CJ, from the NYTimes so you won't question the source of the facts (though you'll undoubtedly spend a ton of time trying to spin them) ...
Future Risks of an Iran Nuclear Deal
Accessing Nuclear Sites
While the accord calls for regular inspections at Iran’s nuclear sites, the enforcement is of limited duration. For example, while the I.A.E.A. can request access to all declared nuclear sites under the agreements it has with all member states, the far more intrusive monitoring at Iran’s main nuclear enrichment site at Natanz is not mandated after 15 years. At that point, Iran also would be free to carry out nuclear enrichment at other locations.
But the issue that has garnered the most attention is a “24-day” rule for resolving disputes if Iran refuses to give inspectors access to a suspicious site — another measure that expires after 15 years. (After that, inspectors can still demand to enter sites, but under the existing rules, which do not set a deadline for compliance.) Critics say that is far different from “anywhere, anytime” access — a phrase Mr. Moniz and others in the administration used a few months ago, and have come to regret.
If Iran balks at an inspection, then a commission — which includes Iran — can decide on punitive steps, including a reimposition of economic sanctions. A majority vote of the commission suffices, so even if Iran, China and Russia objected, the sanctions could go into effect.
That is the theory. In practice, reimposing sanctions could be politically challenging. Iran has warned that if sanctions are reimposed it will no longer be bound by the accord. The I.A.E.A., perhaps fearing its inspectors would be kicked out, might hesitate to start the 24-day clock.
Mr. Moniz argues that the 24-day time frame is sufficient because Iran will not be able to cover up evidence of nuclear work during that period, since traces of nuclear materials could be expected well after three weeks. But some experts say that Iran could cover up smaller-scale illicit activities, including work on the specialized high-explosives that might serve as a trigger in a nuclear bomb. |
