of World War II and Korea were given marching orders by the Commander in Chief, but largely left to do what needed to be done. Over time there was a shift away from that accountability that was generational but also political in nature. The shift became pronounced during the Vietnam War era as the Commander in Chief took a more hands-on active role in the prosecution of the war during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. This was largely a reflection of the pressures both men felt from voters and society and from the high stakes of the Cold War era where a proxy war like Vietnam could suddenly and precipitously lead to a hot war or worse still a nuclear exchange. The societal shifts of the 1960s changed peoples perception and respect for the military that was a sharp 180 degree change from World War II. The growing unpopularity of the war and the draft forced politicians and the military's hands and what evolved was a micromanagement of the war effort driven by media access and coverage that increasingly became more critical of the war. By the end of Vietnam the military had shifted from conscription via the draft to an all-volunteer army but the hits to the generals were considerable. The massacre at Mai Lai, the Westmoreland controversies, and the lingering dissatisfaction over the war led to public distaste and skepticism about our military leaders. The failures of Vietnam shaped the next generation of generals, how they thought and how they operated.
As Ricks points out accountability began to slip in Vietnam and the generals needed to find a way to reshape and reform the Army. Professionalization certainly helped but there was a marked effort too at controlling the message and access. This was cast in high relief during actions in Grenada, Panama, and the First Gulf War where the media had very limited access to front line troops and the messages were tightly scripted. By abandoning the daily body count of Vietnam the generals could shift from that gruesome metric to other less flesh-and-blood metrics that marked success on the ground. It's hard to question accountability when you don't have access and those three actions showed a remarkable return to form, creating heroes out of Schwarzkoff and Powell. The abandonment of open-ended conflicts showed a military precision previously undreamed of. The generals now spoke of exit strategies and defined engagement in ways unimagined. But as we learned that lead to hubris in the political leadership and an enlarged and exaggerated sense of what was possible with military action. The generals showed they were capable of delivering, but still unwilling or unable to stand up to the political leadership and say "NO" when military action was unwise or represented a return to open-ended engagements. The September 11th terrorist attacks represented a Foucaultian rupture and a need to respond with "the army you have rather than the army you wish you had" to borrow a phrase from Donald Rumsfeld. There was no time to ponder exit strategies, this was a 911 call to the army to address a problem in Afghanistan as quickly as possible. There was no time to contemplate how we would get out and it has now turned into one of the most nettlesome problems the generals, politicians, and society has had to contend with in some time. Future generations will debate Iraq as previous generations have debated Vietnam and in that regard "The Generals", as well as Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2003 to 2005 and The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006-2008 are the first drafts of history on that debate. As Ricks points out the war in Iraq has thrown the whole accountability problem into high relief. The Abu Ghraib incident, the Pat Tillman coverup, mistreatment of wounded warriors at Walter Reed, the Wikileaks scandal, and countless other episodes where conduct broke down, was covered up, and mistakes were made pointed to the lack of control by military leadership, but by an large the accountability has stopped at the lower ranks rather than being addressed at the highest ranks. Yet by and large the public supports the troops in a marked shift from the Vietnam era. The generals see this as an opportunity to use this renewed faith in the military to wash themselves of their sins and not hold those at the top accountable. And by and large there has been no hue and cry from the public to go after those in charge who have failed. Ricks points out the litany of failures in the past decade where many of the generals should have been held accountable yet they have gone off Scott free. But blame doesn't fall solely at the generals feet; oversight falls squarely on our Commander in Chief, the Secretary of Defense, and Congress and it is clear that none of them have been willing to do what is necessary and proper. What I was left with was unmitigated anger at the cavalier attitude of the Army leadership but tremendous respect for those that they lead. They have given selflessly far above and beyond the call of duty. The same cannot be said for all of the Army's generals and it is clear now is the time to demand accountability and thin the ranks. "The Generals" also points at the inherent problems with civilian oversight of the military in a democracy, especially when that political oversight isn't up to the job. In that respect "The Generals" is a particularly damning indictment of how bad our political system has become. "The Generals" is a sobering and dispiriting reminder that the military cannot and should not rely on anyone but themselves when it comes to reforming and mending the errors of their ways.
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15 of 20 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars Fascinating look at the American Military Leadership, October 30, 2012
By
Anne Sumers (Montrose, New York) - See all my reviews
This review is from: The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today (Hardcover)
Tom Ricks is brilliant! this is a compelling book and a fascinating read-- a great gift for anyone interested in military leadership. Generals are not being held accountable for their mistakes ( " a private is more likely to get fired for losing his rifle, than a general is for losing a war") and creative, out of the box thinkers are being sidelined, unpromoted, and ignored.
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2 of 2 people found the following review helpful
5.0 out of 5 stars This is the work of a true historical Genius, November 8, 2012
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Herbert L Calhoun "paulocal" (Falls Church, VA USA) - See all my reviews
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