China bargains with Indian territory
By Namrata Goswami
Rise and acquisition in power is followed by a desire to acquire prestige. This trajectory gets further enhanced when there is a territorial dispute between major powers. The rise of China and India as major powers within Asian geopolitics is shifting the dynamics of their bilateral relationship. In the current visit by Chinese President, Xi Jinping to India, China and India have India, reduce trade imbalance, and build a high-speed rail corridor, among other things. Significantly, Xi Jinping pledged to support India's full membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Yet, despite this convergence, the meeting has been tarnished by border transgressions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the Indian state of Ladakh.
In the latest border developments in Ladakh, there have been two major confrontations in Demchok and Chumar. Indian civilian workers have been stopped from constructing a Indian government-approved water canal in Demchok by a large number of "Chinese civilians" who have been especially deposited near the LAC in military trucks and camping out in the area in tents to keep vigil. In Chumar, China's military are building roads to the LAC with heavy machinery and large workforce in violation of the border agreements with India. The People's Liberation Army escalated tensions by surrounding Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) personnel in the area, after which they called a local commanders' flag meeting. In earlier incidents, the Chinese military patrols have tailed Indian border police parties in gross violation of the Border Defense Co-operation Agreement signed by the two countries recently.
While the patrol party face-offs between the two sides are consequences of an undemarcated boundary, what is of note are the spurts of border aggressive posturing of China timed just around the visits and meetings of high profile Chinese leaders, in this case the Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting India. Last year, intensive Chinese intrusions had occurred in Ladakh with PLA soldiers setting up tents on the India side of the LAC just before Chinese premier, Li Keqiang's visit to India. In 2006, just before another impending top leader's visit (Hu Jintao), the resident Chinese ambassador to India claimed in New Delhi that the "whole of what you call the state of Arunachal Pradesh is Chinese territory".
Certain analysts theorize that Chinese intrusions and incidents are the actions of rogue local military commanders acting in isolation: sounds far-fetched when in this case in point, the head of the Chinese military (read Xi Jinping) is himself calling on India. These are well planned and orchestrated tactics to pressurize and garner points at the table, a fact which speaks volumes of China's intentions to honor earlier good conduct border agreements.
China insists on linking economic ties and security issues, while India wants to delink the two areas of co-operation. Xi has pledged investments worth US $20 billion in the next five years in India. It would be interesting to watch how China's economic investment flow in India plays out in the future, given the ongoing security issues between the two countries. China's aggressive posturing to pursue its "expansionist" goals at the disputed border is a prime example among other strategic theaters, which is certainly not promoting regional security let alone working towards striking a strategic partnership with India. Several potential areas of co-operation may fall prey to such an adversarial environment such as China's proposals to India for the Maritime Silk Road and the Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar (BCIM) economic corridor
India may be motivated to respond vigorously in kind to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity both militarily and geopolitically. Some indications of these policies can be inferred from President Pranab Mukherjee's visit to Vietnam and signing agreements in defense co-operation and off-shore oil exploration in the South China Sea, disputed and claimed by China as its territory. China is in a regional 'power' contest with the US in the East China Sea, the South China Sea and beyond the first island chain of the Pacific Ocean in the aftermath of the US "Asia pivot" push. That said the timing and location of the current ongoing Indo-US joint military exercises "Yudh Abhyas 2014" at the Himalayan foothills will not be lost to Chinese observers. [1] A strategic partnership with the US is on the table for Prime Minister's Narendra Modi's summit with President Barrack Obama.
The situation, as its stands today at the LAC, has come full circle. In the first place, China signals aggressive intent with regard to its position on the LAC and Ladakh. It also lays claim to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh and has been upgrading its military presence in Tibet. As a counter-response, India upgrades its military infrastructure in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh to deter plausible Chinese aggression. China views the Indian military upgrade as a response to China's rise in Asia forgetting that its own aggressive posture and military upgrade since 2006 has provoked the Indian response. Amidst this scrimmage, China interprets the US-India strategic partnership as a move to contain China. The consequence of all this is a classic "security dilemma" requiring deft handling as any wrong signaling of intent or offensive military posture from either side could lead to conflict escalation.
The India-China territorial dispute, pending resolution for decades together, is not an intractable issue. It can be resolved. It is in India's interest to address China's security concerns to enable steady and greater Chinese investments over time. It is for China to initiate rolling back coercive military maneuvers and intimidated geopolitics to allow enough strategic space for all stakeholders to establish a win-win security environment in the region.
Dr Namrata Goswami is Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi and a former Senior Fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are solely that of the author.
(Copyright 2014 Namrata Goswami) |
