What John Boehner's ambition has to do with the shutdown                             	 	
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             					            	    		 			 														By Dick Meyer 				Executive Producer, America, BBC News, Washington
    			 		                     John Boehner, left with Obama, is not  seen as a conservative  ideologue, yet he is following the policy agenda  of his most  ideological members     	
                        On  a very  simple level, the closing of most of the American federal  government  can be pinned on the ambitions of one man, Speaker of the  House John  Boehner.
           There is little doubt that Mr Boehner, a  Republican, could,  whenever he wants, gather enough votes from moderate  Republicans and  most, if not all, Democrats to reopen the government.    
           But conventional wisdom says the Republican caucus would  swiftly dethrone Mr Boehner.  And, interestingly, conventional wisdom and  punditry, in Washington at  least, don't blame Mr Boehner one bit for  holding the government  hostage to his career aspirations. Thus is the  cynicism of this town  today.
           Why he is so attached to sticking with such a  bruising job is  another question. His caucus is balkanised and unruly.  This Congress is  held in the lowest public esteem since the invention  of public opinion  polls. And the Republicans are more disliked than the  Democrats.  
           Once seen as a skilled dealmaker, Mr Boehner isn't able to  make deals.  Never seen as an ideologue, he has now relinquished control  of the  Republican policy agenda to the party's most ideological faction.  
                Newt Gingrich (left) led a government shutdown in the 1990s that eventually proved disastrous to Republicans   
         Where's the fun? To put the question another way: Why can't the  leader of the party in Congress control the party on the most important  issues and votes?
           The answers apply equally to Democrats and Republicans.  A  series of self-inflicted errors by the two political parties over  the  past 40 years have left party leaders with no whip and little  power.
     Half-way reform 	      After Vietnam and Watergate,  there was a reform spirit that  wanted to open and democratise the  process of selecting party candidates  for office, as well as get  special-interest money out of politics.
           The first part worked too well.  Party candidates all came to  be picked through open primary elections.  In the process, the parties  lost the ability to select loyal  candidates in smoke-filled back rooms -  they lost a source of power and  persuasion.
           The campaign finance reforms, however, backfired entirely.   The post-Richard Nixon idea was to stop party bosses from doling out   money from local moguls, unions and corporations. Instead, the reforms   deformed and opened the spigots for money to flow directly to candidates   from all the old sources, bypassing the party machines. The quantities   of money have grown to gargantuan proportions.
           By the 1980s, politicians were essentially free agents. They   didn't need the parties to get nominated or to fund campaigns.   Pollsters, advertising wizards and fundraisers replaced the party   bosses. And the party leaders in Congress lost their leverage.
      Incumbent power 	      At the same time, computers and marketing data  gave political  professionals new precision in drawing the map of  congressional  districts. Individual districts have become much more  homogenous -  overwhelmingly Democratic or Republican. It has never  been easy to  unseat an incumbent. But now, once candidates of the  dominant party in  these gerrymandered districts get the nomination,  they are home free.
           So members of the Congress,  especially in the House, mostly  have safe seats and are immune from  challenges by the other party. Their  bigger challenges come from within  their own parties and that tends to  drive them further right or left.  Voting patterns are as partisan now as  at any time since after the  Civil War.
           All that means the House is filled with  increasingly  ideological members who aren't especially worried about  re-election and  are impervious to the party whip and discipline. 
           It is legislative chaos. 
         	                 John Boehner carries an extra burden as a Republican. 
           From 1949 to 1995, the Democrats controlled the House except  for two years in the 1950s.  That is a long time to be in the political  wilderness, with the  Republicans effectively shut out of governing and  legislative power.  They developed a sort of frustrated minority party  mentality, locked  out of power and able only to toss bombs, make  mischief and obstruct.
           Since  the 1920s, Republicans have controlled the White House,  Senate and  House of Representatives at the same time only during parts  of George W  Bush's two terms. So modern House  Republicans have had  virtually no experience actually sharing the  responsibility of  governing. Their minority mentality lingers. And it  shows.
           Republicans were led back to power in the  House in 1995 by  one of the most mischievous, incendiary party leaders  ever, Newt  Gingrich. He led the way to a government shutdown that year  that was  considered disastrous to Republicans.  
           But  the Gingrich confrontation now seems far more rational  than the  Boehner shutdown. First off, back then Republicans also  controlled the  Senate and so had more leverage with the Democratic White  House.
            And Mr Gingrich's Republicans were pushing for a broad set of   coherent conservative changes to the budget. There were realistic   grounds for negotiation. 
           Mr Boehner's Republicans are  pushing to repeal a sitting  president's hallmark achievement a year  after he was re-elected. There  is no room for negotiation and no chance  of success. It is purely a  stunt, an act of guerrilla theatre.
      In effect a third party has formed in Congress to the right of the Republican Party. 
            This has forced Mr Boehner to operate more like the tolerant   head of a coalition government than an iron-fisted speaker of a past   era, who could make or break a politician's career at will. 
      	 		 Read more: The Congressional 'suicide caucus' 	       Mr  Boehner was part of the House  Republican leadership under Mr Gingrich.  He was ousted in 1998, survived  and was resurrected as party leader  years later. One might have thought  he had learned some strategic  lessons from all that.
           It would have been great  sport to watch if Mr Boehner had  decided to gamble this time and take  on so-called "wacko bird"  conservatives. If he put together a coalition  of more mainstream  Republicans and Democrats, there would have been a  classic intra-party  feud, but there would not have been a shutdown.  
            It isn't written in stone that Mr Boehner would have lost his   speakership after that battle. Perhaps a victory could have shifted the   paralytic partisanship in the House today.  
           Ironically,  chances are high Mr Boehner will have to cave  eventually and team up  with Democrats to avoid an economically  irresponsible - and politically  lethal - default on government debt  obligations.  
           That will probably save his job, but it certainly won't make his job any more fun.
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