From Richard Joyce...
Primary Argument: There are no real moral claims
1. In order for an act to be ’moral,’ it must necessarily provide a reason
for carrying it out.
2. No actions necessarily provide reasons for carrying them out.
S1. For an action to necessarily provide a reason for carrying it
out, that reason must adhere to practical rationality for all persons.
S2. In order for a reason to adhere to practical rationality for all
persons, it cannot rationally alienate anyone, nor can it collapse into relativism.
S3. Therefore, for an action to necessarily provide a reason for
carrying it out, it cannot alienate anyone, nor can it collapse into relativism. [S1,S2]
S4. The most plausible accounts of such a reason are ideal observer-based or desire-based.
S5. Ideal observer-based accounts alienate persons.
S6. Desire-based accounts collapse into relativism.
S7. Therefore, the most plausible accounts of such a reason either
alienate persons or collapse into relativism. [S4-S6]
S8. Therefore, no actions necessarily provide reasons for adhering
to them. [S7,S3]
3. Therefore, there are no moral acts.
Symbolic Notation
Primary Argument: There are no moral reasons
1. M ? N
2. ¬N…Therefore, ¬M
3. ¬M (2, 1,MT)
Where M=There are moral reasons and N=Moral reasons are necessarily
provided by moral acts.
Sub-Argument: No actions necessarily provide reasons for carrying them
out.
1. (?x)[Ax ? (¬Ux ? ¬Rx)]
2. (¬Ai ? ¬Ad) ? ¬N
3. Ui ? Rd…Therefore, ¬P
4. Ai ? (¬Ui ? ¬Ri) (1, UI)
5. Ui (3, SIMP)
6. Ui ? Ri (5,ADD)
7. ¬Ai (6, 4,MT)
8. Ad ? (¬Ud ? ¬Rd) (1, UI)
9. Rd (3, SIMP)
10. Rd ? Ud (9,ADD)
11. Ud ? Rd (10,COMM)
12. ¬Ad (11, 8,MT)
13. ¬Ai ? ¬Ad (7, 12,CONJ)
14. ¬N (13, 2,MP)
Where Ax=x is an adequate account of categorical reasons, Ux=x is
universalized in a way which alienates persons, Rx=x collapses into
relativism, N=There are necessary reasons for certain acts, i=An account of
categorical reasons based on idealized observers, and d=An account of
categorical reasons based on desires. |
