How highly were Trump's generals (Mattis, Kelly, McMaster, Flynn) thought of by high ranking military leaders in previous administrations?
Joe Willmore
Mixed bag. Flynn was a highly regarded chief of staff for Stan McChrystal in Iraq. He screwed up badly in Afghanistan and twice committed huge security breaches that had the CIA calling for his head. That’s why a lot of people in the know in the intelligence community just shake their head about some of the Trump Administration comments on leaks and security. First, Flynn gave a briefing to allies where he revealed on a ppt presentation all of the covert CIA ops in the area. CIA was livid over this and even the allies in the room were like “woah—should we be talking about this stuff?” Then in a meeting with Pakistani officials, he revealed the names and covers of a range of CIA assets (i.e.: spies) from Pakistan working for the US Intelligence Community. Given that the Pakistani ISI was rumored to have been helping UBL in hiding, this is just mind-blowing. The Obama administration made the big mistake of cutting him some slack, figuring that the screwup in Afghanistan and then the two security messes should not ruin his career. He was appointed head of the DIA where he was an even bigger train wreck…running a divisive ship, issuing memos that female employees should not wear pant suits and always wear makeup so they’d look attractive and proving that he’d been promoted to his level of incompetence. A range of people who have no affiliation with the democratic party (like Colin Powell) have noted that Flynn was a cluster*ck at DIA.
McMaster was highly regarded in the Army primarily for two reasons. First, he was the creator (in concept) of what the “Surge” came to be in Iraq. Petreaus took his work, built on it and sold it as the “surge.” Americans think of the surge as being an increase in US troops. That really wasn’t it. Yeah, we increased troops in Iraq during that period as part of an effort to “hold” and provide security. But the really critical parts were about draining the swamp (with programs like “Arise” and “Sons of Iraq” where we gave money, uniform, and weapons to insurgents to get them out of the fight) and the special ops fight (led by Stan McChrystal and assisted by Flynn). Also McMaster wrote a brilliant academic publication about the failure of military leaders to call out the President during Vietnam and the refusal to confront him. He argued that the military had an obligation to speak truth to power when that power was the civilian command authority. There is a certain amount of irony now given his existing role.
Kelly was well-regarded. That he had a son serving in a line unit earned him credibility with troops…just as employees often feel the CEO isn’t credible, line troops often view senior commanders with a little disdain (even some of Patton’s troops often referred to his nickname with “Our blood and his guts!”). I do not by any means want to disparage his service—he has serviced with honor in a range of different roles including combat commands. However, I never heard anything about how he had a unique or insightful role tactically or strategically, or how any of his combat actions were especially outstanding. I’ve never seen anything about him or his work that indicates he’s especially understanding of counter-insurgency warfare or doctrine (as opposed to McMaster, Patreaus, McCrystal). In short, he’s a good senior commander who has led units in combat, is a Gold Star family, and career military. Until his involvement in politics, I’m not aware of anything (other than losing a son in combat) that was notable about his career in terms of strategy or tactics or success.
Mattis has an excellent reputation (for a number of reasons). The public knows him as “Mad Dog” Mattis and he was known for meeting with line units and junior troops to utter comments about their mission like “if you fuck with me, I’ll kill you all” and “be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everyone you meet.” But the real nickname he has that the public isn’t aware of is that is more apropos is “the Warrior Monk.” He’s a student, reads a lot, reflects on the nature of warfare, and is a bit of an ascetic. He’s a smart guy and willing to learn from others. He’s very thoughtful. He’s not the guy you’d invite to a party. But he’s absolutely the guy who’d love to have a conversation comparing Genghis Khan’s tactics to Van Manstein’s. Or about the nature of being a warrior. He is very willing to tell people in power they’re wrong (for instance, he told Trump that about torture). He was highly regarded by Marines b/c he was up for Commandant of the Corps and the guy chosen instead of him was an aviator (i.e.: not a grunt or ground pounder which instantly made Mattis more popular with other Marines as the “preferred choice.”) My concern about Mattis is that while I’d love to have him with me in a fight in an alley and he’s led Marines in to some ugly fights with extreme levels of violence, I see nothing about him that illustrates he’s got a good understanding of counter-insurgency war fighting. For instance, one of the things he pushed for (allowing troops in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan to engage superior firepower like artillery and airstrikes on their own authority) is popular with troops but dumb as a counter-insurgency tactic. It produces more civilian casualties (and they are up in the Trump administration), it encourages fighting from a distance (which is not how you defeat an insurgency), and is a “conventional” approach to a war that demands an unconventional approach. Patreaus understood that. So did McChrystal. McMaster does too at least some extent. |
